Comprehensive Description and Analysis

of the

Cayoosh/Melvin Creek

Four Season Resort Development

Environmental Impact Assessment

Table of Contents

Introduction. 1

History. 3

CASP Cheapens EA.. 8

Assumptions, Science and Politics. 10

Battle of the Experts. 13

Scope, Cumulative Effects, and Sustainability. 14

Colonialism Alive and Well in BC.. 16

Conclusions. 19

Appendix. 21

A) Time line of Project 21

B) Grizzly Bear Distribution. 23

C) Mountain Goat Distribution. 24

Comprehensive Description and Analysis of the Cayoosh/Melvin Creek Four Season Resort Development Environmental Impact Assessment

 

Introduction

 

Located 20 km south west of Lillooet, BC, in the Cayoosh Mountain Range, is a hanging valley that drains into Melvin Creek.  This valley gently slopes from 1675 meters to 1500 meters and is protected from prevailing winds by surrounding peaks and ridges that rise to 2400 meters.  The area is situated in the rain shadow of BC’s coast mountain range and hence receives ample sunshine and low fog.  Its elevation ensures generous dry snowfall.  To alpine ski enthusiasts this description equates to some of the best skiing on the planet and due to the efforts of Al Raine and Nancy Green of NGR Resort Consultants (NGR) and the British Columbia Environmental Impact Assessment Office (EAO), some 12,000 to 27,900 alpine ski enthusiasts may soon be able to experience this wonderful ski terrain daily.

However, there are a couple of major obstacles to this proposal.  The first being that skiers are not presently using this hanging valley for the same reason another user group -wildlife- is: there are no roads in this wilderness area.  Grizzly bears and mountain goats (two ‘umbrella species’) utilize this area regularly and both have a propensity to disappear when humans invade their habitat to the extent proposed by NGR.  Another long-term user group in this area is the Stl’atl’imx (pronounced 'Statlium') First Nation.  The proposed resort site is in traditional Stl’atl’imx territory and they have opposed NGR’s development plans from the beginning.  They have given neither the province nor NGR resources the right to develop this resort on their territory.  In a letter to British Columbia Premier, Ujjal Dosanjh, Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs president Stewart Phillip stated the “St'at'imc [1]Elders and Chiefs say there is no question that this project would destroy the critical wildlife habitat of endangered species and cause severe hardship for the St'at'imc people who continue to use this area for traditional activities.”[2]

Undoubtedly, a project of such size in a roadless wilderness area will have ecological and social impacts.  The purpose of Environmental Assessment (EA) is to identify such impacts, determine if the impacts are mitigable, and ascertain if the benefits outweigh the ecological, social, and economic costs of the development.  Ray Crook, the chairperson of the BC EAO’s Melvin Creek/Cayoosh project committee (henceforth referred to as ‘the Committee’), had to direct the Committee towards this goal.  NGR had to prove positive its belief that the project’s benefits outweigh its costs.  And finally, the Minister of Environment, Lands and Parks (heretofore ‘the Minister’), Joan Sawicki, and the Minister of Employment and Investment, (heretofore ‘the Responsible Minister’) Gordon Wilson, had to make a decision based on the information gathered by the Committee, as to whether the project met these criteria.  The Minister’s granting of a project approval certificate to NGR on August 14, 2000 points to the above parties’ belief that the ecological impacts are mitigable and, unfortunately, as will be demonstrated, that the St’at’imc Nation’s dissent and concerns would simply go away.  The purpose of this document is to critically analyze the Melvin Creek/Cayoosh resort development EA process and the Minister’s decision.

History

Though the history of this project can be reviewed in Appendix A, it is pertinent to expand on some key points in the project’s time line.  The project’s wheels began to spin on January 10, 1990 when the Kamloops Regional Crown Lands office requested that the Burnaby Regional Crown Lands office reserve the area in order to study the viability of a commercial alpine ski development.  On August 29, 1990, the Ministry of Kamloops Crown Lands Regional office’s Marketing and Development Section requested referrals from various ministries[3] for a Land Act Section 13[4].  Two days later the Kamloops Ministry of Environment office responded with the following memo, stating that they are “…utterly opposed to the use proposed for this area because of the habitat importance for mountain goats, grizzly and other alpine fauna.  This area is amongst the best goat habitat in the southern interior.  Ski development would eliminate such use and force survivors into less suitable habitat."[5]  This Ministry is quite concerned about wildlife values being undermined in the area and previously expressed concern with regards to logging plans for the area in 1989 and 1990.  No other provincial ministry is in opposition to this proposed development.

Though the primary concern for this development deals with First Nation rights and wildlife conservation issues, between 1990 and 1993 only a small percentage of letters and memos circulating between various ministries and NGR mention the wildlife issues and even less mention First Nation issues.  A Province of B.C. news release dated February 27, 1992, informed the public that NGR was granted the right to conduct a three-year feasibility study for a ski resort in the area.  This study was to take into consideration “environmental, aboriginal, water quality, wildlife, archaeological and recreational issues related to Cayoosh Creek.”[6]  In fact, the only mention of First Nation issues from the proponent is a couple of requests in October 1992 for the provincial government to “…enter into an interim agreement with regional aboriginal peoples as part of the land claims negotiations which are now underway.”[7]  However, on August 20, 1993, a memo was sent from the Land Policy office, Victoria, to the Ministry of Lands claiming that the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs “is apparently continuing to receive calls from the Stel'atl'imx (Lillooet Tribal Council) expressing strong concerns about the lack of consultation with them on (the Melvin Creek/Cayoosh) sale and development."[8]

Also of key interest in this time line is that in 1991, David A. Hughes & Associates were commissioned by BC Lands to review pricing and tenure policies within the Commercial Alpine Ski Policy (CASP).  NGR was adamant that its proposal be tied to the existing policy or it threatened withdrawal.  This is important because under the existing policy (authored by Al Raine of NGR while he served as Provincial Ski Coordinator from 1975 to 1980) the value of the land acquisition would be considerably less than after policy reform.  Securing an interim agreement with First Nations under the existing policy would be considerably cheaper, as NGR proposes to pay First Nations the same rent the Province would for the land use.  The following letter, dated October 12, 1992 from Al Raine to Ministers John Cashore, David Zirnhelt, and Darlene Marzari, attest to this.  "We have indicated from the beginning that our proposal must be based on the same ski policy terms that guided the agreements with the existing operators.  We are not asking for anything better, however should the policy be made more restrictive, we would not continue.  The government should not be afraid to answer any critics with an explanation that the land values are based on the fair market value at the time the project began and that due to the investment of risk capital, good planning and management, these values have substantially increased.  The land could have been sold at the time the project began...  We understand that the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs can enter into interim agreements with bands and we would request that our project be referred to the appropriate government officials to move in this direction."[9]

According to the Kamloops Crown Lands office, the project was not economically feasible under the new CASP guidelines (nor was it feasible under the old guidelines).  The cost of accessing the proposed area was estimated at the time to be roughly $18 million (and has since jumped to $30 million) not including servicing costs.  NGR proposed that it be granted a land price of $200/acre for the base development.  The new CASP guidelines call for $5000/acre[10].  NGR forecasts state that 75% of all infrastructure costs and 50% of road costs are to be recovered from real estate revenue.  BC Lands staff found the venture questionable based on these figures.  "Given the $200/acre is an extremely small residual to land in a high risk development, BC Lands staff question the overall viability of the project.  It is felt that this $200/acre rate would also have been inconsistent with the old policy, and would have been grossly inconsistent with the rate charged to other ski hills."[11]

It was at this point in the lifespan of this project that NGR claimed it was giving up on the development due to too much government red tape and adamant opposition from the Kamloops Ministry of Environment office.  The media began to play an active role at this point and on September 15, 1993 the Vancouver Sun’s Nicole Parton ran the article titled “Victoria stymied resort, Raines claim.”  In it, the pro development slant blamed the Harcourt government for the collapse of the development, not questionable economic viability.  Soon after, the provincial government, which has supported the development from its inception, directed then Minister of Employment and Investment, Glen Clark to develop an “in-government facilitator for ski resorts” charged with the task of championing the project inside government.[12]  It is pertinent to point out here that the government has gone to the extent of creating a position that will facilitate this development process, yet has not had any dialogue with the First Nations in the area.

The BC Environmental Assessment Act was enacted on June 30, 1995, and the Melvin Creek/Cayoosh development triggerred it based on section 53(1)(d) of the Reviewable Projects Regulations: “The construction of a new ski resort development is reviewable where, when completed, the facility will have either:

              I.      a developed base area of 150 hectares or more, including the infrastructure and facilities required at the base of the ski hill or hills to provide accommodation, meals, entertainment, transportation facilities, parking and ancillary services, but not including the ski runs,

           II.      2,000 bed units or more, or

         III.      a maximum rate of liquid waste discharge permitted under the Waste Management Act of 800 m³ or more per day..."[13]

 

NGR’s base area design is less than 150 hectares but will have 14, 186 bed units.  Since CASP was in the process of reviewing the project when the EA Act was enacted, the Ministers (MELP and MEI) signed a Transition Order, which placed the project at the application review stage of the EA process.

At this point, Cabinet removed Melvin Creek from its consideration under the Lillooet Land and Resource Management Plan’s (LRMP) Protected Areas Strategy Study with the excuse that it was going to receive a full EA anyway.[14]  CASP, still an active interest, granted NGR ‘sole proponent’ status in 1996 and NGR submitted its proposal to the EAO.  It underwent two review stages.  The EAO’s backgrounder to the project claims that NGR made “extensive commitments to address key issues raised by government agencies, First Nations and members of the public” prior to the Committee delivering its recommendations to the Ministers.[15]  The most pertinent documentation available with regard to NGR’s “extensive commitments” to First Nations is the claim made by Al Raine that NGR would scrap the entire project if First Nations were opposed to it.  On June 11, 2000, the St'at'imc First Nation Chiefs officially rejected NGR’s proposal, a decision that should not have been a surprise to NGR.  Instead of gracefully “packing his bags” Al Raine’s retort clearly spelled out the gulf between the industrial alpine ski development fraternity and the St'at'imc First Nation’s world views.  He stated: “…I'd pay them the same fees the province would be paid… that could be $500,000 a year… it could be $1 million a year [author’s note: this fee is based on less that the old CASP policy per acre that NGR lobbied so adamantly for!].  It seems irrational to me.  They're hurting themselves a hell of a lot more than they're hurting me."   Instead of packing his bags, Al Raine continued with his application for a project approval certificate.  The EAO granted NGR this certificate on August 14, 2000.

CASP Cheapens EA

During Al Raine’s appointment as Provincial Ski Coordinator, he authored CASP for the purpose of expanding the industrial tourism alpine ski complex in BC.  CASP is a development document that was not designed for the protection of ecological values.  It is a four-step process that begins with an expression of interest for the development of an Alpine ski facility.  The next step is for a proposal call that will result in the successful candidate being declared sole proponent.  The proponent must then conduct a feasibility study providing a comprehensive plan for environmental protection, water, sewage, power transmissions, road access, finance and development. Finally, development of the project can begin if the feasibility study, primarily economic, is favourable.

The CASP preamble clearly displays its policy goals:

“The Commercial Alpine Ski Policy (CASP) is the primary government policy framework for the design, development and regulation of new and existing alpine ski developments on Crown lands in British Columbia. Under CASP, the principle objective is to make additional Crown land available for commercial alpine ski use purposes, and to encourage the private sector to develop skiing facilities to meet provincial employment, revenue and recreation goals.

“It is also government policy to facilitate further ski industry development, given its significant employment and investment impacts, and given also the ability of such resort development to contribute to the transition of British Columbia’s economy from its traditional resource extraction basis to include the more sustainable tourism sector.”[16]

Though the Ministers signed a transition order for EA to replace CASP, what has really occurred is that the EA process has simply been substituted into the CASP process.  CASP granted NGR sole proponent status in 1996 after the EA process took over and the final stages of CASP were expected to reactivate when the EA was complete.  But considering the inherent pro-development bias within CASP, is it appropriate to combine the two?  The purpose of EA is to:

“(draw) together, in a systematic way, expert qualitative assessment of a project’s environmental effects, and present the results in a way which enables the importance of the predicted effects, and the scope for modifying or mitigating them, to be properly evaluated by the relevant decision-making body before a decision is given.  Environmental assessment techniques can help both developers and public authorities with environmental responsibilities to identify likely effects at an early stage, and thus to improve the quality of both project planning and decision-making.”[17]

 

            How is it that biologists from the Ministry of Environment’s Kamloops office immediately put forth ‘show stopping’ ecological data regarding sensitive goat and grizzly habitat upon discovering of NGR’s goals for the location, but the process staggered on for ten years and finally resulted in the granting of a project approval certificate?  The reason is that political science was given a higher priority than ecological or social science as a result of built-in bias in the CASP.  CASP is more concerned with economics than it is with ecology.  Ironically, this was a large stumbling block to NGR’s development as the road construction and maintenance costs were too high for the project to be feasible, but welfare for the road will be taken care of by lower than cost land leasing by the BC government and the BC Transportation Authority.  CASP can serve a purpose when dealing with development to areas that have already been disturbed and as such will have lower access cost and most likely fewer ecological costs.  But when it is being applied to roadless wilderness areas and is combined for this reason with the EA process, it can, and has in this case, devalued the EA process.

Assumptions, Science and Politics

            The volume of wildlife research that has taken place over the years with regards to this project is enormous.  It is, however, not as varied as it is large.  There are three general conclusions.  First, the one held by the Kamloops Ministry of Environment staff, Wayne P. McCrory[18] and 10 independent bear biologists (who recommended that 40-60% of the area requires protection if the grizzly population is to recover), that the development will impose immitigable cumulative impacts to the resident bear and goat population.  Second, that held by the proponent’s hired biologists, that though there will be impacts they can be mitigated via a bear and goat management plan.  The third view is that held by the independent third parties brought in to sift through the discrepancies of the previous two.  Their conclusion was that impacts can be mitigated conditionally -based on a number of assumptions:

“We assumed that the lifts proposed in the material provided by NGR are the extent of development that will take place in the Melvin Creek drainage and adjacent valleys… We conducted this review assuming that there will be no further expansion of the resort over the Upper Barkley Ridge into the Elliot Creek drainage (Barkley Valley), or over the Elliot or West ridges into the Haylmore or Lost Valley Creek drainages. We also assumed that concerns about higher harvest from increased access and mortality related to poaching and legal harvest will be addressed by MELP”[19]

 

The Ministry of Environment’s Large Carnivore Specialist, Matt Austin also reviewed the documentation and in a report to the Committee stated:

"Based on my review of the documentation it is my opinion that the Melvin Creek/Cayoosh Project, including the mitigative measures that the proponent has committed to implementing, has the potential for substantial direct and cumulative impacts to the Stein-Nahatlatch grizzly bear population and to the potential to recover this threatened population in the future.  I believe, however, that these impacts could be substantially addressed through a number of additional mitigative measures and, provided that a comprehensive mitigation package was implemented, may result in no net impact to the population."[20]

 

This MOE report acknowledges that this project will negatively impact the grizzly population in Melvin Creek but may result in no net loss to the Stein-Nahatlatch population, of which Melvin Creek is a part.  It further goes on to point out that the “the most substantial of the mitigative measures discussed are within the perogative of the provincial government as opposed to that of the proponent.”[21]  Wayne McCrory offered valuable criticism to this report in a letter to the Federal Minister of Environment, David Anderson, on June 12, 2000.[22]  The main mitigative issue the MOE report focuses on is access control.  This position makes the rather large assumption, considering funding cuts and past practices, that backcountry access will be effectively controlled once the road and resort are in place.  That kind of control is quite simply utopic.  The report also fails to address the inevitable increase in mortalities that new and improved highways will have on wildlife.

            The perception the public have of a ski resort compared to resource extraction is that it appears to be greener and more sustainable.  The many documents examined clearly point to the fact that political involvement in this process has been, from the beginning, based on the assumption that it should go forward and that the EA process has been mere placation. Further evidence to this is that the Melvin Creek/Cayoosh Project Committee met only seven times prior to sending their recommendations to the Ministers and a public advisory body was not created.[23]

            Though this process did utilize third party peer review, it did not do so to an adequate extent considering the volumes of documentation and as pointed out above, the reviews positive outcomes are based on major assumptions.  It has been suggested that a trust fund be established that can fund an effective, integrative and comprehensive thorough third party peer review process.[24]

Battle of the Experts

 

“Different users assess expert opinion from different positions.  These involve different interests, and therefore it is inevitable that the credibility of the opinion will be articulated differently.  In certain cases the articulation is as follows:  if the opinion is in accord with the interests, the credibility is high, no matter how it relates to the scientific correctness of the opinion.” [25]

 

            Amidst a sea of diametrically opposed expert opinion with regards to the ability to mitigate the damages this project will have on wildlife in and around Melvin Creek, how did the Minister decide which expert opinion was the best choice?  As all of the biologists who submitted wildlife reports are credible individuals, it is important to look at the content of each report.  The committee granted more credibility to reports that championed the belief that mitigative efforts would be successful.  Considering a community of this size has never been dropped in the middle of a roadless wilderness area that is part of a grizzly bear recovery zone, the faith in mitigation does not seem to follow the precautionary principle.  In this case, third party independent reviews attempted to resolve the professional disputes, with assessments based on assumptions.  These assumptions allowed the Committee to provide the Minister with a favourable review, creating a climate that would make it easy to justify the Minister’s decision.  Many documents attained by SPEC’s Freedom Of Information request demonstrate the desire for a green development light by the Ministers.  An example, is a letter dated December 1, 1998 from Pat Shera, B.C. Environment Project Review Manager, Victoria to the Kamloops Ministry of Environment staff involved which states:  "…[the] Cayoosh review is anticipated to resume early in the new year.  I am advised that there is going to be considerable pressure on us to review and resolve all issues to benefit of the applicant.  I will continue to insist that our input to the review be strictly professional and ‘by the book’ and require that all conclusions presented by reviewers represent appropriate a science-based decision based on appropriate legislation, policy or standard practices. You and your program managers will be the determinants of those policies or practices.”

Scope, Cumulative Effects, and Sustainability

The Cumulative Effects Assessment (CEA) for this project with regards to wildlife is very weak and Wayne McCrory has eloquently addressed this to the Committee and the Federal Government CEA officials.[26]  The ecosystem fragmentation will have a major negative impact on the region’s existing large carnivore and mountain goat populations.  The proponent’s EA merely documented presence in the development area and did nothing more than follow precedence with regards to its wildlife studies[27].  Considering the novelty of this development and the availability of baseline and comparative data (i.e. road density data impacts on wildlife in similar habitat), which could have been utilized, the proponent’s cumulative impact assessment is inadequate.

Comparing the cumulative impacts of alternative uses to the area was also weak or missing all together.  The project is expected to hit build out 20-25 years after its start date.  The impacts during construction plus use of the facility will be quite large.  Following build out, the project is expected to run at full capacity for as long as there is an international jet set willing to pay to ski here.  This project will permanently remove a diverse wildland habitat and travel corridor from the ecosystem.  If the area is left alone, St’at’imc traditional use can continue (with less of an impact than Ainsworth’s logging plans, which is a parallel front the St’at’imc are also battling), the guide outfitter currently working the valley can pass that license on to future guide outfitters, and a public that values nature’s intrinsic value will appreciate the knowledge that there is a pristine hanging valley being utilized by wildlife indefinitely.  That said, with our propensity for profit, the obscurity of nature’s intrinsic value, and a general backlash in the province against ‘greens’ pulling yet another valley out of the economic growth pie, it may be difficult to protect this land as wilderness.  However, there are alternative uses with much less ecological impacts that are far more sustainable than a mega ski resort.  For example, temporary disturbances with sound logging practices can maintain a diverse wildland for perpetuity.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of this EA, and cause to many of its flaws, is that its scope is severely limited.  Little concern has been directed towards the fact that this development is catering to the international jet set and that the impacts both regionally and globally will be significant.  If the EAO is going to take its claim to be working towards sustainable development seriously, then it must consider the consequences of a fossil fuel driven transportation sector.  Directly related to this topic, a ski resort’s EA must also take into account global warming.  A recent study conducted on destination ski resorts in the Swiss Alps came to some rather shocking conclusions.  Global warming has severely impacted lower elevation ski resorts, which in turn have caused an increase in higher elevation ski resort traffic.  Computer modeling has showed that if temperature trends continue entire lower elevation mountainous regions will lose their ski industries all together.[28]

Colonialism Alive and Well in BC

 

“One thing that has to be made clear and understood when reviewing the Project Committee's report – is that the Project Committee and NGR Resort Consultants Inc. (NGR) do not speak for the Stl'atl'imx nor the Non-Natives who are opposed to this project.  Xaxli'p always maintained that any meetings held with NGR or representatives of government regarding the proposed ski resort was not to be construed as consultation.  The provincial government's "British Columbia Consultation Guidelines," is a contentious issue with First Nations, our view of consultation and governments' (industry and corporations included), differ – no meaningful consultation took place throughout this process.  Also the Supreme Court of Canada Delgamuukw Decision of December 1997 stated that if there is going to be any infringement on Aboriginal title, consent must be given by the First Nation.  We did not give consent for NGR to infringe on our title and rights.”

Chief Arthur Adolph, Xaxl'ip First Nation[29]

It is mandated in the Environmental Assessment Act that issues raised by aboriginal people are addressed and that they must be enabled to participate in the review process of a project that may impact the exercising of aboriginal rights.[30]  When the EA process was adopted for CASP’s second stage, this placed the Stl’atl’imx First Nation community in a position to be heard.  They certainly were heard, but unfortunately they were not listened to.  As pointed out in the above quote, First Nation’s consultations were being contorted into negotiations.  In light of the Supreme Court’s quashing of the EAO’s project approval certificate granted for the reopening of the Tulsequah Chief Mine[31], a result of actions taken by the Taku Tlingit’s charge that they did not receive adequate consultation, NGR and the EAO are very likely aware that not putting more resources into First Nation consultations was not a very productive strategy.  If their scoping exercises had been more effective from the outset, with regards to respecting First Nations rather than trying to buy their approval (with lower than market-value land rates), the projects non-feasibility would have been obvious enough that it would not have championed the project. The amount of money that has been poured into this project to date (and as such may be a driving force for the poor EA) would not have been wasted.

Though the EA process has allowed for First Nation concerns to be aired to a greater extent than may have occurred under only CASP, the bias involved in this EA process have severely undermined the EAO’s legitimacy.  This EA, with regards to the public participation of First Nations did not meet the minimum requirements for an effective EA.  It should be recognized by EAO staff that just meeting the bare requirements alone is not good enough for a successful EA today.

“Public participation can be more than a requirement to fulfill on the way to project implementation.  …a proactive, rather than reactive, approach can provide benefits for the project proponent, the public and the final plan. We suggest that efforts towards democratic and timely public involvement, developing a suitable and mutually acceptable project, resolving conflicts and establishing co-operative relationships, and collaborative, iterative planning, can improve the process and outcome of environmental decision making.[32]

The EAO and NGR certainly did not follow the wisdom of the above quote and instead have offered placation to First Nations.  They failed to recognizing the difficult position First Nations are in with regards to negotiating land agreements with ski resort developers while treaty talks are under way, the EAO has construed invitations to attend meetings as consultation.  The dialogue and events between concerned First Nations and the Ministers (a small sample follows), displays the gulf between these parties’ worldviews and their wishes for the valley in question.

“We reiterate the words of our Ancestors in the Declaration of the Lillooet Tribe (May 10, 1911): "We are the rightful owners of our tribal territory and everything pertaining thereto.  These lands have been continually occupied by us from time out of mind". On June 11, 2000, a meeting was held by the St’at’imc People in which clear direction was provided to reject the ski resort proposal in the Melvin Creek drainage as put forth by NGR Resort Consultants Inc.  Resource and land use decisions within our territory are to be determined by St’at’imc law.”

Chief Garry John, St’at’imc Chiefs Council

 

"The Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs is in full support of the St'at'imc Nation in their fight to protect their land and resources.”

 

A referendum by the Mt. Currie Band of the Lil'wat First Nation overwhelmingly rejected the development.  Eighty three percent of band members voted no to the proposal…

 

“…the Assembly of First Nations supports the St'at'imc Nation's exercise of their traditional authority in the area of Melvin Creek.  We understand that this is an important alpine ecosystem to St'at'imc culture, as well as, habitat for grizzly bears, mountain goats and other species.  There are already plenty of ski resorts throughout the interior of British Columbia, not to mention the fact that the St'at'imc have already been impacted by ski development at Whistler."

National Chief, Phil Fontain

 

The reasons for the Minister’s response do not equate with documented First Nation Concerns.  These are noted below:

1. “All measures relating to the distribution of information specified by the project committee about the Project have been carried out by the Proponent and there has been adequate consultation by the Proponent and the Environmental Assessment Office with both the public and First Nations whose traditional territory includes the site of, or is in the vicinity of the project (potentially affected First Nations).

2. Issues and concerns identified by the public were duly considered by the project committee, and the Committee Report identified these issues and documented how they would be addressed.

3. Invitations to participate on the project committee were extended to potentially affected First Nations. Although these invitations were declined, First Nations involvement in the review of the Project was achieved by:

• holding meetings between First Nations, government staff and the Proponent to discuss First Nations issues;

• providing First Nations with the opportunity to review and comment on key documentation produced for the review process, including the application and project report, and drafts of the Committee Report;

• undertaking studies particular to First Nations; and

• the project committee responding, in a June 9, 2000 report, to First Nations studies.

8.      Issues and concerns of potentially affected First Nations, including not only cultural and heritage effects, but also economic, social, health and environmental effects, were duly considered by the project committee, and the Committee Report clearly identified these issues and documented how they were addressed.

9. Information provided by the Mount Currie First Nation, including its letter of August 1, 2000 and the enclosed St’at’imc Reply Reports, was fully considered in the context of the purposes of the Act and the advice and assessment provided in the Committee Report.

10. Based on information generated through First Nations involvement in the project review, including studies, First Nations comments and responses, inter-agency comments, and discussions with First Nations, it would not appear that aboriginal interests asserted with respect to Melvin Creek valley would be unjustifiably interfered with by the project.” [33]

Placations and excuses are quite simply not an acceptable form of public consultation.  The Minister’s reasons are disgraceful in light of ongoing First Nation issues in the area.

Conclusions

There are two major flaws in this EA:  First of all, initial scoping exercises were not sufficient.  This process from the beginning required a unique and innovative exercise in scoping.  It received neither and as a result utilized standard process and produced a substandard outcome and document.  Secondly, the above placations and excuses point to the grandest flaw of all, that is, the provincial government’s inherent pro-development bias built into the process through CASP.  This is evidenced in the Committee’s acceptance of a private, proponent-funded (and therefore biased) wildlife impacts report over those of its own publicly-funded wildlife impact reports.  The components in this case quite simply do not add up to the granting of a project approval certificate to NGR and in doing so, the EAO has drastically impaired the EAO‘s legitimacy.

Appendix

 

A) Time line of Project

Ø      January 10, 1990, Kamloops Regional Crown Lands requests Burnaby Regional Crown Lands office reserve the north eastern Barkley Creek area in order to study the viability of a commercial alpine ski development associated with Melvin Creek.

Ø      March 31, 1990, Whistler-Pemperton Commercial Backcountry Recreation Opportunities Study completed.  A prime concern is the negative impact on mountain goats caused by mechanized skiing.

Ø      August 29, 1990, Land Act Section 13 (controlled recreation area reserve for investigation of commercial alpine ski development) by Ministry of Kamloops Crown Lands Regional office.

Ø      August 31, 1990, Kamloops Ministry of Environment strongly opposes Section 13 do to wildlife values in the area, primarily goat and grizzly bear.

Ø      1991- Commercial Alpine Ski Policy (CASP) process begins

Ø      January 23, 1991, Section 13 Land Act Reserve for Melvin Creek watershed granted.

Ø      October 7, 1991, Kamloops Crown Lands recommend the proposal call be awarded to NGR Resort Consultants Inc.

Ø      September 1, 1993, NGR reports to Crown Lands, Victoria of their intention to abandon feasibility studies due to a lack of interest and commitment from government; unsettled aboriginal land claim issues, environmental issues; and concern for the future state of the economy.  They may reconsider if government appoints a ski area development facilitator to advocate for and assist prospective developers.

Ø      Election and much process, lobbying, and bureaucratic change...

Ø      May 31, 1994 B.C. Investment Office directed to advocate for ski-industry projects.

Ø      June 30, 1995, Enactment of the Environmental Assessment Act

Ø      April 27, 1996 NGR granted ‘sole proponent’ status under the auspices of CASP and CASP process formally concludes its first stage.  The second stage, that of project review and EA functions, is met through the EA process.

Ø      On November 7, 1996, NGR Resort Consultants Inc. (the proponent) submitted an application (the application) for a project approval certificate for the Melvin Creek/Cayoosh Project (the project) under the environmental assessment process

Ø      March 17, 1997, the project committee ordered that the project undergo further review.

Ø      July 9, 1999, the proponent submitted a project report in support of the application for a project approval certificate.

Ø      October 12, 1999 the public comment period of 60 days (legislated) ends.

Ø      In order to ensure that there was adequate time for studies to be commissioned by First Nations,

Ø      December 21, 1999 the original time limit of 70 days following conclusion of the public comment period is extended by 101 days, to March 31, 2000.  This date was then extended till May 17, 2000 to allow time for the project committee to complete its assessment of the cumulative effects of the project on grizzly bear populations and habitats.

Ø      February 29, 2000 Melvin Creek/Cayoosh Project –Independent Third-Party Consultant Report on Mountain Goat Issues submitted.

Ø      March 28, 2000, the reports on the studies commissioned by First Nations were submitted to the Environmental Assessment Office

Ø      March 29, 2000, Minister accepts the recommendation of the Executive Director for additional time to complete the project committee recommendations report and referral to ministers, in order that

Ø      May 8, 2000, proponent supports a time limit extension proposed by the project committee in order to assess the cumulative effects of the project on grizzly bear population and habitat and to review and respond to St’at’imc Nation’s studies of the projects impacts.

Ø      May 9, 2000 the Minister orders that the time limit of 70 days, having already been extended by 148 days, be extended by a further 44 days, and the deadline for the completion of the project committee recommendations report and referral to ministers is June 30, 2000.

Ø      June 30, 2000, Report and Recommendations of the Project Committee

Ø      August 14, 2000, the Minister of Environment, Lands and Parks and the Minister of Employment and Investment granted a project approval certificate to NGR for development of the Melvin Creek/Cayoosh mountain resort project. While the environmental assessment process is complete, other steps are required before development begins, including the completion of a ski area master plan and master development agreement required by the province's Commercial Alpine Ski Policy.

 

B) Grizzly Bear Distribution

August 1993 B.C. Wildlife Branch mapping data, on "Grizzly Bear - Distribution and Relative Abundance". The horizontal lines indicate "plentiful" (over 1 grizzly / 65 sq.km); diagonal lines as "moderate" (1 grizzly / 65 - 140 sq.km); shaded areas as "few" (1 grizzly / 140 - 1000 sq.km); and "E" as extirpated. Cayoosh mountains are in the horizontal line zone.

C) Mountain Goat Distribution

March 1988 B.C. Wildlife Branch mapping data, on "Mountain Goat - Distribution and Relative Abundance". The horizontal lines indicate "plentiful" (over 1 goat / 3 sq.km); diagonal lines as "moderate" (1 goat / 3 - 13 sq.km); shaded areas as "few" (1 goat / 13 - 260 sq.km); "stars" indicate rare or occaisional sighting. Cayoosh mountains are in the upper horizontal line zone.