

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Purpose of Study

Pressure group politics, as it is known today, is not a new phenomenon. Interests have forever been served by the efforts of people within political systems. It is, like other forms of politics, concerned with interest, power, and advantage. Pressure groups are formed specifically because their members want to act together to influence public policy. They are generally defined as autonomous organizations which seek, as one of their functions, to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy in order to promote their common interest. Political scientists refer to this phenomenon as pluralism. Pluralism being the establishment of groups all seeking to have their members' preferences reflected in public policy. The role of pressure groups in Canadian society is to represent a multitude of interests; interests that are represented through formal and informal political channels. In spite of the fact that the power and influence of some pressure groups has been seen by some as a threat to opposing interests, most groups play an important role in Canadian democracy.

The purpose of the present research was to identify the resources necessary for an individual or group to influence public policy, to examine how individuals are able to apply these resources in order to influence public policy via pressure groups, and to realize if each of the interests had access to these necessary resources. The research traces a policy decision detailing the events leading up to the policy announcement. The focus, and the interest in pursuing this study, of the research is to address the issue of participation equality in the public policy process by looking specifically at the Clayoquot Land Use

Decision. The Clayoquot Land Use Decision was announced in April of 1993. This policy was the cumulative effort of numerous individuals, agencies, and organizations. In spite of the time and effort invested in this land use decision, it was largely seen as an unsuccessful attempt at consensus-based decision making. It was also seen by many varied interests as a biased policy decision that best reflected the desires of industry interests instead of as a balanced policy representing all relevant interests.

To accomplish the research objectives, findings from the literature were compared with: 1) the results from the case study of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, 2) the results from interviews with participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, and 3) the results from a survey of activists from across Canada.

The Clayoquot Land Use Decision case study identified the following: 1) who the key players were in the decision-making process; 2) whose interests were served in the outcome of the policy decision; and 3) what resources were required by the participants in influencing the policy decision? The first two questions served to detail the policy process, and the third question's results were compared with the results from the literature review, survey and interviews. These three areas of research serve to address the central focus of the thesis - the issue of participation equality in the public policy process in Canada.

The strength of the research was in the application of pressure group theory to activism, followed by the application of these findings to a case study. The results from the

literature review and case study were followed by a survey and interviews. The research results identified who had the greater influence in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision policy process, and the necessary resources required to obtain such a position. The research results also identified what the necessary resources are in order for individuals (activists) to participate more effectively in pressure group activities.

Chapter Two: Methodology

The first part of the research involved undertaking a literature review of both the Canadian environmental policy process and pressure group theory. A review of the literature suggested that there is a need for further study in the area of policy analysis as it applies to the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. More specifically, the review revealed a need for further study into the level of participation by the main interests involved in the policy process. The literature also revealed a void in information pertaining to the influence interests have on the policy process depending on their access to the necessary resources, and the potential outcome if the resources are not made available.

The second part of the research involved a case study. The case study focuses on an area on the west side of Vancouver Island, British Columbia known as Clayoquot Sound (see Appendix - Map). Clayoquot Sound is approximately 350,000 hectares in size consisting mostly of temperate rainforest. Since 1980, Clayoquot Sound has been the focus of intense public debate about land use and resource development (Province 1993a, 1). The debate has led to confrontation, civil disobedience, and economic uncertainty.

The objective of a case study is to highlight specific incidences, individuals, and issues (Yin 1989, 18). The case study was chosen because of the research objective. A case study is meant to draw out the “what” questions in the policy analysis. The case study focused on the Clayoquot Land Use Decision as an example of a public policy. There are several reasons for selecting the Clayoquot Sound forest logging issue, and specifically a moment in time (Clayoquot Land Use Decision - detailed in Chapter Six), for the case

study analyzed in the present work. The logging disputes in Clayoquot Sound have been going on for over two decades, thus providing a selection of pivotal moments from which to choose when studying the development of public policy. Along with selection is the availability of information. There has been a considerable amount of study done on the Clayoquot Sound issue, thus providing ample credible information to a researcher willing to sift through large amounts of data.

To analyze this policy decision Kingdon's and Pross' policy models (see Appendix: Models) were used. These two models were chosen because both were developed to look specifically at the details involved in the development of public policy. These two decision-making models were applied to the case study in order to analyze the development of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (see Section 6.5). Additionally, a range of information sources such as government reports, the news media, and published texts were utilized that looked specifically at the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.

By applying Kingdon's policy model and then Pross' policy model, the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was examined to better understand the policy decision. Kingdon's model provides an overview of the policy process, whereas Pross' model provides greater detail into the policy decision. The steps of the policy process were outlined by first applying Kingdon's model. The results from this first step were then applied to Pross' model to detail further the participants and their role in the policy process, the interaction between the various participants, and the resources identified as essential when participating in the policy process.

In doing the Clayoquot Land Use Decision case study, numerous participants in the policy process were identified (see Appendix: Models - Pross' Policy Communities Model).

These participants were identified in various sources such as newspapers and periodical publications. To delve further into the policy process from a participants perspective, every individual and organization identified (who had a contact number or address) in doing the case study was contacted via fax or electronic mail requesting an interview (Appendix: Letter of Request - Interview). All (a total of four) replies of acceptance were followed-up on, resulting in four separate interviews. The interviews were done using a semi-structured interview methodology by either phone interview or electronic mail. The literature suggests that the use of the semi-structured interview methodology can be an effective approach to data gathering of this nature (Baruah 1998, 67; Fontana & Frey 1994, 361). The semi-structured interview methodology allows interaction between the respondent and the questions asked. This approach allows the respondent to elaborate on any aspect of the area of focus unhindered (Bickman, Rog, & Hendrick 1998, 22).

The questions asked of each of the interview participants were as follows:

- 1) Who do you think the main participants were in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision?
- 2) Identify the interactions/alliances between participants that may have influenced the policy decision.
- 3) Identify the resources that each participant needed in order to influence the policy decision.

4) Based on your response above, outline how you perceive the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was made.

The information provided by the above questions were essential in realizing what occurred in the policy process prior to the announcement of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, from the perspective of the participant. Each of the participants in the interviews were very much involved in the Clayoquot Land Use policy process. Each of the interviewees had the experience to make an informed assessment of the activity leading up to the announcement of the land use decision.

The third part of the research involved a survey of activists from across Canada. This survey was included in the research in order to obtain the opinions of activists - the people in the field. These responses were then compared with the opinions of pressure group theorists - the more academic perspective. Activists were solicited for their input via electronic mail, accessed by using various mailing lists available through organizations such as the Canadian Environmental Network and the Environmental Studies Association of Canada (ESAC). These types of lists were used because they were available, and they provided access to activists from all over Canada. All participants who responded to the general request, and accepted the conditions detailed (Appendix: Letter of Request - Survey), were included in the survey. The final question in the survey asked what they deemed as essential resources in order for activists to accomplish their goals. The survey was conducted as a broader evaluation of the experiences of environmental activists in Canada. From this broad evaluation, the research effort then focused on participation

resources (Appendix- Survey, Question 11). The results from this question were then compared with the pressure group theory literature review to establish an essential list of resources (detailed in Chapter 7). This list of information was then compared with the findings from the case study.

Separate from the goal of the research was a sociodemographic questionnaire (Appendix: Sociodemographic Questionnaire). This questionnaire simply provided a breakdown on details such as gender, age, level of education, occupation, and income (detailed in Chapter Seven). The results from the questionnaire provided a general context of the respondents.

There are certain limitations that are inherent in the methodologies chosen for this research. These limitations are intrinsic to the survey and semi-structured interview. The limitations include the following: existence of researcher biases, the limited generalizability of research results, and the imbalance in the origins of the information examined. Case study limitations also include the actual case chosen to be studied; a case study is time- and situation-specific. These limitations can be addressed in various ways such as in the design of the questions, interviewer skill, and objective reporting of the research results. By noting and accounting for the methodology limitations, the researcher was able to maximize the validity of the study's findings (Yin 1998, 225).

The results from the survey, and the interviews, should be put into context. The responses are from the perspective of each of the participants. These responses should not be seen

as objective, value-free, or quantifiable. The responses are based on the experiences of each of the participants, and as such are subject to some variability. In stating this, the value of each of the respondent's participation in the research results remains valuable to the conclusions drawn. The purpose in stating the above is solely one of clarification.

This concludes the section on methodology. The next section details the environmental policy process in Canada, looking specifically at the various stages of the process and issues regarding the process.

Chapter Three: The Canadian Environmental Policy Process

In its essential features, the Canadian political system has not changed since the nineteenth century. However, the social and economic conditions in Canada, and the agenda of the federal government, have changed dramatically (Lyon 1992, 127). In the early 1990s, during a rise in public concern for the health of the natural environment, Canadian governments struggled to strengthen their institutional and legal capacities to protect the environment. Humans and other species depend on the diversity of complex ecosystems. Growing recognition of this has led to the transition of environmental policy from direct exploitation to an increasing environmental conservation focus (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 3). The policy process is gradually moving towards not only addressing the conditions and amounts of resource use, but also the larger biophysical context in which these activities take place. By the 1990s, the Canadian public perception of a global environmental crisis had had a significant influence on national environmental policy development (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 4).

There were, however, constitutional tensions and legislative uncertainties that raised doubts about whether government was able to attain a policy which would support a sustainable environment (Vanderzwaag 1992, 3). The Canadian Constitution makes no direct reference to the environment, and provides no guarantee of a clean, healthy environment (Vanderzwaag 1992, 4). Canada's Constitution provides no direction as to which level of government oversees environmental responsibility. The sharing of environmental responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments makes the

issue of protection very complex. Each level of government maintains various areas of power which potentially touch on the issue of environmental protection.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was added to the Constitution in 1982. It too lacks the explicit reference to a right to a healthy environment (Vanderzwaag 1992, 16). However, the Charter recognizes the rights of individuals' to life, liberty, and the security of person - except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice (Section 7 of the Charter). As a result, the Charter potentially provides an opening for individuals to contest governmental actions relating to the environment and public health. The breadth of the Charter is limited, however, for it applies only to laws and actions of federal and provincial governments and their public agencies, leaving the private sector largely without liability (Vanderzwaag 1992, 17).

The impact of the Canadian environmental movement on the public consciousness concerning the environmental effects of development has not been matched by equal influence in government policy (Wilson 1992, 110). The direct lobbying attempts of many within the environmental arena to extract firm policy commitments from the various levels of government have met with little success. Participants in favour of strengthened environmental regulations have found that in order to move politicians in the preferred direction, the focus should be on moving public opinion (Wilson 1992, 115).

The first section of this review will focus on the environmental policy process in Canada. First, the actual stages of the environmental policy process will be outlined. The section

to follow delves into the various issues regarding development and implementation of environmental policy in Canada. One will notice that the formal structure of the policy process often does not reflect the actual process; some of the reasons will be detailed.

3.1 The Stages of the Policy Process in Canada

There are five stages of the policy process in Canada as outlined by Hessing & Howlett (1997, 218-225). They are 1) agenda setting, 2) policy formulation, 3) decision-making, 4) policy implementation, and 5) policy evaluation. These steps map out the process through which an interest or objective ultimately becomes an implemented rule or policy. What follows is a discussion of each stage.

1st Stage: Agenda-setting

The agenda-setting stage of policy is the preliminary level. Self-identified and motivated groups or interests lobby governments to include their concerns in the consideration of any given matter. At this stage, ideas and interests are politically defined and judged as either appropriate or not appropriate for policy discussion. Government has the choice to either decline the request or to change the policy agenda. As new information comes to light regarding issues pertaining to the natural environment, it is assumed that interested groups, such as producers, labour, consumers, and health representatives, will bring this knowledge to the attention of policy makers so that the agenda can be modified appropriately.

2nd Stage: Policy Formulation

The formulation of policy involves the collection of general actors and interests into specific groups to articulate potential policy options on the part of these groups. Policy formulation begins with the identification of options by an organized set of interests including production-based business organizations, environmental groups, the media, political parties, and other interest groups.

The collection of actors brought together to articulate potential policy options are referred to as "advisory groups" (Filyk & Cote 1992, 60). Advisory groups share common features such as: all exist to serve government; all are institutionalized organizations; all are funded by, and report to, the government; all show organizational continuity and stable membership for varying periods of time, depending on the mandate; all have knowledge of, and access to, relevant members of the environmental policy community; and all hold distinct mandates, objectives, and operating rules (ibid.). The advisory groups' primary role is to advise: they/it hold little, if any, administrative powers.

3rd Stage: Decision-making

The decision-making stage consists of the production of decisions within formal stages of the policy process, after positions and alternatives have been articulated through the second stage. The Canadian decision-making style reflects the traditional force of productive interests, while other non-economic forces gradually wear away the policy hegemony and impact the decision-making stage.

4th Stage: Policy Implementation

The administrative process of policy development is considered to be equally, if not more, important as the third stage of the policy process. Administrative processes include most of the routine activities through which policy is executed: laws, rules, regulations, and standards. These activities determine how policy is implemented by government agencies.

Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980, 542) have identified a number of variables within this stage of the policy process which act as determinants of implementation. Many of these variables are found to be relevant in designing a response to policy problems. It was found that much depends on the 'tractability of the problem', including factors such as the extent and degree of behaviour change required of the target group. 'Non-statutory variables' that can either facilitate or frustrate implementation of a policy include things such as the degree of media attention, public support, and ties to executive support. As well, the 'statutory underpinning' of the process - including such variables as the clarity of policy directives, financial resources, and the degree of hierarchical integration within and among implementing agencies - is also crucial to the successful implementation of a policy.

The degree of public support clearly has an impact on the level of support allotted to a problem by the members of government dealing with the issue. As well, the response by the executive also has an impact. This in turn will impinge on the strength of policy directives and the hierarchical ordering of implementing agencies (Brown 1992, 24).

Therefore, ambivalence in public attitudes towards the environment, as seen during

downturns in the economy, and the indifference in executive actions translates into ambiguity in policy directives, limited funding, and a peripheral status in government decision-making (Brown 1992a, 40).

5th Stage: Policy Evaluation

Policy evaluation in the environmental sector in Canada has relied to a large extent on formal administrative reviews. As a result, established policy networks continue to exert traditional pressures and the options considered for change tend to be pragmatic considerations about the merits of specific instruments for implementing policy rather than about generalized alternatives to them. The outcome is that the general policy framework tends not to be evaluated. The consequence of this can be the perpetuation of procedures that do not largely address the fundamental issues.

Environmental policy does not end with implementation of policy. Regulation is part of an ongoing policy process, along with evaluation and modification (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 223). However, although modification is part of the policy process following implementation and evaluation, it is often slow in coming and marginal in outcome.

It is clear from the above that new environmental policy emerges in an evolutionary process. The success of this type of process is through the convergence of several interests in the shape of events, authorities, literature, organizational support, and action by various jurisdictions which leads to new public policy (Brown 1992b, 177).

3.2 Issues Regarding the Policy Process in Canada

Canadian environmental policy has been subjected to increasing criticism by the public and by pressure groups concerned with the status of the natural environment due to the inadequacy of existing policy measures (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 7). The shortcoming of existing policy measures is shown in deteriorating environmental conditions and increasing resource scarcity. To date, most policies have been developed without due regard to public interest or ecological concerns (ibid.). As well, special interests, namely business, are given preferential treatment in the policy process. These criticisms of the present policy process have resulted in the legitimizing of many aspects of the existing system of regulation. As well, they have led to demands for new policies and new mechanisms to implement them (ibid.; Stefanick 1996, 230).

In order to address the concerns regarding the present policy process, there is a heightened demand for more public input by the public and various pressure groups throughout Canada. There is also the demand for a review of government responsibility and the legitimacy of public institutions involved in policy development (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 6; Skogstad & Kopas 1992, 43). The review has been hindered due to the complexity and fragmentation of policy issues and jurisdictions; it has also deterred efforts to achieve a comprehensive and unified analysis. The different levels of government, and a range of ministries, administrative arrangements, and statutes, represent a notable barrier to a comprehensive policy analysis (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 7).

Public involvement in the policy process has been driven in large part by the most recent waves of environmental concern generated by the public (Skogstad & Kopas 1992, 49). The late 1960s and early 1970s constituted the first environmental awareness wave in Canada, with the second wave in the late 1980s and early 1990s (ibid.). It was the second wave of concern that has had a notable impact on the policy process in Canada because of the greater role played by environmental groups (Harrison 1996a, 155). This expansion in consultation has had a notable impact on the policy process and its outcomes. Previous to environmental organizations being involved, the absence of public demand for environmental programs, industry's resistance to regulation, and the provinces' protectiveness of their jurisdiction, collectively discouraged federal environmental initiatives (ibid.; Stefanick 1996, 230). However, by the late 1980s, the federal government was increasingly caught between hostile provinces and industry on the one hand, and environmental groups providing an effective voice for growing public concern on the other. As a result, the federal government was forced to resist many provincial and industry demands.

There were, however, many environmental groups suspicious of consultative policy processes. Traditionally, environmental groups operated in the peripheral zones of the policy communities (Wilson 1992, 120). Instead of participating, they would intentionally engage in organizational strategies that were contrary to the status quo (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 123). Direct action and media coverage are perceived by some groups to be more effective vehicles for influencing the policy process than inclusion on various boards, commissions, or tribunals (i.e. groups like Greenpeace, Earth First!, and Friends of

Clayoquot Sound). The use of direct action and media by pressure groups serves to alert and educate the public, who then apply political pressure to influence the policy process (Stefanick 1996, 301).

There are groups, however, that choose to participate in the formal policy-making channels. This route has proven to be no less complicated and difficult than the routes chosen by other groups. Groups and individuals who choose to participate in institutional processes face numerous hurdles in attaining their ends; these hurdles may serve to postpone or divert public attention from the issue (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 124; Stefanick 1996, 244). For example, appointments to consultative bodies are short term, and the results often only provide general direction. As a result, the establishment of a commission may therefore serve to postpone or divert public attention. As well, the goals of environmental groups (public education, land protection and conservation, species protection, etc.) are often found to be too general, diffuse, radical, or philosophical to incorporate into specific policy agendas. Instead, members of environmental groups find themselves co-opted by the terms of reference, the influence of other board members, or the procedures themselves (Stefanick 1996, 235).

There is also often a lack of resources (i.e. money, staff, expertise) to support public involvement in the policy process (Stefanick 1996, 233). There are few Canadian environmental groups that have the resources adequate enough to consult with all of the government officials who play significant roles in the policy process (Wilson 1992, 116).

Finally, the appointed body typically lacks substantive power to implement decisions, thus restricting their impact on the policy process.

The policy process is currently unable to adequately integrate a wide range of environmental interests (Stefanick 1996, 234). Who speaks for what interest? The present discretionary character of practices of public involvement may be inadequate to ensure the inclusion of all interests (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 124). There is yet to be a mechanism for ensuring that a range of environmental perspectives are represented, and their relative importance to the natural environment properly assessed. In light of the barriers within the environmental policy process and to public involvement, these interests, although an increasing force in the policy process, remain secondary to traditional state and industry influences (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 134).

There is a complexity of biophysical processes that complicates the policy process. The predictability of biophysical processes is essential to environmental policy-making in order to attempt to establish sustainable levels of exploitation, and acceptable levels of pollution (Rogers 1997, 3). However, the increasing recognition of the unpredictability of the natural environment undermines this policy goal, thus making the policy process very difficult, if not impossible. In spite of this, policy-making attempts are in progress to link regulatory frameworks that, in the past, have operated separately (i.e. forestry, transportation, urban planning, etc). In doing so, this effort can potentially create an integrated policy that may be able to address the multiple aspects of an issue (Rogers 1997, 3).

This attempt at integrated policy-making is complicated by the wide range of participants all of whom have a stake in the issues. There are considerable increases in the time and resources required to adequately integrate all participants and their interests in the policy process. In spite of the need for policies to be efficiently developed in order to ensure that the policy process is successful, these interests need to be consulted. The challenge is amplified when there is typically a profound difference in the political and economic power of participants, as well as difference in point of view (Rogers 1997, 3). Creating a workable environmental policy will involve contesting these unequal power relations.

3.3 Public Participation and the Policy Process

Public participation, environmental groups included, is required within the policy process from the primary stage to the final stage. Public participation not only requires consultation and interdisciplinary approaches to policy-making, but also a challenge to the interests and power relations that typically generated the perceived environmental problem in the first place. Environmental policy-making needs to address the complexity of the historical policy process if it is to challenge the difficulties in managing and governing the many environmental problems Canada is faced with.

With recent significant changes to the policy process in Canada, and with the accommodation of some public participation, environmental interests have been able to increase their influence. In doing so, there has been an expansion in the scope of issues. In the late 1980s, the scope of consideration in Canadian environmental policy was

dramatically expanded when consultation mechanisms, traditionally limited to federal and provincial governments and regulated industries, were opened up to include environmental groups. Environmental organizations are now able to provide a voice for diffuse public concerns, and to some extent, are able to limit the federal government's ability to substitute symbolism for substance.

Chapter Four: Pressure Group Theory

"...the state's power is not a given thing, it stands in constant need of legitimization. Different political actors take part in this struggle over the limits of the state's legitimacy ... it becomes an extremely important task for political groups to question where [the] authority begins and ends. By challenging the authority of the state ..., political groups seek to construct themselves a powerful position, a position from where they can set [influence] the political agenda." (Hjelmar 1996, 7).

The essence of government in Canada is the struggle of competing interests to persuade decision-makers to frame acceptable public policies (White 1998, 160). Canadians organize in numerous and novel ways to influence the government's decision-making process. Some work through political parties, some prefer to act individually, some hire lobbyists to act for them, while others join groups in order to participate in and enjoy the benefits of collective action (Jackson 1998, 469). A large portion of the Canadian population belongs to some organization or another (i.e. professional organization, labour union, community group, church group) which seek to influence governments (Jackson 1998, 469; White 1998, 160). Large or small, these groups are active in pressing their needs, principles, and desires on other Canadians. When such groups act in the political arena without becoming full-fledged political parties, they are usually referred to as interest groups or pressure groups (Brooks 1993, 72).

Pressure group politics, as it is known today, is not a new phenomena in Canada. The 1960s was a decade of frantic activity in public-policy formation (Pross 1992, 66). The three major movements that influenced the national public sphere during this time were the women's, the environmental and the consumer movements. The groups within these

movements began to demand government attention. As a result, pressure groups became a new political force, surprising the industry-business sectors with their influence on new legislation and regulation.

In spite of the activity of the 1960s and onward, pressure group politicking is a well-practiced but little-understood art (Jackson 1998, 479). The groups themselves are certainly not a new phenomenon in politics, but the academic recognition of pressure groups is more recent (Ball 1993, 104). In fact, pressure groups have a long history in Canada. Evidence of their work can be seen in the colonial period and in the first years of Confederation (Pross 1994, 178). However, it has been since the mid 1960s that the growth and presence of pressure groups have transformed the country's political landscape (Wilson 1990, 142). These groups have become more prominent actors in political debates. The reasons for the shift are not entirely clear. A root cause is believed to be fundamental changes in social attitudes (in particular women's rights, environmental concerns, and the anti-war stance) that have been taking place since the Depression (Pross 1994, 179). Another reason is the impact of television, which taught many Canadians how they could use the media to influence public decisions. Richard Simeon (1995, 37) suggests that domestic pressure groups, particularly single-issue groups, have proliferated in Canada and other western countries with the decline of political parties as legitimate organizers of public opinion.

The Canadian state has been faced with the challenge of responding to a host of new and assertive pressure groups attempting to address a multitude of issues. As well, the

increasing diversity of interests and identities in Canada, and the difficulty for politicians of representing, accommodating, and transcending the diversities, has resulted in the need for further representation (Pal 1997, 209). As a result, pressure group politics have acquired a more prominent place in Canadian politics and is considered by some as a force to be reckoned with (Pross 1992, xi). Considerable importance has been afforded to the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 to explain the success and prominence of pressure groups, and to the ensuing process of "Charter politics" (Alan Cairns 1992). Gagnon & Tanguay (1989, 2-11) assert that the increase in citizen participation in pressure group politics is due to the decline of political parties and their representational capacity. Theories abound as to why pressure groups have multiplied exponentially.

Along with the growth in the numbers of pressure groups in Canadian politics, these groups have also harnessed the most sophisticated tactics in their drive for political influence (Presthus 1978, 68). It is difficult to find any social activity or interest that does not have representation. However, in spite of having representation, there is no guarantee of equal representation. Substantial variations exist in the political and organizational resources amongst pressure groups. The industrial-business and professional groups tend to monopolize the instruments of political influence: political alliances, resources, and sophistication of tactics (Presthus 1978, 68).

The next section of the literature review will look at pressure group theory, both from a general perspective and specifically as it applies in Canada. The review will begin by

defining what pressure groups are, as well as attempt to both differentiate between and reconcile interest group theory with pressure group theory. Once defined, the purpose of pressure groups will be explored from numerous perspectives, as well as the limitations and requirements of pressure groups. The policy process in Canada will be detailed as it applies to pressure group politics. Following is a look at the various actions of environmental pressure groups, using both formal and informal channels. It is at this point that the review will focus in on one area of pressure group politics - environmental. The final area of focus is on the future of pressure groups in Canada, and the potential roles pressure groups will play on the Canadian political scene.

4.1. Pressure Groups Defined

"...there are very real limits on the ability of any one individual to move the policy process. What is generally needed is some form of collective action, and it is here that organized interest groups come into play" (Gibbons 1994, 396).

Movements are tied to ideologies involving broad social change. They are borderless currents of interest that flow easily across political boundaries because of their broad and inclusive philosophies. The message of a movement can be prevalent across countries as well as continents. Movements are not composed of single, unitary actors. Instead, they are informal networks that link different players - organizations as well as individuals - through joint interaction (Phillips 1994, 190). They are socially constructed. Movements are typically composed of four main characteristics: 1) an informal network of organizations and individuals who, 2) on the basis of collective identity and shared values, 3) engage in political and or cultural struggle intended to expand the boundaries of the existing system, and 4) undertake collective action designed to affect both state and

society (Phillips 1994, 189; Stefanick 1996, 16). Movements have become a powerful force in changing societal attitudes and influencing governments (Jackson 1998, 499). Because of their inclusiveness, movements often help to unify people by embracing national and international issues or points of view.

Interest (pressure) groups typically spring from a general movement (i.e. from the social movement springs Amnesty International) in order to focus on a specific issue, piece of legislation, or location. Pressure groups tend to reside inside specific countries, although some do not (i.e. Sierra Club, Greenpeace, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals - PETA). Political parties can also spring from a movement when a group of individuals decide that the interests of the group can be best served by pursuing change through formal political channels.

What are Pressure Groups?

Pressure group formation is considered to be a natural occurrence in any democratic society where individuals with a common interest often form a group to pursue that interest (Knight 1991, 6). Group theory implies that the constellation of pressure groups participating in a policy process would represent all the interests that could be affected by the process. All groups would actively participate in the process, attempting to influence the outcome of the process. Groups are, in fact, viewed as rational, natural components of democratic society by various political scientists.

'Power' can be either direct or indirect. Direct power is exercised directly on government. Groups affect, or seek to affect, government by effectively possessing and/or employing political resources as constraints upon government's autonomy (Pyrz 1994, 329). For example, a pressure group lobbying the provincial government to influence a change in a specific policy is exercising direct power. Indirect power refers to those circumstances in which groups employ political resources to garner support from the citizens and groups who themselves have power over governments. Examples of indirect power include the shaping of public opinion via newspaper articles, the distribution of information leaflets to the general public, and the use of the Internet to disperse information.

Pressure groups are "... any group of citizens seeking to bring about or preserve their preferred state of affairs by means of power, directly or indirectly affecting governments, without standing for elected office," (Pyrz 1994, 329). Pressure group politics involve the political promotion of interests and values. Eckstein (1960, 26) describes pressure group politics as the intermediate level of activity between the political and the apolitical. Pross (1992, 152) refers to this intermediate level as the "attentive public".

Pross (1993, 146) believes that in order to begin to understand pressure group life, one must arrange what is known about them into meaningful patterns. One pattern, applied by many scholars, is to classify all groups according to the kinds of causes they promote. Two broadly defined groups used are the ones that pursue the self-interest of their members (i.e. Canadian Medical Association, Canadian Bar Association, British Columbia Teacher's Federation, etc.), and the groups that pursue more general, public interest (i.e.

Canadian Standards Association, Western Canada Wilderness Society, Planned Parenthood, etc.). This type of classification may be too broad because most groups work simultaneously for both selective benefits and the public interest. For example, the Canadian Medical Association's standards imposed upon their members are there to theoretically safe guard the general public.

Pross (1992, 3) believes that the chief characteristic of the pressure group is that it tries to persuade governments to pursue the policies it advocates. The act of persuasion takes many forms with nearly all of them intended to exert political pressure. The characteristics that separate pressure groups from a mob or movement are continuity and organization. Continuity is required in order to have a lasting effect. The public and government require reminders in order to develop a recognition for both the identity of the pressure groups as well as their issues. A mob is a temporary thing, a product of chance. The mob may gain clearly stated and immediately realizable goals, but it does not have the ability to provide for future objectives; a mob is unable to provide for its own continued existence (Pross 1992, 4). A movement consists of many distinct elements that differentiate it from the more coherent unit of a pressure group.

The distinction has been made between pressure groups , mobs, and movements. There should also be a distinction made between political parties and pressure groups. Erickson provides an succinct comparison between the two terms: "... parties are organizations that put forward candidates to compete for publicly elected office under a particular label and that campaign for votes for their candidates" (Erickson 1994, 277). The electoral

activities distinguish parties from pressure groups; pressure groups form separately from the electoral system. Because candidates compete for votes in elections, the constraints parties confront tend to be different from those facing pressure groups.

In defining the term pressure group, one may find it helpful to have a concise list of characteristics which distinguish pressure groups from other types of groups. Pross provides four prime characteristics of pressure groups (Jackson 1998, 470):

- They have a formal structure of organization that gives them continuity.
- Organization is found to be essential to allow pressure groups to determine their objectives and strategies for action.
- They are able to articulate and aggregate interests.
 - They attempt to act within the political system to influence policy outputs.
 - They try to influence power rather than exercise the responsibility of government themselves.

Similar to pressure groups, interest groups are defined as "... organizations whose members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest (Pross 1992, 3). David Truman's (1951, 33) definition of interest group is "...any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied by the shared attitudes". Interest groups are organizations that attempt to further their common interest by affecting public policy (Jackson 1998, 470). Like pressure groups, there are varying types of interest groups. Gibbins looks at the interest

groups that have a single theme of focus and describes them as pursuing non-negotiable interests which are much more difficult for the political system to handle (Gibbins 1994, 397).

In looking at both interest groups and pressure groups, their expectations are seen to override any expectation of the general populace. Because the group believes that the claims being made are of paramount importance, they also believe that the general populace should support the efforts of the group. Fortunately for many of the interest/pressure groups and the public, their focus is a collective good in that not only will the members within the group benefit, but also the populace as a whole (i.e. through pollution abatement measures, protection of a recreation area, etc.). Of course, there are other interests held by varying pressure groups that only benefit the group requesting it (i.e. pharmaceutical groups pushing for longer patent rights on products to monopolize a specific market) (Gibbins 1994, 397).

In spite of the lengthy definitions provided for both pressure groups and interest groups, by now one realizes that the dissimilarities are slight enough that one may consider the two terms interchangeable. Sidle (1993, 218), for example, states that although the expression 'pressure group' is common in the political science literature, his preference leans towards the use of the term 'interest group' because it is more usual in current political discourse, public debate and media reports. The assumption is then that the terms 'pressure group' and 'interest group' are interchangeable. Pross (1992, 68) also uses the terms interchangeably. However, Pross also goes on to differentiate pressure groups from

all other interest groups; the other groups are latent interests, solidarity groups, social movements, political parties, and government affiliated organizations (Pross 1992, 11). He provides a "test to determine if an organization is a pressure group" which provides simple questions and criteria to guide the answers (Appendix: Pross' Test). Pross' use of the term 'interest group' could then be described as 'the groups involved in the policy process'.

Eckstein (1960, 9) defines both pressure groups and interests groups with hardly a differentiating stroke; the deviation is that interests groups do not involve themselves in formal politics, for if they do, they are then called pressure groups. White's (1998, 154) distinction is based on the relative permanence of interest groups versus the more temporary, spontaneous nature of pressure groups. White (1998) believes that an interest group consists of people who recognize that they share certain characteristics and consequently seek goals that will improve their common situation. In contrast, pressure groups spring up in response to some current or public policy that is considered to have fairly drastic repercussions for those impacted. Once the pressure group achieves their goal, the members disband, having no further common thread to hold it together (White 1998, 154).

Upon reviewing the definitions of both interest group and pressure group, there are few notable distinctions between them. As a result of the interchangeability of terms, the term pressure group will be used from the outset of the review simply because it is the most

recognized term academically. Where the term interest group has been used in the current literature, it will apply to pressure groups as well.

Types of Pressure Groups

There are various types of pressure groups based on the focus, issue, membership, and who gains from the outcome of the effort. The types of pressure groups may be elaborated by making a distinction between primary pressure groups (groups whose primary purpose is political) and secondary pressure groups (groups whose objectives lead them into political action from time to time) (Grant 1989, 10). Of course, this distinction is not always clear. For example, the Catholic Association may provide a service for members, but the association is also very political with issues such as abortion and sexual education.

Similar to Pyrcz (1994) and Grant (1989), Pross (1975, 12) also makes a distinction amongst certain pressure groups based on their focus and actions. The distinction Pross draws is between 'institutional groups' and 'issue-oriented groups'. Institutional groups are those having organizational continuity, cohesion, stable membership, concrete and immediate objectives, and a preference for organizational goals over particular objectives (i.e. the Canadian Medical Association, the Sierra Club, and the Canadian Broadcasters' Association). Institutional groups are concerned about protecting their access to government, and are thus unlikely to become embroiled in election campaigns that might fragment their membership base and disrupt their access (Gibbins 1994, 397). Their contacts with the federal and provincial bureaucrats are carefully nurtured. Issue-oriented

groups, on the other hand, form exclusively to pursue one major policy change, and typically have the opposite qualities of that of the institutional groups; limited organizational continuity and cohesion, lack of organization, knowledge of the government is minimal and often naive, and membership is extremely fluid. Issue-oriented groups typically are involved with issues that are capable of resolution and could potentially be removed from the nation's political arena once addressed (Gibbins 1994, 397). As stated earlier, there are single-issue groups under this umbrella that often pursue non-negotiable interests, which are much more difficult for the political system to address.

Within the two types of pressure groups, there are groups described as advocacy organizations (Pal 1993, 122). As mentioned, these types of organizations are a subset of the larger group of pressure groups, and seek a collective good, the achievement of which would not selectively benefit only the membership of the organization. Instead, a collective good is any public policy whose benefits may be realized equally by many people (i.e. world peace, clean air), regardless of their membership in, or support for, a given organization (Pal 1993, 123).

Canadian Aspects

Canadian pressure group politics, although similar to pressure group politics in other countries, maintains a level of uniqueness when compared with other countries in the western hemisphere (Pyrz 1994, 346). This next part of the review will look at the uniqueness of Canada's pressure group politics, looking specifically at the Canadian

legislature and how it functions, and how this, in turn, dictates the actions of pressure groups.

The actual number of registered pressure groups in Canada proliferated between 1965 and 1984, similar to pressure group growth in the United States (Pyrzcz 1994, 348). Much of the Canadian pressure group growth was due to the support and encouragement that new groups received from the federal government of the period. This is one of the ways that Canadian pressure group politics are distinctive from other countries. Canadian governments (provincial and federal) went out of their way to provide access for pressure groups to Cabinet and to the public service. Governments also sought to develop close, co-operative, consensus-building relationships with many groups (Pyrzcz 1994, 349). By providing the resources for the proliferation of pressure groups, the various levels of government believed that the multitude of interests within Canada would be represented in policy without the implementation of expensive government bureaucracy. Unfortunately for pressure groups in Canada, the subsequent federal government, led by Brian Mulroney, strove to undo much of the work that the previous Trudeau (and Clark) administrations had done in building a larger theatre for pressure group politics (Pyrzcz 1994, 350).

The contact between individual legislatures and pressure groups is believed to be the most significant and persistent difference between Canadian and American pressure group tactics (Pyrzcz 1994, 337). The difference in government between the two countries explain the contrast in levels of contact. Many observers of Canadian politics argue that the acceptance and support of the various political players (including pressure groups) has

resulted in a particularly Canadian brand of politics that is more tolerant of differences and promotes greater inclusion of diverse voices when compared with the United States (Phillips 1994, 199). Presthus believes that the uniqueness of the Canadian policy process is simply due to Canadians being much more respectful than Americans, thus formally enshrining the various points of access to different groups within a democracy (Pross 1996, 43). Because of this respectfulness, Canadians are said to be more inclined to accept the decisions of the elite.

The debate over the role of pressure groups in public policy formation has been conducted within the framework of a pluralist understanding. It is this understanding that has a Canadian twist with its origins in our traditional view of the state (Pross 1996, 36). Pross believes that Canadian-style pressure group politics is unique to this country (Pross 1993, 152). Canada has no public forum in which pressure groups, politicians, and the public may meet and realize all aspects of an issue at center stage. Debate in Parliament has been tightly controlled by government with functions like committee hearings offering few opportunities for debate, much less changing, a policy. As a result, pressure groups, and others wishing to influence public policy, opt to approach and attempt to persuade civil servants and Cabinet ministers, leaving parliamentarians with few options (Pross 1993, 153). In the United States, however, there are public debates involving committee hearings where rival demands are vigorously presented and where every lobby concerned with the issue has the opportunity to put its case to the general public as well as to the policy makers. The 'unique' Canadian system results in the legitimate, wealthy, coherent interests, having increased access to the legislative process, as well as more influence,

compared to the less legitimate, poor, and diffuse interests, who have few sources of access to the legislative process (Pross 1993, 153). A policy system like Canada's, where legislatures do not have a large say in policy development, will encourage pressure groups to develop quite differently from those that emerge in the United States. Canadian legislature, and thus pressure group politics, are unique compared to other countries like the United States. Canadian pluralism has distinctive characteristics that requires focused understanding in order to know how to best apply these characteristics (Pross 1996, 34).

4.2 The Purpose of Pressure Groups

After 1965, the Canadian government, like its counterparts across the western world, was faced with the challenge of responding to a host of new types of pressure groups (Wilson 1990, 141). With the arrival of groups articulating a variety of public interest positions, the political landscape was transformed. The electoral process is a process in which citizens are able to cast a retrospective judgment on government performance (Gibbins 1994, 400). The electoral process, however, does not enable citizens to direct the course of public policy. To address the everyday actions of government, pressure groups have come to serve as alternative policy instruments.

Political parties and other agencies of representation do not seem as attentive to the task of respecting diversity and multiplicity as do pressure groups (Pyrz 1994, 330). In fact, Canadian political parties have proven to be less and less successful at carrying out their fundamental duties. Some of the more predominant reasons for this have to do with the emergence of the mass party, the impact of the electronic media, changes in the way

economic and social life is organized, and the rise of specialized bureaucracies (Pross 1994, 183). Political parties have become proficient at running elections, but steadily less proficient at organizing communication with the grassroots (ibid., 184). Government policy can only serve as public policy if it is based on consultations with an interested public. At a time when many citizens are understandably disenchanted with political parties, involvement in pressure group activity has become increasingly attractive as an alternative means of influencing government (Grant 1989, 164). Pressure groups have a growing importance as a source of constructive opposition to government policy, and as a means of ensuring that the distance between government and the governed does not become too great. Pressure groups have also attempted to fill the representational vacuum at the grassroots level; groups have developed to address the needs of specialized interests. As working relations developed between grassroots groups and specific agencies, the formal political system became less and less important as a required ally. Instead, political interventions were reserved for major issues. As members of the public found it difficult to address large public issues through party channels, the public began forming advocacy groups which found ways to attract national attention and provoke public debate (Pross 1994, 184). The overall success of these advocacy groups led to a growing public conviction that an individual has a greater chance of influencing policy through a pressure group than through a political party.

Pressure groups are a major source of mediation between the government and the individual, articulating aggregated opinions and protecting the individual from excessive control by the state (Jackson 1998, 472). Pressure groups provide a mechanism for

political representation which supplements the electoral process. This service assists the political system by marshaling support for various issues and providing ideas for public policy. Pressure groups enable the political process to be more responsive to social and economic differences in society than the electoral process. Groups provide government with information, both fact and opinion, that can potentially be used to help formulate policies, or discontinue a policy effort. This cycle of communication provides a valuable link between citizens and public policy by enabling government to keep in touch with fluctuations in public opinion (Jackson 1998, 472; Gibbins 1994, 398; Tanguay & Kay 1991, 102-3; Knight 1991, 3). As well, pressure groups help to disseminate and interpret state policies to their members, and assist the state by expanding the range of information available to the state for planning and management (Knight 1991, 4). Groups also act as agents of government by undertaking activities which would normally be a function of the state, such as licensing and regulating their members (Canadian Medical Association, Canadian Bar Association, Professional Biologist Association, etc.).

As Knight details, pressure groups perform these functions in vastly different ways and with varying levels of effectiveness (Knight 1991, 4). There are numerous factors which impact in the effectiveness of the functions of pressure groups. These factors will be discussed further on in the review.

4.2.1 The Role of Pressure Groups: Past, Present, and Future

The purpose of pressure groups in terms of their role in Canadian society, in the country's politics, and in its policy development, is the focus of this part of the review. With a firm

idea of what a pressure group is, one may now delve into the question of why pressure groups exist and why they are important; what is the purpose of pressure groups in Canadian society?

Pressure groups are social constructs with varying levels of cohesion and shared aims which attempt to influence the political decision-making process (Ball 1993, 103). They can be identified in all political systems and serve in various capacities, both formally and informally. Pluralist theorists place particular emphasis on the role of pressure groups in liberal democracies. They argue that the competing group interaction determines the outcome of many political conflicts, provides wider avenues of political participation, and also ensures a wider distribution of power (Ball 1993, 104). In promoting their members interests, groups perform four socially and politically significant functions. They administer, regulate, communicate, and legitimate (Pross 1994, 175). Pressure groups promote the common interests of their members as the central and foremost important function. If they do not adequately serve their members they generally cease to exist. Pressure groups serve to widen the range of interests that are taken into account in the legislative process. Wilson claims (1984, 22) that pressure groups counterbalance two inherent weaknesses in democracy (Grant 1989, 156). The first weakness is that democracy does not work for all people. The second inherent weakness is that electioneering encourages a short-term perspective on issues.

The first weakness emphasizes the fundamental link between the existence of pressure groups and the very survival of a system of democratic government. Freedom of

association is a fundamental principle of democracy. Democracy permits the existence of groups, and these groups are seen to contribute to the quality of the decision-making process (Ball 1993, 21). Pressure groups enable citizens to express their views on complex issues which affect their lives. Ball believes that democracy cannot be simplified to a head-counting exercise. Instead, it must also take into account the strength of feelings expressed, and of the quality of the arguments advanced. Pressure group participation provides a voice, as well as an mechanism for citizens to participate in the experience of ruling and being ruled.

The following is a summary of the eight roles pressure groups play according to Pyrcz (1994, 340-5):

- 1) Pressure groups as agents of interest: The first role pressure groups perform is to identify, collect, express, and represent the interests and opinions of citizens.
- 2) Pressure groups as the agents of community: The second role of pressure groups is to develop a sense of community among citizens who share an interest and who consider this interest to be important to their identities.
- 3) Pressure groups as agents of power: Pressure groups effectively possess and exercise power over governments. Many political agents believe that they get more value from the political resources they expend in advancing their interests and concerns via pressure groups than they do from resources spent in political parties.
- 4) Pressure groups as the agents of Judicial Review: The fourth role of pressure groups is to use the authority and power of the law to protect and advance their members' interests.

5) Pressure groups as the agents of information: Pressure groups provide information to government and society. This information is of two sorts - political information and nonpolitical information. Both sorts of information are useful in representative democracies. Political information provides an indication of which interests and opinions citizens consider to be salient and important to their core interests. Nonpolitical information is information provided by the pressure group on the matters that affect their group's interests and opinions.

6) Pressure groups as agents of legitimacy: The sixth role of pressure groups is to provide legitimacy for governments, Cabinet members, bureaucrats, oppositions, elected representatives, political parties, and even journalists. In doing so, pressure groups run the risk of legitimizing the actions of government while government opts for the opposite of the pressure groups' desired result.

7) Pressure groups as the agents of leadership: Pressure groups provide political leadership. In doing so, they shape public opinion and often politicize the electorate - causing the public to become interested and active in politics and government.

8) Pressure groups as agents of advantage: Pressure groups seek and often achieve an advantage for the interests they represent.

Some pressure groups choose to devote all or most of their efforts to influencing government policy. Other groups may only rarely seek to influence government, instead they concentrate mainly on other activities. However, despite the area of focus, it can be said that those who belong to an organization or a group can be presumed to have a common interest. Along with the common interest, each individual also brings their purely

individual interests, different from those of the others in the organization or group. It is the common interest, however, that brings people together to form a pressure group. And in spite of all the different interests held by the numerous different pressure groups, what each individual has in common, regardless of the group or organization they 'belong' to, is the desire to influence government policy, legislation, regulation or expenditures (Jackson 1998, 470). Aside from the obvious potential political role of pressure groups, they also perform a more subtle task of political communication by helping to create civil society. Groups are able to do this by fostering public spiritedness and motivation, increasing knowledge about public issues, promoting innovation, and helping to mobilize the public (Pross 1994, 177; Gibbins 1994, 398). In fact, in a study of local pressure groups, and how they were viewed by local Members of Parliament, revealed that even those groups with so-called offensive tactics or unrealistic demands were seen as serving an important communications function in the political system, as well as sparking much-needed debate on issues of public policy (Sidle 1993, 196).

Political parties are primarily instruments of governance rather than instruments for the transmission of policy preferences from the electorate to the government. As a result, other ways of transmitting information are required. Individuals are able to express themselves in a number of ways, however, the impact of an individual is very limited in terms of policy development. Where the individual is found to have little impact, pressure groups perform. Gibbins (1994, 396) uses the example of Greenpeace when comparing the impact of the individual with the impact of the pressure group. As an individual, one would be powerless to impact the policy process if it were not for groups like Greenpeace.

On one's behalf, Greenpeace can lobby internationally, sail boats in front of whaling fleets, raise concern for whales in newspapers and magazines around the world, and organize consumer boycotts. Greenpeace becomes one's 'hired gun' with no more demand than the short time it takes to write a cheque. This minimal requirement, when considered cumulatively across thousands of individuals, provides the foundation for an effective political organization.

Pross (1992, 2) believes that pressure groups are essential in any modern state. In fact, he goes so far as to state that the rise in the number and proliferation of pressure groups in Canada has enhanced Canadian democracy (ibid.). Pressure groups provide information both to the government and the general public, thus serving as an information conduit. The provision of information also serves as a connector between government and the governed.

Because pressure groups are accepted within the political culture, there are legitimate channels for complaints and frustrations (Jackson 1998, 498). Citizens are provided an opportunity to articulate viewpoints and defend them. In doing so, most citizens do not have to resort to extra-legal behaviour to be heard. When citizens are part of a legitimized group, they are committed to acting within the system. When the purpose of pressure groups are presented in this fashion, they act as a safety valve for individual frustrations by allowing the possibility of joining with others to influence legislation. Thus, pressure groups provide a crucial and culturally acceptable link between citizen and public policy. Because of the important role pressure groups are said to play within the political arena,

Pal believes that legislative committees should bring groups out of the background and provide explicit opportunities to support or reject bills (Pal 1993, 122).

In spite of the now obvious need for pressure groups in the Canadian political arena, there are limitations to the growth of pressure groups. If pressure groups were allowed to accumulate too much influence, there would be a risk to democracy. However, pressure groups operate in a political system in which they are checked by other political forces (Grant 1989, 163). The first check is public opinion; public opinion strongly influences the context in which pressure groups operate. The second check is political parties. The more broadly based political parties have to appeal beyond the relatively narrow concerns of most pressure groups to win elections. Because of these two 'controls', pressure groups' power is limited, for their power is based on the ability to persuade and to influence, rather than to make decisions or veto them.

4.2.2 Requirements and Limitations Experienced by Pressure Groups

Up to this point in the review, one is left with the understanding of the importance of the pressure group in Canadian politics, both formally and informally. However, there is a small portion of pressure groups who are able to exercise their democratic role to its fullest. The rest of the groups, desperate to play a larger role in the policy process, are denied from doing so. The reason for the denial is not necessarily a legislated one. In fact, restrictions come in the form of resources; they lack the necessary resources to fully participate in the Canadian policy process. This next part of the review will look at the limitations most groups experience, as well as some of the requirements that are thought

to be essential in order for groups to be effective and successful in their endeavors. The first and largest section of this portion of the review is 'resources', with 'legislative' and 'legitimacy' to follow.

Participant Resources

Gibbins (1994, 397) asserts that one cannot assume that all interests within society will find adequate expression through organized groups. An effective organization requires resources. The resources referred to here, as well as throughout this research, are the resources cited by both activists and pressure group theorists as necessary to participate in policy development. The use of resources should not be confused with the term as it applies to natural resources such as forests and water. The term 'resources' as it is used in this research refers to the resources necessary to participate in the policy process in Canada; participant resources. Participant resources (referred to in this research here on in as 'resources') include things like money, leadership, and membership.

As a result of the unequal distribution of resources, group politics may extend the political influence of already powerful interests as much as they open up the political arena to a wider array of competing interests. According to Pal, power can be defined by the level of resources (such as membership, money, strategy, and leadership) that an organization (or group) maintains. The groups with the best mix of resources are presumed to win what they want from the political process (Pal 1994, 42). This approach assumes that politicians respond to the configurations of group power, and that government is not simply a neutral force.

Substantial variations exist in political and organizational resources, with industrial-business and professional groups tending to monopolize the instruments of political influence, both in numbers and resources (Presthus 1978, 68). As well, when one analyzes the relative political effectiveness of pressure groups, industrial-business types tend to rank highest. This is largely due to these groups having the greatest amount of resources, including the exceptional legitimacy that governmental elite's provide to economic actors. As a result of the generosity of government, both access and influence vis-à-vis legislators and bureaucrats, are easier for the industrial-business and professional pressure group's to obtain when compared to, for example, women's or ethnic groups (Presthus 1978, 69; Pyrcz 1994, 335).

The need for leadership and expert advice is unavoidable when a pressure group needs to know what government is thinking about, what it needs to know, and how to get the information to the right place at the right time, and in the most acceptable form (Pross 1993, 148; Ball 1993, 110). In order to accomplish the objective of communication, pressure groups must have an expert staff, or at least a well-informed membership, able to communicate with government officials at bureaucratic as well as elected levels, on a continuous basis. The lack of staff in general is a serious deficiency within the pressure group setting because it generally means that the group does not have expert knowledge about what government is doing or thinking about the issue of concern. As a result, members tend to work in a vacuum (Pross 1993, 150).

When considering resources, Jackson & Jackson (1998, 478) have provided an overall summary of what are necessary ingredients for success for pressure groups:

- An appealing issue; one that will garner very broad public sympathy/support, and increase the size of the group, or at least increase its support.

- Good leadership is important; a strong, vocal, and prestigious leader brings valuable publicity and direction.

- A high-status general membership further increases the chance of success. Distinguished, influential people bring contacts and other resources, as well as having easier personal access to bureaucrats and politicians.

- A permanent organizational structure is important because it helps the group act cohesively. Internal divisions weaken the group. Sections of society that have common interests but are unorganized usually have little long-term impact on public perceptions.

- Large budgets naturally assist in achieving and maintaining access to policy-makers. Property does not guarantee success, but it does increase its possibility.

- Flexibility is another important factor in achieving success, since it is often necessary to compromise one part of a demand to achieve another. The need for flexibility also includes the value of developing networks with other like-minded groups to share resources and amplify the support behind an issue.

- The final important condition of success consists of knowing where and when access to policy-makers can be achieved.

Ball adds to this list the importance of co-operation; governments want advice, technical information, as well as co-operation from strong pressure groups (Ball 1993, 111). By

not securing at least a minimal amount of the necessary resources, these disadvantaged groups will remain underrepresented as will their interests in the policy process (Knight 1991, 11; Pal 1997, 194).

The above summation does not cover the entire spectrum of necessary resources, because these vary with the societal and cultural considerations. For example, what is deemed as absolutely necessary in Canada, may not completely apply to pressure groups politics in other countries. One could even go so far as to say what is found to be essential pressure group requirements in western Canada or British Columbia, does not completely apply to the east coast of Canada.

Legislature

The introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms into Canadian society in 1982 redefined the relationship between the individual and the state (Sidle 1993, 189). In fact, the Charter has clearly, and in some cases dramatically, changed the Canadian policy process (Pal 1993, 152). The academic literature supports the view that the state is less than it used to be, in light of the implications of the Charter (Pross 1996, 43).

In spite of the lessened importance of the state, the legislature remains a prominent player in the policy process. Because of this, pressure groups must be aware of procedure when dealing with a legislature in order to efficiently utilize resources. When choosing a lobbying strategy, a group must consider the extent of its resources, as well as the extent of its lobbying efforts. A group may choose to not only lobby legislators and bureaucrats.

Instead, they may lobby in concert with arousing public opinion. However, no amount of persuasion of the government by pressure groups will be effective unless public opinion is in agreement with a lobby, or at least not hostile to its demands (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 482; White 1998, 118). As well, pressure groups must be aware of the policy process within the legislature. Policies are made before they reach Parliament, therefore, lobbying MPs at this point is not the most effective use of group energy and resources. Instead, the most beneficial form of lobbying is probably to target key bureaucrats and ministers while policy is in the development stage (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 483).

With the realization of the procedure of the policy process, pressure groups work towards their goals in vastly different ways with varying levels of effectiveness. There are numerous factors that cause this variation in effectiveness, however, theorists have suggested that access and legitimacy are the most important (Knight 1991, 4). Access is determined by the level of legitimacy bestowed upon a group by members of the policy process.

Seeking Legitimacy

Pressure groups are not strongly oriented towards Parliament because of the limited capacity groups have in influencing public policy within this forum (Sidle 1993, 190). In addition to limitations on the ability to influence, it was found that even if the newer, issue oriented groups, or those speaking for previously underrepresented elements, opted for the legislative path to address their interests, they lack the privileged access to government (Sidle 1993, 193). In the attempt to overcome these limitations, groups have accessed the

power to reach the public via dramatic demonstrations carried on television and in other media.

In Canadian politics there are many represented interests, and over time a considerable number of people representing these interests exert influence in the policy process.

However, unless these groups of interests have access to more resources than most individuals and the majority of companies, they lack the ability to sustain their influence (Pross 1993, 145). The end effect of a system persisting with unequal distribution of resources is that legitimate, wealthy, coherent interests, having multiple access to the legislative process, will tend to be more influential than less legitimate, poor, diffuse interests, which have few sources of access to the legislative process (Pross 1993, 153; White 1998, 160).

It is important for pressure groups to use the access points provided within the political system and establish a framework for mutual consultation (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 485; Ball 1993, 109). Legitimacy may be obtained by working within the established system. These types of actions indicate that the group has obtained recognition as the representative for its particular interests. The established interaction is a symbol of the compatibility of the groups' goals and tactics with both Canadian political culture and the goals of the government (Ball 1993, 109). The legitimacy established by a group provides further access to the bureaucracy and Cabinet during the pre-parliamentary stages of a bill where the most change is possible.

The rewards of legitimacy for pressure groups is the knowledge that policy-makers acknowledge that the groups speak for a significant portion of the general population. With this acknowledgment comes power. Policy-makers recognize that the pressure group(s) speaks for a part of the public that can be mobilized into political action should its interests not be accommodated in public policy. This legitimacy bestowed upon a pressure group serves as a useful group-governmental bargaining tool (Pross 1992, 9; Pyrcz 1994, 334; Eckstein 1960, 20; White 1998, 158).

The importance of gaining and maintaining legitimacy, however, can result in groups compromising their principles and goals. For example, Greenpeace began as a direct action group applying civil disobedience as the mainstay for garnering support. However, in their efforts to gain political legitimacy, Greenpeace has increasingly devoted more resources to research, report-writing, and to more conventional lobbying techniques than to direct action. As a result, Greenpeace has alienated members who have been supporters from the outset. It is these supporters who feel that Greenpeace has compromised their purity and effectiveness in their drive to gain mainstream legitimacy (Grant 1989, 20).

Compromise also occurs in other forms. There are pressure groups who are either largely or partially funded by government and industry. The pursuit of organizational development through these types of financial support has obvious limitations. The groups in these situations can feel constrained when their agenda challenges the orientation of government and of the corporate sector (Coleman & Skogstad 189, 9). If a group takes

their challenge too far, they risk losing their funds as well as their capacity to act. However, if they back down from their agenda established by their members, they risk group legitimacy and face eventual disintegration. As a result, state sponsorship of pressure groups appears to be as much a method for controlling dissent as it is for assisting the disadvantaged. The possibilities for government supported groups to initiate policy changes are clearly limited.

4.2.3 The Operating Structures of Pressure Groups

The functions of pressure groups have much to do with their internal organizational structure (Pross 1993, 145). The operating structures of pressure groups can take on two general forms: hierarchical/leader-led or grassroots/consensus-based. Most pressure groups would fall under both at varying degrees depending on the issue and available expertise. The structure, in turn, is greatly influenced by variables such as the kind of resources made available by the group's members, members' determination to promote their common interests through exerting influence, as well as the characteristics of the political system itself. The structure of the pressure group in terms of decision-making affects its ability to respond to immediate issues. The pluralistic nature of our society creates many cross-pressures within individuals and makes it difficult for larger groups to consolidate their membership for concerted action (White 1998, 156). Hjelmar states that in hierarchical organizations, the right to exercise power is centralized which makes these types of organizations capable of reacting more promptly to urgent issues (Hjelmar 1996, 5). However, organizations that operate with a grass-roots, consensus based decision-

making model are unable to react promptly. Instead, they must take the time to inform, discuss with all interested members, and then try and arrive at a consensus based decision.

Most pressure groups progress through an organizational life cycle, beginning their existence as a relatively ill-equipped, under-financed and naive organization concerned with the resolutions of one or two issues or problems (Tanguay & Kay 1991, 83). They tend to seek publicity or media attention more than access to key political decision makers. If the once new groups are able to adapt to the political system, they then expand their membership base and increase their access to knowledge of the workings of government. The most important determinant of the selection of channels for pressure group activity in any political system is the structure of the decision-making processes (Eckstein 1960, 16). By gaining further insight into the 'workings of government', pressure groups are able to influence policy decisions more effectively.

Since the profile of pressure groups has increased over the past three decades, there has been open criticism regarding various structural attributes. There have been concerns about pressure groups and the degree to which they actually represent the people they claim to represent (Pross 1994, 181). The internal decision-making processes are said to be frequently undemocratic and dominated by an elite and not the membership at large. As well, the tactics used by some groups are believed to be an abuse of the general principles of civil discourse in politics. Opinion has gone so far as to state that some groups unnecessarily polarize issues and encourage their members to take extreme

positions and to refuse compromise. In taking the position of 'no compromise', these pressure groups' interests cannot be met within the Canadian political structure.

Pressure groups, as well as other organizations, can also develop momentum that goes beyond the intentions and interests of key actors, even when organizational action initially unfolds in an orderly and rational fashion (Hannan 1989, 6). Organizations can take on lives of their own, which can be largely independent of the wishes and interests of those who created them. Another way that an organization can lose sight of the initial objectives is when organizations face potential demise or the status quo is threatened. This may be due to changes in social, economic, or political systems, which will affect organizational structures and practices, as well as changes in membership. When faced with the need to preserve status quo, an organization's goals may be displaced in favour of the aim of simply maintaining the organization and its hierarchy of power and privilege (Michels 1915, 49). As a result, the private goals of the more powerful members tend to dominate the public goals as an organization ages (Pross 1994, 181). The politics of resource allocation in an organization prevents these members from responding quickly to pressures to alter organizational practice or to initiate new kinds of action (Hannan 1989, 6).

Organizations, especially the larger and more powerful, rarely change strategy and structure quickly enough to keep up with a constantly changing social, political, and economic environment (Hannan 1989, 12). Pross describes most pressure groups as "chameleons"; they take their lobbying role seriously and will adapt their internal

organizations and structure to suit the policy system in which they happen to operate (Pross 1993, 147). The smaller, newer organizations, however, are far more flexible. Organizational change occurs in response to environmental changes, threats, and opportunities. Where the smaller and newer organizations have the advantage of flexibility in organizational structure and adaptation, the larger more established groups have superior capacities for creating specialized units to deal with emerging environmental problems. As well, the larger, more established groups have the membership and notoriety to forestall or direct change. In light of the advantages and disadvantages of both the large structures of some organizations and the smaller, newer organizations, one can see the potential strength in developing networks amongst organizations that share common goals. One can also see the need for both types of groups on the political scene.

4.2.4 The Co-Existence of Pressure Groups

In political life there are many interests requiring representation to ensure they are represented in the policy process. In order for organizations to be a part of this extremely complex process, they must have access to more resources than most individuals and the majority of companies in order to sustain their influence (Pross 1993, 146). For most organizations who want to take part in the process, the only feasible way to do so is to band together with other like-minded organizations to share costs and to deploy at appropriate times the numerous talents that participation in the policy process requires (Coleman & Skogstad 1989, 85).

In liberal democracies, such as Canada's, pressure groups thrive within pluralist systems; such systems allow a diversity of interests to be pursued by a wide variety of associations (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 473). Within the pluralist allowances, pressure groups often unite together both formally and informally. A policy community consists of numerous actors or potential actors who share a common policy focus and help shape policy outcomes over time. Pressure groups, within this regime, maintain a relatively narrow focus and tend to be part of only one policy community but can, with the strength of a network, be quite a force within the one policy community. As a result, it is often the notably successful groups who opt to join, at least temporarily, with other groups to bolster each other's claims (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 478). As well, networks offer greater flexibility and capacity to accommodate differences within a movement. Organizations within themselves may become specialized, but collectively, as a network, the movement covers a diversity of issues (Phillips 1994, 191). In light of the potential benefits of networking, groups must maintain flexibility in order to make use of all the access points available to them.

4.3 Pressure Groups in the Policy Process

This section of the literature review will focus on pressure groups within the policy process; what generally happens, why it happens, and any recent changes that have occurred in the policy process regarding the role of pressure groups.

Pressure groups are impressive democratic bodies due, in large part, to their diversity and multiplicity (Pyrce 1994, 332). And, in spite of the media's general presentation of a

coupe type approach by pressure groups, their participation in the policy system is thought to be generally continuous, discreet, and multifaceted (Pross 1993, 153). The existence of pressure groups in Canada, as stated in the introduction, has a fairly long history for such a relatively young country. However, it was not until the late 1960's that pressure groups grew in number and prominence (Pal 1993, 148). This is due to the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, which created new opportunities for pressure group politics in Canada. It is believed by some students of policy development that pressure groups have functions to perform that are just as necessary to the development of government policy as those performed by other political actors such as political parties, executives, and courts (Pross 1993, 147). One must consider, however, that the way in which pressure groups perform those functions is as much determined by the shape of the policy system as it is by the knowledge, the enthusiasm, the financial capacity, and other internal characteristics of individual groups (ibid.).

There are basic rules regarding the task of government in the policy process. At its most basic, the task of government is to hold societies together. To do this, Richardson believes that the major sections of society must somehow be accommodated in the policy process as part of the basic role of government. If the state is unable to accomplish this basic requirement, then society itself is threatened (Richardson 1993, 15). As stated by Jackson, the interaction of pressure groups within the political system requires mutual accommodation at all points (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 492). In fact, it has been found that government agencies find it helpful to have friendly pressure groups endorsing government policies, programs, and budgets before Parliamentary committees and the

media (Pross 1994, 179). There is the realization by all parties involved in the policy process that all other parties have an investment in the outcome of the legislative process, and therefore have a legitimate share in the formulation of public policy. This type of accommodation is referred to as "elite accommodation" (Presthus 1973, 4). Elite accommodation is a structural requisite of any democratic society in which policy decisions are the result of negotiation and consultation among the parties (the elite) concerned. Presthus considers elite accommodation as inherent in the process of democratic government.

As mentioned, unlike political parties, pressure groups do not run candidates for public office under their own organizations label. Pressure groups are active in influencing election outcomes by vocalizing their support for candidates who support their cause. Between elections pressure groups' primary focus is directed toward cabinet where policy formation takes place. However, with the growing presence of the courts of law in politics, pressure groups are using the courts to pursue political objectives (Gibbins 1994, 397).

Aside from the organizational considerations such as financial resources, membership commitment, and knowledge requirements, there is also the role of government in the pressure groups' effort to convince policy-makers of the rightness of their cause.

Government affects pressure groups behaviour just as much as organizational considerations like structure, resources and legitimacy. In fact, those pressure groups who take the lobbying role seriously have been found to adapt their internal organizations and

structure to suit the policy system in which they operate (Pross 1993, 147). Because of this need to be flexible on the part of pressure groups, the groups working at the provincial level in Canada are often quite different from those groups who concentrate their efforts at the federal level. To go further, this is why both groups are found to be quite different from their counterparts in other parts of the world, including the United States.

The potential limitations experienced by pressure groups, as outlined in a previous section, are typically experienced by the new, small pressure groups; they either continue to exist in spite of these limitations, or they no longer exist. Because of the limitations (financial, organizational, leadership, and expert knowledge), there are pressure groups who resort to confrontational tactics in order to gain a voice in the policy making decisions. Pross believes that confrontation is dysfunctional for groups in the long run, but does recognize that in the early life of a group it can be very important and sometime essential (Pross 1993, 151). Because groups generally emerge in response to a policy issue, chances are these groups have not participated in the actual policy development that led to the decision they are concerned about. Therefore the group is entering at a point in the policy process when events have moved beyond the stage of participation by the group. As a result, the development of a pressure group over the formation or demise of a policy provides groups with few options as to how to respond. Under these circumstances, confrontation may be the best available strategy.

The pressure groups who progress from this 'placard carrying' stage are believed to do so by changing its relationship to its members by adapting to the policy system (Pross 1993, 151). Pross believes it is at this point that a group is required to get past the single issue focus, instead they must take up various causes. This is a common progression for environmental groups. They begin with a single-issue focus, gain notoriety, membership, and financial resources, then progress from there to focus on more general environmental issues. In doing so, the group is able to garner a larger membership base and potentially increase the level of finances. The larger membership base may provide further access to expert knowledge, as well as political clout with membership numbers representing voting citizens. This growth includes the financial capacity to hire professionals such as lawyers, public policy experts, and public relations experts. These professionals and experts provide the means for a pressure group to better participate in the policy process. The growth also signifies the first step in institutionalization of the pressure group. Pross believes that from this point on the organization does not change in structure, focus, or approach. The growth allows the organization to become more complex, more capable of responding and adapting to changes in the policy system, and - to the disappointment to grassroots minded people - typically more remote and professional, guided increasingly by paid staff (Pross 1993, 151).

The move towards institutionalization provides the pressure group more readily the attention of government officials. In doing so, the level of legitimacy - both political and societal - afforded the group also increases, thus projecting the group further along the institutional path. This progression steers the pressure group in its chosen actions. As the

group becomes more intimate with the details of bureaucratic decision-making, it is less likely to utilize the media as a tool to influence the public and politicians (Pross 1993, 152).

An example of a pressure group which fits the above progression is Greenpeace.

Greenpeace began with seven students concerned about nuclear testing. They began with a single issue, and garnered tremendous support via the local, national, and international media. The public became aware overnight of this single issue, and a new pressure group was born. Now Greenpeace is an international organization with offices on every continent, millions of members, a multi-million dollar budget, hired experts, and a sophisticated public relations effort.

With the progression of pressure groups comes specialization. This specialization occurs in all areas of management including government, private companies, and pressure groups. To specialize is to focus on one specific area and to come to know that area of focus entirely so that one may serve as a source of information for others not specializing in this area. Specialization within the political community results in what is called "policy communities" - groupings of government agencies, pressure groups, media people, and individuals who, for various reasons, have an interest in a particular policy field and attempt to influence it (Pross 1993, 154).

The presence of policy communities limits the participation of others in any policy debate. As mentioned previously, Pross describes those who are excluded from the policy debate

as the "attentive public" (Pross 1993, 155). The attentive public lacks the power of the state, but still plays a vital role in policy development. From its strategic territory between the government and the public at large, the attentive public has the power to force the emergence of issues from the policy community into the larger political system (Gardner 1990, 4). Another role of the attentive public is to maintain a perpetual policy review process. In other words, the attentive public plays the role of the scrutinizers; constantly ensuring that the inclusive policy players are performing as expected. In doing so, the policy process should never at any point become static or unchanging. One may look at the attentive public as the catalyst for constant progression.

Pressure groups and members of the attentive public are the most mobile members of the policy community. Via informal networks, they are able to cross the organizational lines that formal players within the policy development circle cannot. These networks, and their role in evaluating policy and developing opinion, make pressure groups important members of the policy community (Pross 1993, 155-6). There are times when this generally predictable policy relationship is altered. When circumstances occur beyond the control of both the formal and informal policy community, such as economic changes, technological change, or a shift in public concern, the usual procedures are not equipped to handle these changes. Instead, the issue will be resolved at the highest political levels. When this occurs, the policy community, and the policy itself, is often altered well beyond its original state.

Another way that pressure groups are able to participate in the policy process is via the committee system (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 487). A committee is a body of people appointed for a special function by a larger body like the government or a branch of government. The objective of a committee is to gather information and either arrive at a decision, or provide information or choices to an appointed body. Some examples of committees within the Canadian political arena are the Agriculture Committee, the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada, and the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee. These examples do not even begin to represent the multitude of committees and the subjects of interests within the Canadian political system. It is through committees that pressure groups often serve, representing their interests amongst numerous other interests.

Similar to the duration of time that serving on a committee can require, passage of legislation is a very lengthy process, often taking years. Knowing this, pressure groups are able to utilize this wait of passage lobbying government and conducting public relations campaigns, especially if they are opposed to the proposed legislation (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 488). This effort by pressure groups often results in the delay of a proposed bill, which can often be just as effective as working to have a proposed bill thrown out.

In spite of the growing realization of the crucial democratic role pressure groups play in the Canadian political society, there is a growing concern that pressure groups have too much influence in public decision-making (Pross 1994, 173, 180). This concern derives from the belief that too often the special interest that pressure groups speak for overrides

the general public interest. As a result, pressure groups are seen to pose a threat to the Canadian, constitutionally established, representative institutions - the legislatures. So then, one is faced with the question of how the Canadian political system is able to make effective use of these relatively new machines for political communication, while respecting Canada's traditional, party-based system of democratic government (Pross 1994, 173). One suggestion has been to simply impose limits on the media and their coverage. In order to offset the level of coverage a pressure group receives, the media could establish equity between those who are elected and accountable to the people and those who have a special interest (Pross 1994, 180). Presthus (1973) suggests that for political markets to be competitive, and yield plans that promote the public interest rather than favour particular interests, there are five important considerations that must be satisfied (Knight 1991, 10):

- 1) power must be diffuse in the system;
- 2) all interests must be represented in the process;
- 3) pressure group leaders must accurately reflect the goals and aspirations of the group's members;
- 4) individuals must possess a multiplicity of overlapping membership so that narrow self-interests are tempered; and
- 5) the political market place must have multiple points of access (therefore equality of opportunity) and a government that is open and receptive to all interests.

Presthus' requirements to ensure pressure groups' interests are not given priority over the general public's appears to be somewhat of a 'wish list'. Each point's relevance would be

difficult to argue, but the feasibility of obtaining the degree of openness, accountability, and access proposed by Presthus is optimistic to say the least.

Regardless of Presthus' optimistic criteria for attempting to equalize the representativeness of all interests in the policy process, there exists a perception that groups desiring attention to influence the public will use whatever means in order to dictate what the media considers news.

4.4 Pressure Groups in Action

The "pressure groups in action" section will be looking at the specific actions employed by pressure groups. To accomplish this task, the focus will be to look at actions that have been utilized, as detailed in pressure group theory.

Critics of the present system of policy development assert that the public interest is not represented by those who make major decisions in society (Knight 1991, 13). Instead, the participants involved in policy development are accused of being motivated by their own self-interests or class interests versus the interests of the general public. As a result, there is an elite group maintaining the policy-making power while groups outside the elite are forced to adopt radical measures to initiate even small changes in the status quo (Eckstein 1960, 21). In spite of the apparent realities, pressure groups place a high priority on access to upper-level bureaucrats. To gain access to this level of decision-making, a pressure group obtains highly valuable information that other groups do not have (Knight 1991, 15). The pressure groups who secure such a privileged position do so because they

are not a direct threat to the government and the status quo, otherwise the government would not find it in its best interests to allow such an elitist position.

Jackson believes that the most fundamental ingredient for the political success of a pressure group is that its values, goals, and tactics are compatible with the country's political culture, thereby being perceived as legitimate (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 478). Gaining public support is essential for without it a group has very little chance of receiving government recognition. Groups who employ violent demonstration tactics, rather than negotiation, meet rigid resistance within the Canadian system. The same can be said of those who approve goals foreign to the Canadian political culture such as the concept of state controlled family planning.

In light of the position of most pressure groups, who are members of the attentive public with no access to high level decision-making, there is hope that the force of logical and well-prepared arguments will be sufficient to convince reluctant ministers and skeptical bureaucrats to adopt their proposals. When this fails, these pressure groups resort to other ways of garnering support. Many groups, especially the newer groups, look to the public by arousing emotional support to persuade government that general support for the pressure group's proposal exists (Pross 1992, 3; Sidle 1993, 193). The pressure groups may also appeal to the unions for support, or initiate economic boycotts, or get industry-business on side in order to sway government. The choice of tactics of persuasion is as extensive as the relationship between government and the society it serves (ibid.).

Persuasion is the underlying objective of any action employed by pressure groups; to persuade agreement or support for their views and interests.

Persuasion depends on various attributes such as organization, persistence, the level of knowledge regarding the issue at hand, as well as the financial resources available to pressure groups. Aside from the necessary attributes that enable pressure groups to accomplish their goals, there are certain steps that are deemed necessary (Pross 1992, 3): common objectives must be identified, strategies worked out, procedures adopted, responsibilities assigned, and consistent positions formulated, if a group is to persuade government to take specific action. Pross believes that, above all, pressure group activity must have continuity if it is to have lasting effect.

The policy process in Canada, like other countries, is highly bureaucratic. As a result, most successful pressure groups are those that know who to talk to - and when - and are able to communicate in a bureaucratic fashion, with briefs, working papers, and professional consultations, as opposed to the use of placards and demonstrations (Pross 1992, 15).

The term successful, when looking at the pressure groups and those admitted by the bureaucracy, would include considerations such as access, impact, and overall level of representation of a group's interests and concerns by the bureaucracy. To encourage the odds of success, some major pressure groups in Canada have established themselves as federations in order to influence the local, provincial, and federal governments within the

Canadian political structure (White 1998, 157). Some examples of established federations are the Canadian Bankers Association, the BC Federation of Teachers, and the Canadian Construction Association. These are just a sample of the numerous federations in Canada that exist solely to represent the interests and values of their members, and to increase their access to the policy making process.

In looking at levels of access, Leon Dion (1971, 335) found that the groups who were afforded the best access to government were those that neither wholly opposed nor wholly endorsed the policies of governments. Whereas, the groups that were denied effective access to governments were either those that embraced governmental policy or those that were wholly opposed to government. Participation in the democratic process requires some degree of equal access, balanced debate, diversity of expression, and the absence of overwhelming bias favouring one side or another (Danielian & Page 1994, 1057). Public debate in which important voices were silent or drowned out could mislead the public and would also ill serve democracy.

This next part of the "pressure groups in action" section of the review will look at specific actions of pressure groups in general, as well as at tactics used by specific types of pressure groups.

Media Use and Advertising

Media coverage has clearly had an important role in promoting concern about various pressure groups, especially those concerned with environmental issues. There is strong

circumstantial evidence that the priorities of policy-makers and the general public are influenced, though not determined, by the issues stressed in news coverage (Fletcher 1992, 180). There have been a number of case studies done that have shown that sustained media attention has forced government action on a particular issue or problem. One is then able to conclude that media coverage influences public perceptions and the responses of politicians by framing issues as economic or social, personal, or political (ibid.).

Media use and advertising is a mainstay for pressure groups at some point or another. Groups influence public opinion through advertising, via direct lobbying, by capturing media attention, and by exploiting Parliament (Pross 1992, 166). Media use and advertising serve as a way of getting in touch with members of the general public who may be sympathetic to a group's cause. As well, politicians of every rank are also susceptible to the influences of media and advertising, serving as a potential sympathetic ear to the cause (Cook *et al* 1983, 25). The general public and politicians, with their newly formed opinions, are able to serve pressure groups by providing the information. This service can be in various forms. For example, a number of people of the general public may sit down and write a heart-felt letter to their local politician, providing copies for the provincial and national representative, voicing their distaste for the particular action or bill that was presented to them via the media, with the original information gained from a pressure group utilizing media. Perhaps the politician will go to work the next day and make a few calls to influence the issue at hand. Either way, the use of media and advertising can be an especially gainful option for any pressure group with a well-worded message. But as

pointed out in an earlier portion of the review, most pressure groups are limited in their venues due to the lack of financial resources.

The lack of resources will indeed limit the extent of advertising done by a group, but the use of media remains an option. Therefore, groups with many willing volunteers but little cash have come to rely on the free advertising provided by the media. One may think that the only real limitation in using media is the imagination of the members of the group in deciding how to grab the attention of reporters and television cameras. Actually, this has been found to be untrue. Theories of biased pluralism have revealed that the level of media coverage is proportional to material resources, especially money, organization, and media-related skills (Danielian & Page 1994, 1059). Because most corporations and business associations have far more resources than most other pressure groups, one is able to assume that there is a dominance of corporate and business interests in public debate and media coverage. Journalistic emphasis upon the novel, the spectacular, and the contentious provides the resource-poor pressure groups little choice but to draw media attention with protests, demonstrations, and other such activities (Danielian & Page 1994, 1060). With the corporate pressure group bias, the notion of balance in terms of representation in media coverage is just that, a notion.

In spite of the hard-earned, potential benefits of media use and advertisement for pressure groups, Pycrz believes that groups are most active, and often most effective, when they are out of the news; nurturing their access to public decision-makers (Pycrz 1994, 333). Pycrz makes the assumption that pressure groups can all gain equal access to the policy

decision-makers in order to impact the final outcome. The potential ideological burden of soliciting the attention of the media is that once a group presents its position on an issue, the media can create an ideological niche in which groups may find it difficult to change in spite of fluctuating situations. Unfortunately for a pressure group in this position, life is not static. If the group wavers from its position, and the media reports this, it may create a feeling of distrust amongst the public and the membership (Sidle 1993, 197). However, the media can also beneficially serve the newer, issue oriented groups, as well as the more seasoned groups in their efforts to obtain and maintain the public's and politicians' attention. Going public is an important technique of communication that pressure groups rely upon to obtain and maintain public support for the policy positions the group feels the government should take (Pross 1994, 176). Because it is the function of the media in a democratic system to inform the public, the pressure groups with limited resources often create newsworthy events so that information about their group and their activities will be publicized without a cost to the group (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 488).

Direct Lobbying

Lobbying, with the knowledge of the policy process and skill in presenting a clients case to decision-makers, has become a fixture in our modern, extremely complex, governmental system (Pross 1994, 179). Lobbyists working within the Canadian parliamentary system face some daunting challenges. In order for a lobbyist to be effective, he/she must have reliable information about when, where, and how decisions are being made, along with an ability to penetrate the screening structures set up to shield decision-makers from unwanted entreaties (Wilson 1992, 117). A good lobbyist must earn good access to

decision-makers as well as to those who supply the information and advice on which decisions are based. Wilson believes that it is essential to recognize the power of those who shape Cabinet ministers' perceptions of problems and solutions.

For direct lobbyists, Wilson (1992, 117) details how lobbyists are able to best address the challenges:

- cultivate alliances; when the door of a new contact opens, make sure that one's homework is complete by understanding the audience;
- the higher up the ladder the bureaucrat is, the more valuable their time is; be concise and provide illustrations if possible;
- the art of successful negotiation requires that a person understand what his/her adversaries value and need as people - and give it before he/she is able to receive it;
- build personal rapport with people who are sympathetic;
- figure out a strategy for building coalitions across parties; and
- follow-up is critical (i.e. credit those deserving credit).

The list provides some general guidelines considering that there is considerable variation across both pressure groups and issues. The extent of variation includes the degree of access to decision-makers and in the extent to which access translates into influence. It has been found that access and influence are generally better where the issue is not perceived to entail major and visible redistribution of scarce resources among pressure groups or government agencies (Wilson 1992, 118).

In spite of lobbying being a fixture in our modern and complex government system, there continues to be a degree of distrust towards lobbyists. The efficiency at which most lobbyists operate has inevitably drawn suspicion. Even the firms who fulfill their objectives with integrity are observed with suspicion because of the fact that the wealthy are most likely to succeed in the policy process because they can buy lobbying expertise. This is galling to many Canadians who believe in equal rights for all in a democratic society. The function and necessity of lobbying in the Canadian political culture has not alleviated the distaste for its existence. This situation may never resolve itself.

Parliament

Parliament, a formal channel of access, has become an important target for groups wishing to publicize their demands and receive the legislature's support (Sidle 1993, 194). With the participation and endorsement of Parliament regarding the efforts of a specific pressure group comes the interest from other pressure groups to also get Parliament on-side. In spite of the fact that some MPs subscribe to the argument that the Canadian Parliament has been hijacked by pressure groups, there is a more prominent view that groups make a useful contribution by providing information, proposing policies, and providing reaction as to whether legislation and regulations will be workable. This has been reiterated by such well known environmental activists as Elizabeth May. She has stated that she works extensively with MPs individually and members of standing and legislative committees (Sidle 1993, 200).

Pross believes that the more direct-action methods such as blockades, placard carrying, and boycotts do not work in the long run (Pross 1993, 150). In short term, the action may result in a decision being turned around, but to change policy groups need to be close to government thinking. Groups also need to overcome the barriers created by administrative secrecy, and become knowledgeable about where and when to intervene as a pressure group.

In spite of Parliament's potential limitations, it has become a valuable tool amongst the leaders of pressure groups. Because of the fragmentation of election discourse as a result of the increasing role of pressure groups, the parties' ownership claim on the election stage has become the subject of considerable debate (Hiebert 1991, 3). The increase in election involvement by pressure groups has introduced a new dynamic to election contests and the parliamentary process, as well it has raised questions regarding the fairness and appropriateness of the present regulatory regime (Hiebert 1992, 4). For example, some are in favour of allowing pressure groups to participate financially in elections and the parliamentary process through actions such as donations towards specific political parties and more ready access to pre-policy development. In allowing this, groups force parties to address issues that they would otherwise be reluctant to have put on the political agenda (Hiebert 1991, 8). However, unless the legislation enacted in 1974, which prohibits pressure groups from incurring expenses to promote or oppose candidates or parties, is addressed (Hiebert 1991, 13), the level of participation by pressure groups in formal elections will remain limited.

In spite of the limitations on participation of pressure groups in the formal political channels, there has been a recent increase in the chorus of criticism regarding the election activities of organized pressure groups. There is the perception that these rapidly proliferating bodies - representing diverse interests - are becoming more organized and openly political (Tanquay & Kay 1993, 77). The tactics employed have resulted in the general fear that pressure groups may influence electoral outcomes by hijacking the political agenda, thereby diminishing the role of the traditional representative institutions in a democracy - the political parties. The fear is that ultimately this could lead to government by special interests, with political parties and individual candidates becoming increasingly accountable to a few wealthy groups with the resources to propagate their views (Tanquay & Kay 1993, 78; White 1998, 85).

Protests

Nonviolent demonstrations are used as a means of securing publicity for a group's cause. Both violent and nonviolent protests do not fit within the norms of mutual accommodation between pressure groups and policy-makers in Canada (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 483). As a result, Jackson & Jackson believe that groups who employ the protest tactic risk being ignored, discredited or pacified with purely symbolic action. As well, the use of protests, and other well publicized attempts to influence legislators, such as bombarding representatives with petitions, letters, and telegrams, tend to bear out the generalization that noise accompanies political weakness (Ball 1993, 112; Danielian & Page 1994, 1057). Ball suggests that governments and pressure groups operate within a web of political values and attitudes that provide other variables to determine group effectiveness (Ball

1993, 115). The result is that pressure groups are expected to learn the already established intricacies of policy development and abide by them in order to be effective in impacting the outcome of policies.

As stated earlier, Pross also believes that confrontation is deemed dysfunctional for groups in the long run (Pross 1993, 150). However, in the early life of pressure groups, protests can be very important tools, sometimes they are essential. The less organized, policy-polished groups lack the influence within the policy community. The lack of influence may be countered by exciting public discussion on the issues that concern them. The essentials for participating in policy discussions - standing in the policy community, knowledge of the policy process, and the language used - are lacking in a lot of groups. Consequently an appeal to public opinion may be the best way - sometimes the only way - to challenge specific decisions or to object to an undesirable policy and to embarrass governments into taking action (Pross 1992, 124). Actions are often in response to an issue already in the presentation stage. Pressure group options are limited as to how to stop the progression they oppose. As a result, only those actions with the most media grab can be considered. By making use of protests, a group is able to make use of the media's ability to influence the only decision-makers who may still be able to change the course of events - the politicians (Pross 1993, 150).

Phillips, in defense of the various actions employed by pressure groups, including protests/demonstrations, states that all political issues and discourses are filtered through values and ideologies, thus, meaning is always constructed or framed (Phillips 1994, 194).

Pressure groups do not accomplish the framing of issues "... by locking themselves away in offices, but by being visible to people, demonstrating the injustices, the causes, and reasons for working for change" (ibid.). Phillips believes that by getting people to act, the group reinforces a collective identity and communicates its 'frames' to others. The wide-spread acceptance of the projected frames by groups does not occur as the result of a single event. Instead, it can take many actions and efforts which can span over months, years, or generations.

There are numerous opinions offered regarding the degree of effectiveness of protests in impacting the outcome of a policy or other issue. Some theorists believe that protests are necessary within certain criteria, a tool that should be accessed as frequently as deemed necessary. Others believe it should never be accessed for the result will not be suitable for all parties involved and the group employing the action will marginalize itself further. One could also look at it simply from the stance that as long as the average citizen is being drawn into political participation, then varying degrees of effectiveness have been accomplished. Ball supports this summation in stating that by encouraging wider political participation, pressure groups are said to extend the liberal democratic concept of representative government, and in some instances groups provide the only source of opposition to the united front imposed by the political parties (Ball 1993, 117).

4.5 Pressure Groups from an Environmental Perspective

There is interest in Canadian society to press for policy change. Two notable examples of this in all Western democracies since the late 1960's are the rise of women's and

environmental movements (Richardson 1993, 7). The environmental movement appeared in western societies as people became concerned about the deteriorating quality of the natural environment and the depletion of world resources (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 495). The emergence of new and more outspoken organized environmental pressure groups is linked to the progress of scientific discovery. This growth and increased vigour of pressure groups has resulted in the policy process being crowded and the ability to reach agreements within the process has become more difficult (Richardson 1993, 8). The existence of groups is a constraint on governmental action, but this cannot be helped for the role of government is to hold societies together. To do this, governments must accommodate the major sections of interests in society.

Environmental pressure groups can be differentiated from other types of pressure groups, such as the industry-business and professional association pressure groups. As stated earlier in the review, pressure groups like these latter ones are formed to represent the interests of their members, but not typically the Canadian collective good. Of course, some of the indirect results of these organizations can have a collective good (i.e. Canadian Medical Association ensures their members are good standing in order to practice medicine in Canada), but this is not the primary objective of these organizations; the interests of their members are primary. Environmental pressure groups, on the other hand, are composed of members who have an interest in the natural environment and its continued health. The natural environment, being a collective good (we all rely on a healthy environment for the continuation of humans and other animals) benefits from the efforts of these groups. This part of the review will delve further into the role

environmental pressure groups have had and continue to have on the Canadian political landscape.

From its inception, environmental pressure groups have been treated as a threatening phenomenon by such interests as big business and industry (Wilson 1990, 143). Wilson believes that this is due to industry's conviction that any systematic threat to the sanctity of the status quo undermines its leverage in financial markets. Environmentalism, in its entirety, imperils the unwritten code of speculative rights in the capitalist system in Canada, thus threatening a system that has long legitimized a profitable flow in access to public resources (Wilson 1990, 143; Stefanick 1996, 271). Environmental groups face corporate-government alliances determined to resist fundamental challenges to 'business as usual' patterns of resource development (Wilson 1992, 124). As a result of the perceived threat by environmental pressure groups, environmental groups, by and large, remain outsiders in the Canadian policy process. Due to a high level of "issue commitment" among environmentalists, these groups have been able to largely overcome the various problems which affect the abilities of other groups to attract and retain members, and have largely avoided the trend towards dependence on government resources (Wilson 1990, 145). Due to factors such as limitations in resources, environmental groups have moved little towards the establishment of hierarchical, over-arching group structures (with obvious exceptions like Greenpeace, Sierra Club of Canada, World Wildlife Fund, etc.). This has limited the ability in the establishment of stable and binding deal-making arrangements with the government and industry. These types of linkages are considered

highly suspicious by most environmental groups, and they are therefore not keen on such co-optation.

Environmental groups vary considerably in size, generally have low overhead operations, require deeply committed volunteers, and have a tendency to reject complex, formal structures (Wilson 1990, 149). These groups vary also in decision-making approaches, but most can be characterized as benign, open oligarchies. The main motivation for members of an environmental group is the desired result; the intrinsic worth or dignity of the ends themselves are regarded by most members as justifying effort. Broadly speaking, environmentalists themselves regard economic growth as less important than the protection of 'quality of life' (Jackson & Jackson 1998, 495), thus making them a threat to all other pressure groups and governments who exist to protect the continued growth in the Canadian economy in spite of the impacts to the natural environment.

Along with size, environmental pressure groups can be differentiated according to various criteria. As discussed earlier, Pross describes groups who would be presented as issue-oriented groups, or, at the other end of the spectrum, institutional groups. Institutional groups include groups like Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and World Wildlife Fund. These types of groups have an established hierarchical, over-arching group structure. Issue-oriented groups, however, envelope numerous other types of environmental groups. Issue-oriented groups spring up at a moments notice, then typically disband when the issue has been addressed. Occasionally, however, they keep on playing a part in politics and slowly become recognized voices in policy-making (Pross 1993, 149). In order to reach this

point, groups must become more highly organized, developing a particular competence to communicate their policy views to government. Since the early 1970s, a number of environmental pressure groups have made the transition, in effect engaging in the process of institutionalization. This transition does not happen quickly or completely. In fact, very few groups 'progress' to the institutional status, instead most being described as fledgling or mature groups (Pross 1993, 150).

There is a tremendous degree of diversity within the environmental movement. The movement's diversity represents an important political asset. The organizations within the movement are able to cover a range of tactical bases. There is typically some segment of the movement that can usually be counted on to gravitate quickly to the approach deemed most appropriate in a particular situation (Wilson 1990, 150). Because of the diversity within the environmental movement, interests opposing the efforts of environmental groups have found their various objectives very difficult to obtain, and impossible in some cases.

The diversity of environmental pressure groups also shows in the methods applied by these groups in order to accomplish their goals. The goals of the group influence how the group attempts to realize those aims. Groups with aims hostile to important aspects of the existing political system cannot hope to exert influence on the administration and legislature in the way legitimized business groups would do (Ball 1993, 109; Stefanick 1996, 50). The type of approval that the group possesses affects its methods. Those groups without approval (such as Greenpeace) have to resort to national campaigns and

programmes of civil disobedience. However, the groups deemed acceptable by government and other participants in the policy process, ones who do not threaten the status quo, will be called upon for active participation in policy decision-making (Stefanick 1996, 15). It is these groups that are able to use their participation as a powerful tool in any negotiation with the government.

There are, however, the environmental pressure groups who do not enjoy the approval of the various levels of government, or by other powerful pressure groups like industry-business groups. These groups do not share the privileges of access and do not have a vested interest in keeping issues out of politics. Because these groups lack power, and are excluded from securing power and influence, public debate is seen as a way of obtaining power and influence (Pross 1992, 159). These groups are prepared to challenge the status quo and bypass the Canadian capital in their search for environmental solutions (i.e. economic boycotts), which can result in volatile relations between the government and members of the policy community (Boardman 1992, 240; Garner 1990, 4). Groups like Friends of the Environment and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society refuse to play the game of pressure politics because the groups believe their objectives are qualitatively different from those of other pressure groups, in particular the industry-business groups (Tanguay & Kay 1991, 84). The outcome has been that relations between environmental groups and members of the policy community are often particularly hostile, perhaps because environmentalism attacks the ideological underpinnings of much of the economic activity in Canada.

The subject of resources has been already discussed in a previous section of this review. It was found that the level of resources available to pressure groups determines, to varying degrees, the effectiveness of the group. In an attempt to overcome the limitations imposed by the lack of resources, environmental groups have developed numerous alliances, referred to in this review as networks. The formation of a number of issue-specific alliances have enabled environmental groups to overcome problems that could have been expected otherwise (i.e. lack of personnel due to limited finances is alleviated somewhat with the sharing of information, research, and actions by various other like-minded groups). As well, the high level of issue commitment prevailing among group members enabled groups to counteract shortages of resources, thus enabling environmental groups to maintain lobbying and public relations efforts (Wilson 1990, 163).

It is the limitations in resources, as well as ideological constraints imposed on environmentalists by themselves, that has encouraged environmental groups to garner support from the general public in creative ways. The massive mobilization of support from the public depends largely on actions like the capturing of media attention. Both Pross (1986, 154) and Love and Goyer (1983, 85) acknowledge the importance of this route of influencing public opinion and generating wider participation in the policy process (Gardner 1990, 16). The dependency of environmental groups on media contacts to compensate for their weak position, with respect to interests that are well entrenched in government policy, is expected due to the groups' lack of traditional political power. The group with the least power to sanction has less incentive to play by the rules. In addition

to the media, the point of access to policy most used by environmental pressure groups on the national level is the lobbying of federal politicians (Pross 1986, 165). Signs of institutional and political change as a result of the efforts of environmental groups are appearing (Garner 1990, 25). Worldwide, campaigns by environmental groups have aroused public opinion, and decision-makers are increasingly obliged to consider carefully what the public is likely to tolerate or reject in terms of environmental impact (Lowe & Goyder 1983, 79; Coleman & Skogstad 1989, 132).

4.6 The Future of Pressure Groups in Canada

The increasing role of pressure groups in Canadian policy development, as well as in the overall political culture, has been found to have several effects. From a democratic participation standpoint, pressure groups have increased the sum total of public participation and influence on government policy (Presthus 1978, 69). One outcome of the increased role of pressure groups in Canadian politics has been that such groups (except perhaps poverty and minority groups) tend to represent social interests that are already highly advantaged. As a result, they put government in the position of protecting the strong against the weak. This, of course, is not a general application for even though environmental pressure groups have shown to be effective in influencing the policy process on a site specific basis, their successes have not constituted a strong position when compared with the industry-business pressure groups. Other effects that have been noted with the increasing role of pressure groups have been the participation of the general public in the Canadian democracy, increased awareness of the intricacies of the policy

process, and the increase in the representation of previously underrepresented groups within the Canadian society.

It is widely known that both the organizational structures and the multi-media communications abilities are constantly expanding to bring together the forces of like-minded individuals and pressure groups across national boundaries (Dobell & Steenkamp 1993, 574 from Pal 1997, 209). The new 'hypermedia' (electronic mail, internet, video conferencing, etc.) enables groups from across the world to communicate, develop networks, and track the actions of other groups, industry, and government in every continent. Stanbury & Vertinsky (1994, 14) outline some of the potential impacts of the new communication and information technologies on pressure groups. The new information technologies are: making it less expensive for groups to operate; enabling organizations to seek out more easily others with similar interests; enabling easier communication, more often, and for longer periods of time; enabling ease in raising funds, to acquire information, monitor issues, communicate views; and enabling the mobilization of members to a threat or opportunity for group action (Pal 1997, 210).

Pressure groups have been found to perform various functions vital in the policy process, as well as in the Canadian political community in general. Pross details four of the most important functions performed by pressure groups: they play communication roles in politics, they transmit demands from sectoral constituencies to public authorities, they carry messages and demands from the authorities to their members, they help build public support for programs and policies, they administer various programs for government, and

they often engage in regulatory activities (Pross 1993, 14-15). It was found in the first part of the review that there are various types of pressure groups, each performing a role in democracy. Pross has long argued that as political power becomes more diffused, the political system becomes increasingly dependent on 'policy communities' to articulate, implement, and monitor the general will (Johnson 1996, 13). Because of the growing complexities in life, pressure groups have come to fill a political representation void, and the need is expected to continue to grow. The long term direction of change is toward democratization, decentralization of policy to local communities, debureaucratization of government structures, and the forging of partnerships with communities, business, and pressure groups of all types (Pross 1993, 203).

As we come to understand how it is that some pressure groups survive in the Canadian political system, to become influential and organizationally sophisticated, while other groups quickly disappear, there is the opportunity to learn a great deal about pressure group interior life and about their particular policy environment (Pross 1993, 148).

Pressure is a group phenomenon which indicates the push and resistance between groups. It is the balance of the group pressures that results in the existing state of society (Bentley 1993, 19). And, as suggested by Pross, it is in the best interests of both the political parties and the pressure groups to reach an understanding of the role each can best play in the Canadian political system and to work out an arrangement - balance - within that understanding (Pross 1994, 184). In doing so, all pertinent values have the opportunity to be represented in the policy process, and democracy is preserved.

Chapter Five: Policy Analysis

Policy analysis is part of the first step in attempting to address the thesis question. In order to efficiently perform the analysis, policy models will be used to better understand the progression of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. Models are used to describe and generate explanations of, or predictions about, social or political phenomena (Salazar & Alper 1996, 384). Models are representations of selected elements in which political actors are able to choose tactics based on displays of how power is configured. Power may be found to be widely distributed or concentrated in a polity. As a result, political actors estimate where they are likely to have leverage, based on the information provided by a model analysis, and utilize resources to influence particular targets. These models are used as strategic resources (ibid.). People acting on the basis of models will target particular actors and institutions and employ particular tactics (Salazar & Alper 1996, 387).

The following is a summary of both Kingdon's and Pross' policy models based on the graphic display in the Appendix (see Appendix: Models).

5.1 Kingdon's Decision-making Model

Kingdon's decision-making model enables an analysis of a policy to be broken down into specific, separate components in order to better understand the process which led to the policy decision. By applying his three streams in the analysis, the researcher is then able to realize why or why not a policy was influenced or developed. The following is a summary of the structure of Kingdon's decision-making model.

The three streams that determine whether or not a policy is put in place are: 1) the Problem Stream; 2) the Policy Stream; and 3) the Political Stream. These streams (see Appendix: Models - Kingdon's) must merge to create a "window of opportunity" in order to impact a public policy or change an already existing one.

The following details each of the streams that make up Kingdon's Decision-Making Model.

1) The Problem Stream: indicators show that there is a problem.

Kingdon states that there has to be some kind of problem that emerges. Quite often, when looking specifically at environmental issues, it is of crisis proportions (i.e. global warming, hole in ozone, acid rain, etc.). There is a sudden deep concern for an issue because the public is made aware of the problem; the problem emerges out of unforeseen awareness that something is wrong.

2) The Policy Stream [solutions]: Policy communities are composed of specialists in a given policy area such as health, housing, environmental protection, criminal justice. The policy communities interact with one another and exist independent of such political events as changes of administration and pressure from legislators' constituencies' (Kingdon 1984, 123-4). It is within these policy communities that the second stream can be found. The second stream must be in place; there actually has to be a policy. Someone has to already be thinking about a solution within the policy community (Kingdon 1995,

172). If there is not a solution, then the widow of opportunity will not open because the policy makers do not want to be involved in something they cannot address.

The selection of a policy is very deliberate. Through the imposition of selected ideas, some policies are selected out for survival while others are discarded (Kingdon 1995, 200). The criteria in deciding which ones are sifted out include technical feasibility, acceptability with the values of community members, and the knowledge of future constraints - including budget constraints, public acceptability, and politicians' receptivity (ibid.).

3) The Political Stream [the political will]: "Flowing along independently of the problems and policy streams is the political stream, composed of such things as public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in government, and changes of administration" (Kingdon 1984, 152).

The third stream, the political stream, can also be referred to as the political will stream; the desire to do something about the issue. Because you might have a very serious problem, and in fact there may already be a solution, you have to have the political will. In order to get it into the public realm where it is actually going to be created as policy, where government cares enough to do something about the issue, you have to have the political will. Sometimes this can be driven by the sheer magnitude of the problem. An alarming problem can cause enough public opinion that the political stream may worry that inaction could cause political problems.

Within the political stream are the participants in the policy process. The participants include levels of government, stakeholders, and interested groups. There is also what Kingdon refers to as the “policy entrepreneur”; a fancy way of describing a politician who takes on a pet interest/issue. The policy entrepreneur brings several key resources into the policy process: their claims to a hearing, their political connections and negotiating skills, and their sheer persistence (Kingdon 1995, 205). The policy of focus may come to light because the politician’s constituents present the issue of concern to them and request action, or because it is of personal interest to the individual politician. The issue is taken on by that one person, who then may go to caucus or to their party and say that the issue is serious enough that it requires address.

The participants within the policy process must keep in mind, throughout the process, that the progress of the three streams may discontinue. This may occur because windows of opportunity can close as abruptly as they open. Two notable reasons for the windows of opportunity to close are a change in the political stream, and a new problem captures the attention of government officials. With this realization, some participants within the policy process, seeking to push their agenda, cannot avoid maintaining a feeling of urgency throughout the process.

It has been established that all three streams have to occur in order to merge at the same time for the window of opportunity to open to influence or create a policy. There is also the fact that the window of opportunity naturally opens and then closes during the cyclical

nature of the political system (Kingdon 1995, 166). As well, there is always the potential that a new issue erupts that is critical enough to capture the attention of government officials. It takes a knowledgeable “entrepreneur” to anticipate this moment and capitalize on the potential.

The knowledgeable entrepreneur must also realize that the window of opportunity remains open for a limited amount of time; the duration in which no one can be completely sure (Kingdon 1995, 195). As a result, interested groups and individuals must act when the opportunity presents itself for fear of “missing the boat” altogether.

As mentioned previously, there are times within the political arena that a policy analyst is able to predict when certain occurrences generally occur. These are moments of opportunity that interested groups and individuals would be best served in utilizing. There are also the notable “unpredictable windows” that even the policy entrepreneur is unable to accurately predict resulting in decision-makers scrambling to react. A crisis can potentially best serve an interest or be quite the opposite; hence the term unpredictable.

Kingdon’s decision-making model is useful in that it describes the policy process in three simple streams. The researcher is able to break down any process leading up to a policy decision and decipher questions like: Was there the political will? and Where was it from? In studying the policy process, these questions can be paramount.

5.2 Pross' Policy Community Model

Pross' policy community model is designed to identify the various levels of players/actors involved in policy development or change. Policy communities include all actors who have an interest in a policy area, who share a common policy focus, and who help shape policy outcomes (Whitaker 1995, 430).

When looking at Pross' model one can see that there are numerous actors involved in policy development (see Appendix: Models - Pross'). There is the bureaucracy trying to get their ideas through, and the various levels of government acting in the interests of their own mandate. There is also the pressure from other political parties to pursue other actions, and there is the interested groups at the lower portion of the model. There are the stakeholder groups trying to pressure government to make decisions in their favour.

Included are the "interested groups" (as well as interested individuals) who focus only on specific policies that affect them. There are also the pressure groups composed of individuals who come together to get something done then disband once the goal has been accomplished. Finally, there are the interest groups more like Greenpeace; a group that is continually trying to create a whole new ethos in society. This type of interest group not only creates an issue but also creates a whole new social movement in order to get people to think in a new way (Summerville 1999).

One actor in policy development that has not been included by Pross, but has been included in the model, is the media. The media influences policy development by simply presenting the public, politicians, bureaucrats, and policy makers with stories that can

potentially become issues (Kingdon 1995, 57). As stated in the literature review, media coverage has clearly had an important role in promoting concern. There is also strong circumstantial evidence that the priorities of policy-makers and the general public are influenced, though not determined, by the issues stressed in news coverage (Fletcher 1992, 180). Groups influence public opinion through advertising, via direct lobbying, and by capturing media attention (Pross 1992, 166). The potential impacts of media coverage is unpredictable and site specific, depending on the issue at hand. For example, the general public is the target of mainstream media. Depending on the issue, be it local, regional, national, or international, the public targets their concern (and perhaps outrage) at the level of government applicable. Private interests, like the energy resources field, may, in response to a media effort, pressure officials from the federal energy department and their counterparts in energy producing provinces such as Alberta and British Columbia to assert their interests (Whitaker 1995, 430). In light of the connection between media and its impacts on policy development, one realizes that media plays a considerable role in public policy. As a result, media holds a place in the policy community showing no connection to one actor over another.

Pross states that one must look at how each of the policy communities interact. Whitaker observes that these policy “communities” have grown up around particular policy areas involving bureaucrats from the federal government, their counterparts in the provincial bureaucracies, and the interested private-sector organizations, including companies, trade associations, and pressure groups (ibid.). In essence, what these communities have accomplished is an expansion of access to relevant information and the establishment of

external bases of potential support for specialized bureaucrats in their policy fields. The increase of interaction due to the creation of policy communities has also allowed alliances to be made - as indicated by the crossing over of circles in Pross' model. These alliances are made when the opportunity arises. When these alliances are no longer useful, they are discontinued. Hence the name "talking chameleons" (penned by Pross); interested groups are capable of changing their colour to suit the issue, unlike political parties.

Pross' model is also very good at showing the different levels of progression in policy development. The progression, interaction and influence of the various communities are on a site specific basis depending on the issue. The researcher must look at the origins of influences in order to realize where the power is for each policy decision. By applying Pross' policy communities model, the researcher may realize where the power lies in a policy decision, as well as realize what the chain of events were leading up to the policy decision, realize who came together and what kind of pressure they exerted, and whether there was any success in that pressure.

The above policy analysis portion will aid in understanding the following case study focusing on the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.

Chapter Six: Clayoquot Land Use Decision - A Case Study

Clayoquot Sound is located on British Columbia's Pacific Rim, on the west coast of Vancouver Island. The Sound has been the focus of intense public debate with attention on land use, First Nations land rights, ecosystem protection, aesthetic values, and resource development since 1980 (Province 1993a, 1; Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 11). The Sound consists of a significant wilderness area, with biogeoclimatic zones ranging from snow-capped mountains, to massive ancient rain forests, to sandy beaches. It encompasses 3,000 square kilometres (350,000 hectares) of land and water, running from Hesquiat Peninsula down the west coast of Vancouver Island for 65 km (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 10; Province 1993a, 1). Nine of Clayoquot Sound's primary watersheds (watershed basins that drain directly to the sea) of 1000 hectares or more are essentially natural (Province 1993a, 2). Six of these watersheds together form the largest continuous block of natural primary watersheds left on Vancouver Island.

There are over 4,500 known plant and animal species in Clayoquot Sound, including black bears, wolves, cougars, Roosevelt elk, and 249 species of birds (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 10). In the spring, grey and orca whales feed offshore while hundreds of sea lions feast on the large herring schools moving inshore to spawn. The most politically notable plant species in the Sound are the ancient trees. Some of the world's biggest and oldest Sitka spruce, western red cedar, Douglas fir, hemlock and balsam - up to 1700 years old and 200 metres tall - exist in the Sound. It is their notable beauty and commercial value that has sparked an intense conflict for almost thirty years, attracting attention from around the world.

Clayoquot Sound is part of the Regional District of Alberni-Clayoquot. There are four communities within the Sound: the Nuu-chah-nulth communities of Ahousaht, Tla-o-qui-aht, and Hesquiaht (with a combined population of less than 1000), and Tofino (Province 1993a, 3). The economy of the Regional District relies heavily on timber, tourism, fisheries, mining, and aquaculture (ibid.). The principle tourism attraction in the Sound is Pacific Rim National Park Reserve.

The following case study focuses on the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (released to the public April 13, 1993) as a public policy example. As stated previous, to analyze this policy decision the two policy models used are Kingdon's Decision Making Model and Pross' Policy Communities Model. The key areas to be addressed in the case study are: 1) the actors/participants, 2) the relations of power (alliances), 3) the interests served in the outcome, and 4) the resources necessary to participate. The overall objective is to understand the policy decision using the models.

The case study begins with a time line and summary up to the 'Moment in Time'. This is followed by a detailed description of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. From there, Kingdon's model is the first policy model to be applied in this research, followed by Pross' model.

Time Line: (The sequence of events listed below was extracted from “A Report by the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, & the Friends of Clayoquot’s Forest Watch Program.” The Friends of Clayoquot Sound. 1998.)

1980 - MacMillan Bloedel (MacBlo) announces its intention to log Meares Island, sparking the formation of Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS), an advocacy group dedicated to the preservation of the rain forest (Ecotrust 1997, 101).

1984 - MacMillan Bloedel prepared to log Meares Island; a large old-growth island in the Tla-o-qui-aht and Ahousht First Nations territories. It was at this time that local First Nations and environmentalists came together in BC’s first blockade to stop logging. MacBlo responded by applying for and receiving an injunction to stop the blockades. The Tla-o-qui-aht and Ahousht Nations declared the island a Tribal Park (Ecotrust 1997, 101), and applied for, and received, a counter-injunction based on outstanding land claims; the injunction remains in force today.

1988 - Sulphur Passage (north of Flores Island) is blockaded to stop a logging road being built by BC Forest Products and Fletcher Challenge. The blockade resulted in 36 people being arrested.

Late 1980s and early 1990s - the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force, and later the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, brought together local and provincial governments, industry, labour, and environmentalists

to develop a land-use plan. An attempt at the use of consensus-based decision-making and resource planning was made. Both processes failed.

1989 - The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force collapses over disagreement over interim logging and representation at the negotiation table (Ecotrust 1997, 101).

1990 - A study by Sierra Club revealed that of 60 primary watersheds larger than 5000 hectares on the west coast of Vancouver Island, only five remain unlogged, including three in Clayoquot Sound (Ecotrust 1997, 101).

1991 - The BC government establishes Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee. Shortly thereafter, environmental representatives walked out following a decision to approve interim logging (Ecotrust 1997, 101).

Summer 1991 – A logging bridge over the Kennedy River was deliberately burnt by members of Friends of Clayoquot Sound. There were road blockades and arrests (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).

October 1991 - The New Democratic Party (NDP) formed a new provincial government (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).

January 1992 - The new NDP government announced the formation of the Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE). Despite CORE's mandate to develop a comprehensive land use planning process for the province, the Clayoquot Sound Steering Committee process was exempted (Hoberg 1996, 276). In protest, sixty-five people were arrested in a blockade at the Clayoquot Arm bridge (Ecotrust 1997, 101).

October 1992 - Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force disbanded, unable to come to a consensus-based decision on land use (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).

February 1993 - The BC government bought \$50 million worth of shares in MacMillan Bloedel. An inquiry held concluded there was no 'conflict of interest' on the part of the provincial government (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).

April 13, 1993 - Clayoquot Land Use Decision Announced

Following the failure of the Steering Committee to reach full agreement on areas to be protected, Premier Harcourt flew his entourage and the press corps to an isolated hilltop in the Sound to announce the government's Clayoquot Land Use Decision. This decision claimed to be a balance between the area's economic, environmental, and social needs (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13). The decision protected the Megin Valley and other smaller areas, but still left 74% of Clayoquot's productive old growth forests open to logging. In protest, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound organized a blockade at Kennedy bridge. As well, in protest, the environmental representatives resigned from CORE (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).

July 5, 1993 - Opening of Clayoquot Blockade at Kennedy River Bridge.

Summer 1993 - Daily blockades and arrests totaled 857, culminating on August 9 when over 1000 people join blockade and 309 people were arrested. This was the largest civil disobedience action in Canadian history (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).

The summer of 1993 concludes the intended extent of the time line and summary up to the moment in time. The events preceding the summer of 1993 are detailed throughout the remaining case study.

6.1 The Clayoquot Land Use Decision

The following details on the Clayoquot land use policy decision are largely derived from the government document *Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision - Background Report* unless otherwise cited.

The Clayoquot Land Use Decision was a policy decision made by the government at the provincial level. The government put forth with the decision principles underlying the policy. The stated principles are:

The decision:

- builds on the limited agreement that was reached with the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee (the Committee). While recognizing that no consensus was achieved on the total land use issue, the Committee process did result in

an understanding on some areas that should be designated for development and on some areas that should be designated for protection;

- utilizes the extensive resource information that was collected by both the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force (Task Force) and the Committee (list of participants in both found below);
- is consistent with policy directions that were recommended in the Protected Areas Strategy and the Forest Practices Code;
- reflects the approach that any future forest harvesting in sensitive areas should be carried out under stricter guidelines for protecting environmental and tourism values than in the past;
- ensures that timber harvesting will utilize alternate strategies to avoid extensive clearcuts and to maintain visual qualities in important areas; and
- reflects a balanced approach between protecting the significant environmental values of the Sound, while ensuring stability for workers, local communities and their economies (Province 1993a, 6).

The Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision was broken down into two main sections:

Protected Areas and Integrated Resource Management Areas (see Appendix - Map).

1) Protected Areas

The Clayoquot Land Use Decision gives protected status to 48 500 hectares; 18 percent of the land area (Province 1993a, 7). Combined with the existing protected area of 39 100 hectares, the result is a total of 87 600 hectares, or 33 percent, of the Clayoquot Sound land area is in protected area. These areas are reserved from any *new* (italics mine)

resource development or allocation, including timber harvesting, mineral claim staking and Land Act tenures. *Treaty rights have yet to be settled and include protected areas in the negotiations* (ibid.). (italics mine)

2) Integrated Resource Management Areas

The majority of the Clayoquot Sound land base is designated as integrated resource management areas. It is these areas which contain the “working forest” (Province 1993a,10) (See *Clayoquot Sound Forest Practices Standards* for details on the working forest). These areas will continue to support various types of economic activity, including timber extraction, fisheries, wildlife, tourism, recreation and mineral exploration and development. Aquaculture activity can be conducted on the shoreline areas that adjoin integrated resource management areas. Economic assurance is provided with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision for forest workers, their communities, and the forest industry. The policy decision resolves the outstanding land use question in Clayoquot Sound.

The goal for the working forest is a sustainable harvest level of 600 000 cubic metres per year. The actual levels of harvest are tentative for the actual changes in allowable annual cut (AAC) are determined by the province’s Chief Forester. Some of the details guiding the allocation are based on the following:

- The government will amend the areas of Tree Farm Licenses (TFLs) 44 and 54 and the Arrowsmith Timber Supply Area (TSA) to delete the areas identified for protection.

- The Chief Forester will require that the TFL holders in the area prepare revised TFL Management Plans.
- The Ministry of Forests will complete a new timber supply analysis for the Arrowsmith TSA.
- Changes to the TFLs and TSA will reflect the requirements of the special management areas and the application of new forest practices.
- The small dispersed cutblocks will be reforested, on average, within 3 to 5 years following harvest.
- An emphasis on more environmentally sensitive harvesting systems will result in more jobs. Aerial systems which suspend the logs in the air will be required.
- Harvesting methods such as single-tree selection and group selection methods will be utilized in sensitive areas within the scenic corridors.
- Sixty-two percent of the land base of Clayoquot Sound remains available for mineral resource extraction and development (Province 1993a,10).

A policy of performance-based operations will guide timber resources development in the integrated resource areas. “Performance-based” means that forest companies, must, on an on-going basis, demonstrate ‘good performance’ in meeting harvesting and environmental standards. New operations will be approved only when monitoring indicates that operations have been conducted to these standards (Province 1993a,11).

The Land Use Decision requires timber harvesting plans to incorporate smaller dispersed cutblocks. Lower road densities are required, instead utilizing skyline and helicopter harvesting systems.

Participants of the Task Force & the Committee

Participants in the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force (Task Force) and the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee (Committee) can be limited to five categories: resource development and extraction interests (aquaculture, fishing, labour, mining, small business, timber, tourism), environment, First Nations, bureaucrat (government employee), and politician (elected official). The number of participants in each are as follows:

Task Force

Resource development and extraction interests	3
Environment	0
First Nations	6
Bureaucrat	3
Politician	3
Residents of Tofino	2

The Provincial government initially included the Nuh-Chah-Nulth Tribal Council (NTC) on the Task Force without consultation, resulting in disinterest and distrust by the native residents of Clayoquot Sound. In an attempt to resolve the lack of First Nation's representation, the Province conducted separate discussions with the mediator and the NTC requested six representatives - one for the Council and one for each of the Tla-o-qui-aht, Ahousaht, Hesquiaht, Toquaht, and Ucluelet Bands (Darling 1991, 16).

The Committee (Darling 1991 in Appendix 5, 1)

Resource development and extraction interests	9
Environment	1
First Nations	1
Bureaucrat	6
Politician	4

6.2 The Outcome of the Clayoquot Sound Decision-Making Processes

The Clayoquot Sound decision-making process was a failed test of an innovative and promising experiment in democratic governance (Hoberg 1996, 274). This failed alternative model of governance, known as consensus-based negotiation, or shared decision-making, was first applied by the provincial government in Clayoquot Sound.

There were two attempts to reach consensus on land use decisions in the Sound. Both attempts were hindered by the same issue; the issue of what logging should proceed while negotiations were in progress. The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force was the first attempt, formed by the provincial government in August 1989 (Hoberg 1996, 275). A broad range of interests were represented including: labour, industry, environmentalists, Natives, and government. The task force's mandate was to develop a long-term sustainable development plan for the region, as well as approving short-term decisions about where logging would occur on the interim. It was the issue of short-term logging that resulted in the task force falling short of their stated goals (Darling 1991, 37).

The task force then recommended the creation of an alternative process, the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee, which was established in October

1990 (Darling 1991, 45). It was agreed by the task force that the mandate of the steering committee was to develop a long-term land use plan. The issue of short-term logging was left up to a panel consisting of officials from the Ministry of Forests and the Ministry of Environment (Hoberg 1996, 275). The decision of this newly appointed panel to allow interim logging created a major stumbling block for the consensus process. Individuals and groups representing environmental interests were outraged that the panel decided to permit logging in the Bulson Creek area, which was considered to be an unlogged watershed. The environmentalist interests saw this decision as an absence of a commitment to negotiate in good faith. They saw irreversible decisions being made on the very issues they were suppose to be addressing at the table, leaving them with the impression that they were falling into a “talk and log” trap (Hoberg 1996, 276). They had already agreed to give up one unlogged watershed, Tofino Creek, when they entered the original task force. Not wanting to lend legitimacy to the process, they resigned from the steering committee in May 1991 (ibid.). There are two reasons cited as to why the Bulson Creek watershed was slated for logging in spite of its “unmodified” state:

- From the perspective of industry, labour, and government, the watershed had already undergone some development so additional logging there was not considered unreasonable;
- Timber supply in the region was sufficiently tight that in order to keep the workers of the Kennedy Lake Division employed, access to Bulson Creek was deemed necessary (Hoberg 1996, 276).

In spite of the lack of environmental representation, the steering committee continued.

The committee membership believed that environmental views were still being represented in the committee by representatives from Tofino, the tourism sector, and the Ministry of Environment (ibid.). However, once the official environmental representatives left, the committee lost its most forceful advocates of the preservationist position.

The new NDP government announced the formation of the Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE) in January of 1992 (Hoberg 1996, 276). Despite CORE's mandate to develop a comprehensive land use planning process for the province, the Clayoquot Sound Steering Committee process was exempted. There are conflicting reasons given for this decision:

- The official government explanation is that more than two years had already gone into the local process and it was deemed unfair to the participants to preempt it at that point.
- The NDP was looking out for the interests of the International Woodworkers of America (IWA), which was concerned that CORE would become captured by environmentalists, and that it would be unfair to 'reward' them for walking out on the steering committee.
- The NDP wanted CORE to succeed, and including the Clayoquot Sound issue in the process would have potentially doomed the process from the start (Hoberg 1996, 275).

In spite of the environmental interests not being represented within the steering committee, the committee still could not come to a consensus (Hoberg 1996, 276). There

was the presentation of what was called “Option 5”, but the “greener” members of the committee from Tofino and the tourism sector would not agree to it. As a result, the steering committee disbanded in October 1992 without coming to any consensus on the land use issues.

After the committee process ended, the coalition supporting Option 5 organized to present what it called the “majority option” (Hoberg 1996, 277). This option was supported by ten of the thirteen interests at the table. The thirteen did not include the Native groups for they did not take a position on it, nor did it include the environmentalists who had walked out of the negotiations. The three dissenting groups were Tofino, tourism, and mining; Tofino and tourism thought it was not preservationist enough, whereas mining thought it was too preservationist. Ultimately, the two co-chairs of the failed steering committee issued a report to cabinet in January 1993 laying out various options (ibid.):

- Option 5
- A more preservationist option - the Tofino Option
- The option to refer all parts of the decision to CORE

With the failure of the steering committee process, policy was then developed as it had always been, at the highest levels of government in a lengthy cabinet debate. It was this decision that was announced April 13, 1993 by then BC Premier Mike Harcourt in Clayoquot Sound (Hoberg 1996, 277). The decision was found to be more preservationist than the “majority option”, but did not protect nearly as much of the land base as the environmental interests had sought. It was this decision that sparked the massive protests

during the summer of 1993 leading to over 800 people being arrested for blocking logging roads into Clayoquot Sound .

6.3 Summary of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision

The failure of the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force to reach a consensus, later the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, resulted in the government presenting their own Clayoquot Land Use Decision.

The summer of 1993 proved to be very memorable for most people of British Columbia. What first appeared to be a difficult local issue in land management became an international issue putting Canada's west coast on the international media scene (Hoberg 1996, 277). Despite opinion polls showing general public approval within the province for the government's compromise decision (although, soon after over 800 protesters were arrested in acts of disobedience in Clayoquot Sound, the government had only a 22 percent approval rating on environmental issues (Harrison 1996, 295)), concerns raised by the internationalization of the issue forced the cabinet to rethink the decision (Hoberg 1996, 277). The obvious reversal of the decision was not a politically viable option. Instead, the government took two major steps that produced similar results of a reversal without having to publicly acknowledge doing so.

Post-Clayoquot Land Use Decision

The first step made by the government, faced with few options of appeasing all interests (at the prodding of CORE Commissioner Stephen Owen), was to engage in an impartial mediator role appointing people well-known for their said environmental sympathies. The appointed people served as co-chairs. In addition, foresters, hydrologists, biologists, and others were appointed to a new panel of scientists to draft recommendations “to make forest practices in Clayoquot not only the best in the province, but the best in the world” (Report 5, 1). This new panel was named the Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound, known as the “Scientific Panel” for short. It was realized at this point, by the BC Ombudsman in a report released in November of 1993, that the local First Nations had not been adequately consulted about the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (McCallum 1997). As a result, four First Nations representatives were included on the Panel to integrate Traditional Ecological Knowledge into the new discussions.

In April 1995, the panel recommended extremely stringent forest practices that would ultimately make logging in the sound far more expensive, in some cases prohibitively so (Hoberg 1996, 277). In spite of this, due to pressure from the public, in July of 1995, the government announced that it was adopting all the recommendations put forward by the scientific panel.

The second step made by the government was to enter into an “interim measures agreement” in March 1994 with the Nuu-chah-nulth tribes, creating what Hoberg refers to

as a co-management agreement between the First Nations in the Sound and the provincial government (Hoberg 1996, 278).

6.4 The First Nations in Clayoquot Sound

The role of First Nations in Clayoquot Sound has not been explored in detail up to this point. In order to better understand the events surrounding the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, it is necessary to include the role of the local First Nations in this study.

The environmental controversy surrounding Clayoquot Sound has had a relatively long history, beginning with MacMillan Bloedel (MacBlo) proposing to log Meares Island in the early 1980s. It was then that the Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation and environmentalists put up the first logging blockade in Canadian history (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13). The blockade was constructed to stop the passage of logging equipment into the Tla-o-qui-aht Nations' traditional territory. The Tla-o-qui-aht Nation, at this time, declared Meares Island a tribal park. The First Nations and MacMillan Bloedel went before the provincial Supreme Court, each seeking an injunction to stop the activities of the other (Tennant 1996, 55). The judge granted MacBlo its injunction; the First Nations appealed the decision. The province's Court of Appeal reversed the lower court decision and ordered that logging be halted pending progress in resolving the Nuuchahnulth land claim encompassing Meares Island (*ibid.*). These land claim negotiations continue today.

The success of the Tla-o-qui-aht Nation was, unfortunately, saddled with tremendous debt. It was the strain of this debt that would serve as a strain on the alliance between the

First Nations of Meares Island and the environmentalists who worked along side them. Francis Frank, an elected chief of the Tla-o-qui-aht, reflecting on the Meares Island dispute said, “They [environmentalists] said they were with us, and clearly they weren’t.” (McIlroy, June 27, 1993). Frank is referring to the \$1.2 million in legal bills the tribal council was left with as a result of the court battle with MacBlo. This perceived breach of trust has resulted in the First Nations of Meares Island refraining from forming alliances with environmentalists to address the Clayoquot Sound issue.

In defense of fellow environmentalists, Friends of Clayoquot Sound director Valerie Langer responded by saying, “Nobody knew their debt was that much.” (McIlroy, June 27, 1993). Langer, like many other environmentalists working to preserve BC’s forests, is aware of the potentially powerful alliance that can be realized between the First Nations and environmentalists. During the Clayoquot Sound protests in the summer of 1993, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS) held off blockading logging roads until they received permission from the local First Nations. “An alliance with the natives is the best thing that could happen and I think the most frightening for the government,” says Langer (ibid.).

The maintenance of this desired alliance may, however, require compromise on the part of the environmentalists. The natives in Clayoquot Sound are opposed to the Clayoquot Land Use Decision announced by Premier Harcourt, and to the methods used by the logging companies, including the giant clearcuts. However, it is here that the First Nations part company with the environmentalists and where compromise on the part of the environmentalists is seen as necessary in order to maintain an alliance with the First

Nations. “We aren’t opposed to logging,” says Frank. “How can I say that when unemployment in some of our villages is 70 percent. But I can say we would only log in a selective, sustainable way.” (McIlroy, June 27, 1993). The degree of willingness to compromise on the part of the environmentalists in order to build/maintain First Nation alliances was later revealed in the Clayoquot Sound land use issue with the creation of the company Iisaak (detailed on page 89).

Clayoquot and the Future of Policy Development

Before the late 1980s and the issue of Meares Island, BC forest policy was conducted through a traditional regime that emphasized the mutually compatible interests of industry and government, with environmentalists and First Nations on the periphery (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 387). The Clayoquot Land Use Decision of April, 1993, combined with the Meares Island outcome, resulted in dramatic policy changes in BC involving both Aboriginal policy and forest policy. (The actual land use decision in itself may not have had quite an impact on policy regimes except that it was accompanied by an Interim Measures Agreement with the Nuuchahnulth (ibid., 399; Johnston 1999, 6).) Hoberg and Morawski refer to this type of dramatic change as a “policy sector intersection” (1999, 390).

The concept of sector intersection involves the overlap of actors and institutions that comprise the policy regimes for different sectors. Hoberg and Morawski identify two forces required in order for the intersection to occur: 1) some type of significant disruption - economic, social or political; and 2) the result of the strategic actions of

political actors (ibid.). Both forces, no matter how deliberate, can potentially produce unintended consequences, as well as intended ones.

Hoberg and Morawski applied the concept of policy sector intersection to the case of Clayoquot Sound. As stated, prior to the late 1980s, BC forest policy was administered through a traditional regime that emphasized the interests of industry and government. Aboriginal policy was dealt with in its own distinct policy regime. However, the combination of events involving the land use issues in Clayoquot served as catalysts resulting in these two policy regimes converging and producing notable policy changes (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 391). These changes include 1) the creation of a Forest Practices Code to implement what is considered more stringent regulation for harvesting; 2) an increase in the amount of wilderness protected from logging throughout the province; and 3) a comprehensive inventory analysis continues throughout the province to provide recalculations of the allowable harvest levels (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 393). These changes have resulted in policies that have been reported to have reduced the annual harvest levels of between 8 and 17 percent (ibid.).

The impact of these changes on BC's Aboriginal population has been notable. Throughout this most recent transition in forest policy, the First Nations of Clayoquot Sound have participated in a selective manner. The initial occurrence concerning Meares Island involved the cooperation between environmentalists and the local First Nations. However, throughout the summer of 1993 in Clayoquot Sound, the First Nations remained quiet (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 394). The reasons for this lack of

involvement was the lack of trust in alliances on the part of the First Nations, and that the First Nations throughout BC were, and continue to be, involved in the process of altering the political landscape of aboriginal policy through treaty negotiations (ibid.).

The application of treaty negotiations will alter the relationship First Nations have with government and impact the practice of resource management in the province of British Columbia. First Nations involvement will progress from the provincial and federal government being the dominant actors in the control over land and resources in traditional territory, with aboriginal groups largely excluded from meaningful participation, to the First Nations assuming administrative control over negotiated sections of land. This transition symbolizes dramatic changes in the status quo policy regime; what Hoberg and Morawski referred to as 'policy sector transition'.

“Unlike environmental groups, First Nations groups have difficulty using public opinion as a resource to motivate policy-makers to address their concerns. Instead, their major political resource has proven to be the power of law.”
(Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 392).

Beginning in the late 1960s, the courts began articulating the specific rights of the First Nations people of Canada (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 395). This progressively allowed First Nation people a powerful position in the policy network. The legal force behind a land claim is the recognition by governments and the courts of aboriginal title. The establishment of the treaty process in BC has forced resource extraction industries to recognize the First Nations as potential competitors to the resource and/or as potential partners.

In Clayoquot Sound, MacBlo has chosen to take the later approach. MacBlo has publicly supported First Nations and their quest for resource-management responsibilities: “First Nations should have a central decision-making role in ... resource development,” and “First Nations should share in the economic benefits from resource development within traditional territories.” (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 403). In April 1997, MacBlo entered into a joint-venture forest company with the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 404), Iisaak. MacBlo maintains 49% control of Iisaak, with the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations maintains the remaining 51% (Johnston 1999, 3). The new company assumed control over MacBlo’s operation in the northern part of the Sound. In taking this step, the First Nations in the region became not only part of the government, but also part of the forestry business. As a result, when environmentalists oppose logging in Clayoquot Sound, their opponents now not only include industry and government, but also the First Nations.

On June 16th, 1999, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Clayoquot’s new joint venture company Iisaak and various environmental groups was formally signed. The purpose of the MOU is

“to promote the resolution of the historic land use conflict in a way which respects First Nations’ traditional ownership of their territories, enhances local sustainable economic development opportunities, provides stability for local communities by reconciling parties that have been involved in social conflict, and protects the natural beauty and bio-diversity of Clayoquot Sound.” (Johnston September 1999, 14).

However, the key environmental group behind the organization of protests the summer of 1993, Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS), chose not to join the other environmental

groups (Greenpeace, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Western Canada Wilderness Committee) in the signing of this MOU. Friends Of Clayoquot Sound acknowledges the key steps towards conservation included in the MOU, such as not logging in pristine valleys. However, since only 27 percent of Vancouver Island's ancient forests remain standing, FOCS could not endorse any industrial logging of old-growth (Paone 1999, 16). Instead, FOCS has taken on the role of monitoring Iisaak's logging activities.

The decision by FOCS' to not sign the MOU with Iisaak, thereby not supporting the new co-management arrangement encouraged by the interim measures agreement, is indicative of the considerable tensions between aboriginal groups and environmental activists (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 403). With the creation of Iisaak, resulting in First Nations participating in industrial logging in Clayoquot Sound, environmental groups are obliged to forego previous agreements made with the First Nations. For example, in June 1996, Greenpeace and FOCS initiated a blockade on a road accessing old-growth slated for active logging in the Sound (ibid.). This was done in spite of an agreement made with the Nuuchahnulth chiefs that approval would be sought before any actions were employed. This action angered the chiefs; they demanded that the blockades be removed. In justifying their actions, the activists noted that "the Nuuchahnulth chiefs approved the logging we were protesting... As with any government, we reserve the right to disagree with the decisions that cause irreparable ecological harm." (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 403). Actions like this further the wedge between First Nations and environmentalists.

As discussed, the concept of policy sector intersection involves the overlap of actors and institutions that comprise the policy regimes for different sectors. The two forces identified by Hoberg and Morawski that are said to be required in order for the intersection to occur are: 1) some type of significant disruption - economic, social or political; and 2) the result of the strategic actions of political actors. In reviewing the above discussion, one is able to identify the significant disruptions that occurred in the case of Clayoquot Sound, as well as the strategic actions of the political actors. The first force, the internationally covered protests by the environmentalists and the land claims process, served as significant disruptions to the status quo in policy regimes. The second force consisted of notable events such as the introduction of the forest practices code, the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, as well as the creation of the interim measures agreement between the provincial government and the Nuu-chah-nulth. These forces combined have resulted in profound policy transformation. In the case of Clayoquot Sound, the regime governing First Nations has, in many cases, converged with the regime governing forest policy (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 406). The impact of this transformation in policy sectors was advantageous to the First Nation. However, for the environmental groups working to avoid the liquidation of the old-growth forests in Clayoquot Sound, the wedge driven between them and First Nations is counter to an advantageous alliance in the effort to maintain the ecological integrity of the old-growth forests of Clayoquot Sound.

In conclusion, the transformation in policy sectors has resulted in the establishment of alliances between the forest industry and the First Nations in Clayoquot Sound. This alliance has undermined the efforts of environmental groups such as FOCS. As stated

earlier, Langer realized that in the effort to halt industrial logging in the Sound, an alliance with the First Nations would help serve this objective. With the intersection of forest policy with Aboriginal policy, the interests involved in this intersection appear to have undermined future alliances between the First Nations and environmentalists. The overall result of the policy sector transformation on the effectiveness of environmental groups to impact policy has been substantial. Environmental groups such as FOCS, who have been unwilling to compromise in the past (i.e. refusing to sign the MOU regarding Iisaak), forego a potentially powerful alliance in their efforts to influence the impact of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.

6.5 Policy Analysis of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision

Policy analysis involves the separation of the policy into its parts (i.e. events, actors, alliances) for individual study. In order to properly examine the various parts of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision policy, one must ensure that the terms applied are generally understood. In order to ensure this throughout the policy analysis, the following section is provided.

6.5.1 Productive Vs. Non-Productive

When identifying the main actors in a policy process, labels are used in order to simplify the model illustration and ensure optimum understanding of the process being illustrated. Pross' Policy Community Model is no exception. Most of the terms used are straightforward in application. However, some of the labels require explanation.

The main actors in the Clayoquot Land Use policy analysis are mainly concentrated in three areas: bureaucratic, political, and interested groups. The labels applied in the two communities bureaucracy (government employed) and political (elected official) require little detailing for the labels used are commonly applied. However, the labels used in the area of 'interested groups' require further detail. The objective of this section is to first state the labels to be used, then define, and finally to justify why these labels are to be used and not others. The purpose of the objective is to reveal the potential misappropriation of labels which then form perceptions; perceptions and ultimately opinions and attitudes (Sherman & Gismondi 1997, 14; Tuan 1990, 70).

Hessing and Howlett (1997, 73), in their research on policy actors looking specifically at resource and environmental policy, have applied the terms "productive" and "non-productive" when describing stakeholders and interested groups. They write,

"The institutional and economic advantage of actors with 'productive' interests in resource activities typically exceeds that of those representing 'non-productive' interests. This imbalance curtails the opportunities for, and the effectiveness of, public involvement in the resource and environmental policy process."

The 'productive interests', in Hessing and Howlett's case, are institutional and economic; gauges readily recognized/accepted and measured by mainstream economists and members of government. The 'non-productive interests', however, are interests that appear to not contribute either economically or institutionally. One could certainly argue that all interests serve a productive role institutionally in the development and influencing of public policy (ibid.). However, one cannot easily argue that 'non-productive' interests contribute equally economically. As a result, the advantage remains with the 'productive'

actors in the policy process. The productive actors remain at an advantage until one critically evaluates the term 'economic' and how this is calculated.

The case study in this research looks specifically at the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, developed in response to the controversy surrounding logging in Clayoquot Sound. In terms of 'productive' and 'non-productive', these labels are applied to interested groups that either contribute to the economy by logging (productive) or do not contribute to the economy by focusing on the preservation of the old-growth forests (non-productive). Looking specifically at this application of labels, one could argue that both the extractors of the old-growth and the preservationists of the old-growth are both 'productive' interests. The economic value of the old-growth (without going into the entire debate in the inherent values of the preservation of old-growth) is shown to be far greater if left intact and unlogged (Schilder 1999, 18; Macy 1999, 12; Freed 1996, 211). The values of old-growth, if preserved, have been shown to contribute significantly to the local economies of the area in an economically sustainable fashion. The local economies are able to benefit from the protected old-growth through alternative economies such as low-impact tourism, wildcrafts, and seasonal product extraction (i.e. mushroom picking). The difference between the economy created/preserved through the protection of the old-growth forests and the logging of the old-growth forests may now be compared economically. Of course, one could then argue that preservationists, through the creation of an alternative economy, are 'productive' interests. The difference would be this 'protection economy' is long-term with sustainable economic gain because the forests are

left standing. Whereas, the logging of these same forests is ‘productive’ but with short-term, limited economic gain (because clearcut logging is short-term).

Upon using the terms ‘productive’ versus ‘non-productive’ using a vertical (protection - the trees are left standing therefore are not harvested) versus horizontal (logging - the trees are harvested therefore are not protected) analysis one can realize that the terms productive and non-productive are relative to context and application. One could further argue that the terms have been applied incorrectly; productive typically considered long-term and non-productive typically considered short-term. However, for conformity sake, the terms ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’ will be applied throughout the policy model analysis as Hessing and Howlett intended them to be applied; ‘productive’ are the pro-logging interests and ‘non-productive’ are the preservationists. The purpose of the above is to reveal the potential misappropriation of labels which then form perceptions; perceptions and ultimately opinions and attitudes.

6.5.2 Analysis Using Kingdon’s Model

By using the decision-making model by Kingdon, the researcher was able to establish a general overview of events and how they are organized into the three streams for describing how the window of opportunity was created. Kingdon’s model worked as a frame, which was then followed by Pross’ community policies model. Pross’ model was used to identify essential events and actors leading up to the policy decision and announcement.

As detailed in the Policy Analysis section, Kingdon's model enables an analysis of a policy to be broken down into specific, separate components to better study the process which led to the policy decision. Kingdon breaks the analysis down into three parts: the problem stream; the policy stream, and the political stream. As one of the two chosen models for the research, this analysis will begin by breaking down the Moment-In-Time using Kingdon's model.

1) The Problem Stream:

There are typically indicators that show there is a problem. In this case, the demise of both the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force and the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, as well as the continued pro and anti-logging pressures in Clayoquot Sound, serve as the indication that there was a land use policy issue. It was the provincial governments responsibility to address the problem.

2) The Policy Stream

The policy stream focus is on the solution; the introduction of a new policy or the change of a policy. The Clayoquot Land Use Decision, made public April 13, 1993, was the solution; the introduction of a new policy.

3) The Political Stream

The political will, in the case of Clayoquot Sound, was driven by the sheer magnitude of the problem. The NDP government was faced with a problem which caused a strong

enough public opinion that the government had to act. Had the government not acted, in spite of the public pressure, it would have risked political problems due to inaction.

In the case of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, all three streams occurred resulting in the window of opportunity opening and the introduction of the new policy. Using Kingdon's model for this policy analysis, one was able to answer the two earlier stated questions:

Was there the political will? and Where was it from? Both can be answered without complication simply because the situation surrounding Clayoquot Sound is fairly straight forward. There was the political will because of the external pressures exerted by interest groups, interested individuals, stakeholder groups, politicians, and bureaucrats in the provincial government. The political will came from all policy communities who had an interest or stake in the outcome of the decision.

6.5.3 Got Vs. Wanted

In any decision rendered by the state, there are perceived 'sides'. The Clayoquot Land Use Decision was no different. The 'sides' in this specific policy decision emulate the groups used in Pross' policy community model from the "Interest Groups Community". In the "terminology" portion of the thesis, the two sides have been broken down into 'productive' and 'non-productive'. In order to detail further the outcome of the policy decision, this next section identified who wanted what and who got what. As done in previous sections of this study, the division used to distinguish the two sides will apply the terms 'productive' and 'non-productive'. The policy is detailed above (Section 6.1), outlining the government decision as it is to be applied to the land base. What was then required

was a comparison of the actual policy decision with the desires and expectations of each of the sides. The objective was to draw out the 'winners' in the policy decision, as well as the 'losers'. From there, an understanding was gained as to why one side was seen as the losers and one side the winners, and the implications this has on the policy process in BC.

In order to accomplish the above, this next part of the study looked at the actual policy decision (Section 6.1; as well as at the proceeding, supporting sections - Sections 6.2, 6.3, & 6.4), the media bytes, and the interviews. Via the policy decision, media bytes, and the interviews, one was able to examine 1) the participants, 2) the alliances, 3) the interests served in the policy outcome, and 4) the resources necessary to participate in the policy process.

In examining the policy decision outcome from Section 6.1, one could simply state that because Clayoquot Land Use Decision allows for 74% of the Sound to be accessible to some form of logging, the productive interests won; leaving the non-productive interests as the losers. Reviewing the numerous media bytes from both 'sides', one was left with the impression that the non-productive interests are indeed the losers. Specifically, after the announcement of the policy decision by Harcourt, The *Toronto Star* reports that the forest companies impacted by the decision "...said the decision will prevent sawmill closures and massive layoffs that could have devastated the Clayoquot communities of Tofino and Ucluelet" (CP, April 14, 1993). This is supported by a report the same day in the *Ottawa Citizen* (Baldrey, April 14, 1993), stating that the forest companies in the Sound had expressed "...its cautious support for the decision, saying it will end uncertainty and

instability in the region and allow for proper industrial planning." "In broad terms, we're pleased the cabinet has finally made a decision which should bring some stability," said Doug Cooper, interim manager of the coast forest sector for the Council of Forest Industries [productive interest] (ibid.). As well, a senior employee for MacBlo, Dennis Fitzgerald, stated that industry was satisfied with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision - "Yes, industry certainly accepted it and supported it" (Section 6.5.4).

The apparent satisfaction on the productive side runs counter to the level of satisfaction of the non-productive side. For example, Vicky Husband (an official with the Sierra Club) states after the announcement by Harcourt, "We [non-productive interests] feel betrayed, angry and frustrated, and I suppose more than anything else, sad (Baldrey, April 14, 1993). Environmentalists [non-productive interests] said the government's decision effectively fragments the ecosystem in the Clayoquot area, opens the door to widespread devastation of old-growth timber, and is fraught with uncertainty about logging practices (ibid.). While the environmentalists were outraged with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, the forest industry [productive interests] expressed relief that not only had the decision finally been made, but that it appeared to have struck the right balance. Fred Lowenberger, Vice President of Land Use for International Forest Products (Interfor), one of the two major forest license holders in the region, said the government had chosen a balanced approach. "It's a very realistic option. On balance, if you're sitting in cabinet and caucus and facing all the pressures they face, this is a balanced decision." (ibid.).

Contrary to the perceptions of the productive interests, a “balanced decision” is not how the majority of the general public perceived the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. According to an Angus Reid poll (Bell, April 17, 1993), the NDP led by Premier Mike Harcourt was the least popular party in the province, with 75 percent of the public disapproving of its performance. Harcourt and the NDP had the support of only 14 percent of British Columbians, while 75 percent said they disapproved of the party’s performance over the month of April. The poll, commissioned by the *Vancouver Sun*, indicated the provincial budget and the government’s handling of the Clayoquot Sound issue were among the issues that had eroded the party’s support. Pollster Angus Reid said the survey showed Harcourt was in “deep trouble” because of his “recent policies”. Before April of 1993, the NDP approval rating was 35 percent. The poll suggested the NDP government had “grossly misread” the people of the province.

This discontent is echoed in the federal caucus of NDP. “Three federal NDP politicians say the provincial NDP government is not protecting enough old-growth forest around Clayoquot Sound” (Bohn, April 17, 1993). The strongest criticism came from Burnaby-Kingsway MP Sven Robinson, who declared he was willing to join a peaceful road blockade to stop logging. Robinson also called the new land use plan a “betrayal” of NDP environmental promises. Saanich-Gulf Islands NDP MP Lynn Hunter also reported to be disappointed with the decision not to protect more rainforest. She was quoted as saying, “This is not improving the world picture at all. When they say they have to balance jobs and the environment, most of the jobs are lost because of technology.” In an attempt to address concerns, Svend Robinson appealed to BC NDP government to reverse its

decision to allow limited logging (CP, April 18, 1993). He believes that any logging in the region would mean the international view of BC would suffer; he accused the provincial NDP of betraying its own principles. He wanted the BC government “to reverse this decision, to reconsider, to recognize the enormously destructive impact this will have on the environment” (ibid.). He was also upset that the provincial government bypassed its own consultative process in the Clayoquot decision and believed strong public protests would force the NDP to backtrack. Robinson had said the Commission on Resources and the Environment should be involved in the decision. Environmental groups had asked Harcourt to refer the Clayoquot issue to the BC commission (ibid.).

The Clayoquot policy decision resulted in unrest within the provincial NDP membership. “The so-called tax revolt over the NDP government’s latest budget is not nearly as critical for the government as the fermenting furor over Clayoquot Sound” (Baldrey, April 23, 1993). The decision to allow logging in 74% of the Clayoquot Sound area was a much more sensitive issue for a party that liked to wrap itself in a dark shade of green. The Clayoquot Sound decision enraged the NDP’s own supporters. Several people who held positions in the party publicly split with the NDP and quit those positions. The decision itself shocked even some NDP caucus members and government officials, who were stunned that so much of the Clayoquot would be thrown open to logging. Stephen Owen, head of the government’s Commission on Resources and Environment, waded into the fray with thinly veiled criticism of the decision and demanded that conflict-of-interest commissioner Ted Hughes be asked to look at the government’s purchase of MacMillan Bloedel shares before it made the Clayoquot decision. If the government had turned down

the request, it risked damaging the Owen Commission's credibility and further alienating itself from the environmental movement (ibid.). Doing so could have hurt the NDP in the long run for there were a number of environmental activists who were important election campaign organizers.

Liberal environment critic Paul Martin (Lasalle-Emard MP) stated on May 26, 93 (O'Neil, April 27, 1993), "The federal Liberal party will give Clayoquot Sound wilderness protection status if it wins this year's election". He went on to say that the Liberal government would launch negotiations with Victoria and the forest industry to determine compensation for lost logging rights. The report continues, stating that the Liberal party urged the federal and BC governments on April 8 to give Clayoquot wilderness protection status. There is support for park status based on the popularity and success of the Pacific Rim National Park, which is adjacent to the Clayoquot Sound region. Martin is quoted as saying, "One can justify the extension of the park obviously for the protection of the forest but also because of the tremendous success of the existing park" (ibid.).

Internationally, the response to the policy decision was not any more favourable. Groups like the European Rainforest Movement (ERM) encouraged an international boycott of wood products coming from Clayoquot Sound upon hearing the Clayoquot Land Use Decision announcement (Hamilton, May 11, 1993). A letter from ERM to the Ambassador Edward Lee in Vienna stated logging in Clayoquot Sound, an area containing rare and endangered species, violates the Biodiversity Convention which Canada supports (ibid.).

Locally, provincially, federally, and internationally, the response to the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was not favourable. The overwhelming majority of support for the decision was from the forest industry and the labour unions (productive interests). In fact, it was requested and suggested to government by a notable number of high profile government and non-productive interests to either modify the policy decision outright, or to allow CORE to be involved in the decision (CP, April 18, 1993). Mike Harcourt and the NDP party refused to consider such options, stating that the Clayoquot Land Use Decision would be “viewed as a paragon of balance between the interests of industry and those of the environment” (Seattle, May 1, 1993).

Looking at both the productive and non-productive interests, from when the decision was announced to today's impressions, one can propose the following: the non-productive interests, without question, were extremely unsatisfied with the policy decision. Whereas, the productive interests, overall, were satisfied with the policy decision. Simply looking at it from this perspective, one can assume that the winners in the outcome of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision are the productive interests, and the losers are the non-productive interests. The decision resulted in 74% of the Clayoquot Sound being open to logging, in spite of the pressure from the non-productive interests. Based on the literature review, and looking at both ‘sides’, one is able to state that the lack of participant resources (as detailed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2) on the part of the non-productive interests appears to have greatly impacted the policy outcome. In realizing this, one is made aware of the importance of certain required participant resources identified by both the pressure group

theorists and the activists themselves. Had the non-productive interests been able to maintain alliances with the local First Nations (by providing financial and legal support), the policy outcome may have been more favourable to their interests. Perhaps if the non-productive interests were able to maintain more of a presence on both the Task Force and the Steering Committee, the policy outcome would have been more favourable. The non-productive interests (as was found in Section 6.5.1), however, are secondary to those of the productive interests in the policy process. As a result, their influence on the Task Force, the Steering Committee, and ultimately the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was limited.

6.5.4 Interview Results

The results of the media bytes, and the ‘sides’ portrayed in the above section, are reflected in the interview results. The interviews provided updated impressions and perceptions of the decision, and provided further clarity as to which ‘sides’ expectations and desires were most satisfied. Each interview involved four questions (Appendix: Interview Questions). The following section provides a summary of the results of the four completed interviews, progressing in the order of the questions given. A summary and conclusion of the results of the interviews will be used in the following final section of the research.

The Politician

The first interviewee was a senior politician (Independent) in Clayoquot Sound at the time the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was announced. He will be referred to throughout as the ‘politician’. The first question asked for the identification of the main participants in

the policy process. The main participants according to the politician were: industry, NDP government, First Nations, and environmentalists.

The politician believes it was the lack of alliances that directed the progression of the policy process. The participants in the policy process could not come together to develop a community based policy. It was this lack of alliances that resulted in a politically motivated policy versus a community based policy. The politician believes there was a lack of an alliance between the First Nations (non-productive/productive interests) and environmentalists (non-productive interests) where one should have perhaps occurred. This was because of the distrust the First Nations have regarding the motives of the environmentalists. The politician believes that the stand taken by the non-productive interests regarding old-growth logging (preservation) alienated themselves from the First Nations, the local communities, and the labour sector in the Sound. This alienation resulted in alliances not being formed between these groups - a potentially powerful alliance. This lack of an alliance was believed to greatly hinder the progress of the environmentalists. In spite of the apparent polar interests of these two groups, one wonders if they could use each other in the form of an alliance - the same type of alliance seen in other resource issues in Canada - as a means to an end.

The second question focused on the necessary resources. In the interview process, each of the interviewees were asked the question which included the same brief list of examples each time for illustration purposes. The resources required in order for each of the participants to effectively partake in the policy process was not specifically listed in the

interview with the politician. Instead, the politician simply stated that whatever resources were deemed necessary for full participation by the key players in the policy process should have been provided for. Without providing the necessary participant resources, the provincial government could not ensure a community based policy decision that reflected the interests of all the main participants. Instead, the participants with the necessary resources were effectively represented, providing a non-representative policy. Another risk to not providing the necessary resources was the threat of a policy decision being made externally, outside the communities impacted by it. The result, as had happened with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, would be the lack of endorsement and ownership by the communities involved.

When asked how the politician believed the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was made, he stated that the policy process was a process set up to fail. While he believes that the NDP government provided the forum for the consensus decision-making, this effort on the part of the government was deliberately deceiving. While providing the forum, the government was aware of the polarized views that were to be represented at the table. The provincial government, realizing the consensus process was unfamiliar and untested in BC's forest policy process, was essentially "keeping the kids busy in the sandbox" while the politicians and bureaucrats worked on a politically motivated policy; the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.

While unable to substantiate this perspective, one is able to speculate that there was a tremendous degree of distrust for the government's conduct, as well as strong evidence of

the feelings of futility on the part of the participants in the policy process. This senior politician, who served on various tables in the early 1990s in Clayoquot Sound regarding resource use in the area, can be said to be unsatisfied with the policy process. He posits that the Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision was politically motivated with little consideration for the “facts and figures”. He believes that the underlying factor in the policy decision was the treaty negotiations; the government was attempting to appease the First Nations, as well as the environmentalists. The politician credits the non-productive interests for raising the issue of the old-growth liquidation that was occurring in the Clayoquot Sound, but then followed by saying that these same groups went too far in their efforts. The non-productive interests wanted preservation instead of conservation, in spite of the fact that there were communities in the Sound that relied on the forests for their livelihood.

The Politician believes the First Nations benefited from the agreement indirectly, because of the agreement came the Interim Measures Agreement providing them with an increased role in the economic benefits of resource extraction in the Sound. The communities within the Sound benefited from the land use decision indirectly as well. The events following the announcement of the policy resulted in the small communities gaining notoriety, increasing the levels of tourism which continues today. According to the politician, the outcome of the policy satisfied some of the groups in question, including industry. The productive interests were believed to have gained by the policy simply because it involved “bailouts”. The politician believes that the logging companies operating in the Sound were generally satisfied with the policy. The implications of the policy provided

compensation for the existing licenses, thus relieving these companies of what was seen as expensive, in some cases prohibitively so, logging options (Smyth, April 15, 1993). The only group involved that can be said to be entirely dissatisfied with the policy decision are the non-productive interests (environmentalists). The politician believes that because of the non-productive interests' hard stance against any further industrial logging in the Sound, the government was unable to provide any level of satisfaction to them.

Interfor (International Forest Products)

This next interview involved a senior employee of one of the two main logging companies operating in Clayoquot Sound, International Forest Products (Interfor). Throughout this section this participant will be referred to as 'Interfor'.

The main participants in the policy process, according to Interfor, were environmentalists, industry, local communities and community groups, labour unions (specifically IWA), the NDP government, the Social Credit, and the local First Nations. Interfor speculates that Bill Vander Zalm, of the Social Credit party, merits mention because Vander Zalm, in response to the environmental pressure in the late 1980s, visited a clearcut and burned area in Clayoquot Sound described as the "Black Hole" and was reported saying "this is a disgrace". His description was thought by Interfor to lend credibility to the efforts of the non-productive interests and contributing to the provincial governments move to start land use planning in Clayoquot Sound.

Amongst the main participants there were alliances identified by Interfor as being part of the policy process. One such alliance was between the First Nations and environmentalists. He cited this alliance as being mutually beneficial for different objectives (First Nations for land claims and environmentalists for parks). Another alliance identified was one that included First Nations and environmentalists, but also the NDP government. Interfor believes that the provincial government was “more focused on ‘green’ decisions in the early 1990s than they are today”, thus, he believes, benefiting the environmentalists. A separate alliance identified was that between the IWA and the NDP government. Interfor believes that the forest companies “did not really exert all that much influence on the NDP in the early 1990s on [the issue of] Clayoquot Sound”.

The resources identified by Interfor as necessary for effective participation in the policy process reflected what was found in the literature review. Interfor believes that, in the specific incidence of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, the environmentalists’ resources were the ability to blockade (volunteers, connections to the grassroots), their access to money (source not stated), First Nations support (alliances), and friends in government (political support) enabling them to effectively participate in the policy process. The First Nations, he believes, had access to money (source not stated). The IWA had its membership and the influence on the NDP government as their necessary resources. Interfor does not provide any insight as to what the productive interests had to be effective participants in the policy process.

In addressing the forth question in the interview, Interfor presents his perspective in the form of a progression of events, beginning in the 1960s, to explain how the Clayoquot Decision was made. The 1960s witnessed the building of the first logging road through the Sound that allowed access to the west coast (previously accessible only by air or water). The logging road enabled recreationalists to access Long Beach for camping and hiking. This road also provided a route to remote areas on the coast desired by people seeking an ‘alternative’ lifestyle. In 1972, the Pacific Rim National Park was created, attracting more people to the Sound. With the addition of recreationalists and people seeking alternative lifestyles to the Sound, which had already been occupied by the various First Nations groups, combined with the logging activity, caused resource use conflicts to develop. These resource conflicts increased over the years until the late 1980s when pressure from the non-productive interests resulted in the provincial government having to address the land use issues. The provincial government imposed various decision-making processes specifically dealing with Clayoquot Sound (see Section 6.2) in an attempt to address the various land use conflicts. It was the failure of these decision-making processes that precipitated the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. However, as detailed by Interfor, the Sound already had a history of land use conflict prior to the 1993 policy decision.

MacMillan Bloedel

This interview involved a senior employee of the other main logging company operating in Clayoquot Sound, MacMillan Bloedel (MacBlo), Dennis Fitzgerald.

The main participants who influenced the policy outcome, according to Fitzgerald, were those who participated in the Task Force and the Steering Committee (Section 6.1). As participants, the First Nations fulfilled more of an 'observer status' because they felt that their participation potentially compromised their land claims and their negotiations with the provincial government. The environmentalists participated for a short while until they realized that the government was going to allow logging in the contentious areas in Clayoquot Sound throughout the processes.

Fitzgerald identified various alliances as being part of the policy process. The first alliance identified was between the First Nations and environmentalists. Fitzgerald stated that this alliance had been maintained since the Meares Island issue (detailed in Section 6.4). The alliance between First Nations and environmentalists is described as a "long-standing marriage of convenience". They had certain common objectives. They also had certain fundamental differences. Depending on the situation, these differences would either be obscured ("shoved into the background") or come to the fore. The First Nations were "shut out of the economy - forest industry". They believe that this land belongs to them and are pursuing this in land claim negotiations. This was not always the case (First Nations were active participants in the forest industry right up to the early 1980s; they would fish, then when that was done they would work in the forest industry. As long as the jobs were there they could work. With the changes in the forest industry and less jobs, the ones who worked periodically did not have seniority and were the first to go.) First Nations were able to form a common cause with the environmentalists who wanted to stop logging, but their interests were contrary to one another. The First Nations objective

was to enter the forest economy, whereas the environmentalists objectives were to hinder the industrial forest economy. There were conflicting interests, but they (First Nations and environmentalists) used each other. The First Nations shared the environmentalists disapproval of the logging practices. The First Nations wanted things done differently in the industry. However, the company of the two interests parted when it came to what each interest wanted for the land base. In the long term, these interests diverge, but in the short term they were able to find common ground.

Labour and the NDP government was another alliance identified by Fitzgerald. As well, industry, throughout the dispute, had made alliances with labour, as well as with the local communities (mostly Uclulet than Tofino - there has been a split in the two communities. The split in the two communities was the result of the main industry offices being moved out of Tofino to Uclulet. This resulted in Uclulet becoming the industry-based town, and Tofino the tourism-based town. This polarized the interests of the communities because each relies on opposite resource interests. Significant animosity has been created between the communities as a result; since the late 80s.).

Fitzgerald did not specifically identify the resources necessary for the effective participation in the policy process. He did state that the process itself was well-resourced externally by the provincial government. As a forerunner to the CORE process, it was much more extensive and intensive in comparison in regards to the amount of participant resources ('resources' includes access to scientific data, accurate geographical information, meeting locations, honorariums, etc.) allotted by the provincial government.

Any resources deemed necessary were forthcoming. Fitzgerald believed that the participation of the environmentalists and First Nations were not deterred due to a lack of resources in the process because there were avenues provided by government to meet their needs.

Fitzgerald thought it important to recognize that, when detailing how the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was made, the decision was from the two very long processes before it, beginning in 1989 under Vander Zalm. Robert Prescott Allan and Jim Walker facilitated the Task Force group. This group was given the impossible task of reaching a consensus on a recommendation for Clayoquot. In the context of those times, there was simply no mood for the possibility for the parties involved in reaching an agreement (unanimity).

At the time, the processes were progressive initiatives by the government. These government initiatives were new in terms of being multi-stakeholder conflicts. Everyone approaches the negotiating table, they lay out their positions, then the facilitator must try to move these positions together as close as possible to build some sort of compromise that nobody is totally happy with, but hopefully nobody is totally unhappy with. “The decision couldn’t hold politically”. Logging on the interim of these processes is what killed the processes. The first third of the processes were spent trying to find the most contentious areas to set aside and the areas where logging could continue.

There was the “majority position” (Option 5) put forward that did not have tourism’s, mining’s, or First Nations’ (no position given) support. Mining would not support any

protected areas because they felt that they could not agree to setting aside land that may have future development potential (they asserted that the economic costs - opportunity costs- had to be realized first). The remaining majority of participants did sign-off on the agreement. The agreement lacked support from what Fitzgerald referred to as the “critical groups” (First Nations and environmentalists).

With the overall results from the Task Force and the Steering Committee, Cabinet went away and made their decision. Fitzgerald believed that here was not much more conversation that went on between the time of the conclusion of that process, to when the facilitators filed their report, to the Cabinet decision.

Fitzgerald believed that the NDP always had their environmental wing and their labour wing. The government had to make a compromise between the two. The Cabinet decision went beyond the required protected area requirements. The process of the Task force resulted in further polarizing the main participants. The environmental position came further towards total protection; nothing should be logged. The final Cabinet decision was not viable as judged by the First Nations and environmental participants.

Fitzgerald further elaborated on the process and the events surrounding the release of the policy. He stated that overall industry appeared fairly satisfied with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, but environmentalists and First Nations did not. Fitzgerald believes that given where industry started out - their initial position at the negotiations (Task Force) - they had moved substantially in the accommodation of other interests. Industry had come

to terms with the reality that there had to be compromise - whereas the environmentalists did not. When the policy came out, industry was already resigned to some form of compromise, whereas other participants were not. First Nations were in a special position; it was found that they were not consulted. They were primarily offended by the fact that they were not consulted.

According to Fitzgerald, "Industry certainly accepted [the decision] and supported it". Industry came to the position over the course of several years to where the policy was found to be acceptable. However, this same position proposed several years before may not have been supported and accepted. What was considered acceptable changed over several years.

Premier

The final interview involved the then premier of the province, Mike Harcourt. Harcourt listed environmentalists, local commerce, community organizations, logging companies, unions, the various local communities, First Nations, Cabinet, NDP caucus, key ministries - forestry, environment, and Aboriginal Affairs as the main participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.

The Premier lists only one alliance in the policy process; one that he describes as a dishonest one. The alliance between the environmentalists and First Nations was a dishonest one. The environmentalists were basically saying that they were on the First Nations side, but weren't because the Nuuchah-Nulth wanted to log and be involved in

the economic activities in the area. The environmentalists were misleading the First Nations; “It was a higher priority for them (environmentalists) to have the whole thing preserved than for the Aboriginal people to work their way out of poverty.” Harcourt did not believe that this was necessarily deliberate on the part of the environmentalists, “but they were not being up-front”. It was this alliance that Harcourt believed influenced the land use decision.

The resources necessary in order for the participants to effectively participate in the policy process were not directly listed by Harcourt. However, he does list the main participants whom he believe did have the necessary resources to effectively participate and the ones who did not. The companies and the unions had the necessary resources, and the Aboriginals as well to a certain extent (although they are talent and leadership thin with all the demands placed upon them). Harcourt believes that the individual citizens, and non-productive groups, lacked the necessary resources to effectively participate in the land use process.

Harcourt suggests some resources required by participants in the policy process. He believes there needs to be a well-informed process with good information available to all interests at the negotiation table. Harcourt suggests that there needs to be some compensation for travel and accommodation, and honorariums for the participants who do not have access to sufficient financial sources in order to participate.

Harcourt believes that the NDP was committed to taking a balanced approach to land use decisions, so those who wanted no logging, and those who wanted to over-log, would not be satisfied. With the release of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, 80-90 percent of the islands citizens accepted it. The policy was a compromise between the extremes; the policy was made on compromise.

Harcourt further elaborated on the policy process and the events surrounding the release of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. He states that there were extremists on both sides - environmentalists (particularly Rainforest Action Network, Friends of Clayoquot Sound, Greenpeace, and the Western Canadian Wilderness Committee) who wanted all of the Sound to be park, and pro-logging who wanted the status quo. However, the NDP made it clear that they were not going to preserve the entire Sound, nor were they going to allow the 'old' way of management to continue. A mistake by the provincial government was to have not consulted and/or done some interim measures with the Nuu-Chah-Nulth before hand.

Summary

The above interviews are summarized in the order of the questions given. The main participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision according to the participants interviewed consisted of: the logging companies (industry), the NDP government, First Nations, environmentalists, local community members and organizations, labour unions, local commerce, Cabinet, and the key ministries. Each of these have been mentioned by one or all of the interviewees. The participants listed above reflect those identified in Pross'

Community Policy Model. The participants lacking in the model are the local community members and organizations. These have not been identified in the model nor were they listed as participants in the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee (Section 6.1). However, the list of participants for the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force does list, as one of the categories of participants in the policy process, two residents of Tofino (Section 6.1).

The alliances between participants that may have influenced the policy decision, as identified by the interviewees, are: First Nations and environmentalists; First Nations, environmentalists, and the NDP government; industry and labour; industry and the local communities; and IWA (labour union) and the NDP government.

The absence of identified alliances between industry and the NDP government at the time of the CLUD is not curious; the NDP government's alliances have historically been with labour and other 'left' interests. However, based on the literature on pressure group theory and the prevalence of alliances between productive groups and government, as well as with other productive interests, government typically aligns itself with corporate interests. However, had the provincial government been under Liberal government leadership, the apparent lack of an alliance may not have existed.

Judging by Interfor's response, one is led to believe that the forest companies did not maintain any alliances. This would run counter to what was believed by the non-productive interests at the time the policy was released to the public. Specifically, in the

video *Fury in the Sound* (Wine 1997), the non-productive interests assert that the productive interests exerted tremendous influence on, and maintained a strong alliance with, the provincial government throughout the policy process and the events following the announcement of the policy. There was the suggestion that the government bowed to the economic pressure applied by the productive interests and allowed logging in over 74% of the Sound (Baldrey, April 13, 1993). This same pressure by the productive interest was said to have been applied to allow the RCMP to arrest a perceived ‘ring leader’ who was not breaking the law at the Kennedy Road protests in the summer of 1993. It was also this pressure that was believed to be applied to the provincial court to alter the charges against the protesters at the “mass arrests” (standing in the middle of a logging road in an attempt to stop the logging trucks from accessing the Sound) from civil to criminal, resulting in the incarceration of protesters, some for more than four months. This perceived alliance between the productive interests and the provincial government did not exist according to Interfor.

Interfor’s perception of alliances also runs counter to what was described in Section 6.5.3, and what is illustrated in Pross’ Policy Community Model. The productive interests are shown to have closer alliances with both the Government and the Bureaucracy Communities compared with the non-productive interests.

The majority of the interviewees (excluding the politician) identified an alliance between the First Nations and environmentalists in the policy process. Fitzgerald describes this alliance as “one of convenience”, and Harcourt describes it as a “dishonest alliance”.

Interfor supports Fitzgerald's assertion. Each interviewee believes that in spite of these two groups having apparent contrary objectives, their temporary alliance was seen to serve both their goals effectively. The politician, however, believed that there lacked an alliance between these same two interests, thus compromising the influence each had on the policy process.

On the question of necessary resources, two of the interviewees choose to avoid listing specific resources (in spite of the researcher including with the question examples to establish the direction of the question). Instead they stated that whatever resources were required were provided or should have been provided. The other two interviewees provided conflicting views on the question of resource availability. Fitzgerald asserted that all interests (productive and non-productive) had access to all necessary resources to effectively participate in the policy process. However, Harcourt believed that only the productive interests (except not as much for First Nations) had the necessary resources. Harcourt believes that the non-productive interests lacked the necessary resources to effectively participate in the policy process.

The participant resources that were identified as necessary by the interviewees consisted of: the ability to blockade (volunteers; connections to the grassroots); money, alliances, political support, membership, access and influence; well-informed process; and good information. Each of these resources are included directly and indirectly in the survey list (Appendix: Survey). The actual resources listed by the interviewees are not contrary to the survey results, but what is contrary to the survey results is who the main participants

were perceived as having these necessary resources. For example, one questions how the non-productive interests and First Nations are perceived by Interfor to have had all of the necessary resources in order to effectively participate in the policy process when one looks at the outcome of the policy (Section 6.5.3) and the history of forest policy development in the province (Section 6.4). Both groups have traditionally been on the periphery (as noted in Section 6.4). It was found in previous sections that neither group had the necessary resources in order to alter their status, nor that there was an alliance between them. In fact, it was only with the outcome of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision that the First Nations in the Sound found themselves as participants in forest policy, after the fact. However, throughout the process the productive interests were represented, which can also be seen in their level of satisfaction with the policy outcome. This cannot, however, be said of the non-productive interests.

Along with the resources identified as necessary by the interviewees was the mention about the lack of necessary resources to the participants (see Section 6.5.4 - Politician and Premier). The Politician stated that whatever resources deemed necessary for full participation by the key players in the policy process should be provided for by the government. In neglecting to do so, the government would be unable to provide a community based policy decision that reflected the interests of all of the main participants. Premier Harcourt also stated that in order to ensure all interests are represented and able to participate in the policy process, the necessary resources must be provided. Harcourt, however, stops short of suggesting that this responsibility should be the provincial governments.

The final question focuses on how each of the interviewees perceive process by which the land use decision was made. In summary, the first interviewee perceived the policy decision as one that was set up to fail; it was one that was deliberately designed so that government could dictate how the policy was to be designed. The second interviewee perceived the policy decision as one that naturally progressed based on the history in Clayoquot Sound and the evolving land use issues. The third interviewee perceived the policy decision as one that evolved out of the efforts of the Task Force and the Steering Committee with interests and alliances evolving with these processes. The final interviewee describes the land use decision as one of design based on compromise between the various productive and non-productive expectations. The prevalence of the role of government in the development of the land use decision is noted in at least two of the interviewees responses. This point will be explored further in the following section.

The interview participants provided insight into the events surrounding the Clayoquot policy process. After much effort in inviting the views of the other main participant groups (First Nations, bureaucracy, and non-productive) with no response, the researcher was forced to rely on the extensive information provided by media sources during the period in question, as well as on the survey responses, for their input. The above section (Section 6.5.3), combined with this section provides the basis for the next and final section of analysis.

6.5.5 Analysis Using Pross' Model

This next portion of the research will look at the case study in more detail using Pross' Policy Community Model. This model was designed to show the players/actors involved in policy development or influence. It shows that policy communities include all actors who have an interest in a policy area, who share a common policy focus, and who help shape policy outcomes (Appendix: Models - Pross').

The policy communities include various actors who have an interest in this particular policy area, they share a common policy focus, and all play a role in influencing and shaping the policy outcome. Each of the many actors involved in the case study have been listed, as well as, where possible, their role/position during the policy process. The next step in the policy analysis, using Pross' model, was to look at how each of the policy communities interact.

The policy communities' interactions are illustrated in Pross' model. By detailing the interaction of the policy communities in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, this analysis was able to provide insight into how the interactions between each community influenced the policy decision. The following model analysis details each of the main communities, as well as some of the sub-communities where necessary. Some of the sub-communities list only those members mentioned in the information sources available. This list is not all inclusive; there may be other participants within the sub-communities that were not mentioned in the information sources.

It should be noted that an entire political community is rarely involved in a specific policy decision (Pross 1995, 264). The process leading up to the release of the land use decision, like other policy decisions, involved specific actors from various communities according to their specialization. The Bureaucracy Community (Bureaucracy) is the first community of focus in Pross' model. The Bureaucracy involved the Lead Department Agency - Ministry of Forests (along with the supporting agencies: Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks & the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs). The Sponsoring Minister - Minister of Forests - served as the liaison between the Bureaucracy and the Government Community (Government).

Cabinet, which is tied to both the Government and the Bureaucracy, served in its official capacity regarding the land use decision (Cabinet's purpose is to direct the business of Parliament, administer individual departments of government, pass Orders-In-Council, and formulate and discuss policy (Smith 1995, 391)). Cabinet's role in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was to formulate the policy with the demise of the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee (Hoberg 1996, 277). Cabinet and the Sponsoring Minister served as the link between the Bureaucracy and Government.

Within the Government Community there was the provincial government sub-community consisting of members such as the Premier, the Attorney General and the Finance Minister. The local government is illustrated as being neither closer to the provincial government sub-community or the official opposition. This is because the views expressed indicated that the local government favoured neither the views of the Official

Opposition nor those of the provincial government (detailed in Section 6.5.4). The Official Opposition sub-community is illustrated in the model apart from the provincial government due to its obvious function in the Government. The final sub-community within the Government is the Interested Individuals. This group is illustrated as a periphery group due to their limited influence on the process. Like other such groups in other processes, this periphery sub-community is not static in membership; the membership changes with the issue.

The third and final policy community to be detailed is the Interest Groups Community (IGC). Within the IGC is the Stakeholder Groups (productive) sub-community, Interested Groups (productive) sub-community, Interested Groups (non-productive) sub-community, and International Interested Groups (non-productive) sub-community. Each of these sub-communities are illustrated according to the role and influence they had on the policy process. The Stakeholder Groups are placed in the model closer to both the Bureaucracy and Government based on what was found in the research: 1) The literature review on pressure groups found that stakeholders generally enjoy better access to the policy makers due to their access to the necessary resources, as well as their economic role in the provincial economy; and 2) The research shows that the typical role of the stakeholder was evident in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, especially when one gauges their level of satisfaction in the policy decision compared with the non-productive Interested Groups in the IGC. Within the stakeholder group is the Tribal Council. The purpose in placing the First Nations within the stakeholder group labeled as productive is due to their claim

on the land and resources through traditional territory. As well, the First Nations became 'official' productive interests with the completion of the Interim Measures Agreement.

The Interested Groups (productive) and Interested Individuals (productive) are shown in the model as attached, but separate from, the Stakeholder Groups. These three sub-communities are separate, but there is obvious overlap when one looks at the interests of one compared with the other. The stakeholder groups are supported by the productive interested groups for it was in the best interests of the productive interested groups to do so. Members within this sub-community rely on the stakeholder group for employment, therefore they support the stakeholder groups in the land use decision making process.

The non-productive Interested Groups, both Canadian and international, are illustrated as being further away from the Bureaucracy and Government. This reflects the events in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, supported by the results of the pressure group literature review. This sub-community was shown to generally lack the necessary resources to provide the stakeholder groups and interested groups (productive) with competition for the attention and consideration of the policy makers. As well, the non-productive interests were shown in the research to generally lack the political alliances entertained by the productive interests. This was shown in the two processes leading up to the Clayoquot Land Use Decision; they lacked non-productive interested groups' input (see Section 6.2). The land use decision did not reflect the expectations and desires of these two sub-communities, especially compared with the productive sub-communities. Pross' model

reflects the position of the non-productive Interested Groups' position in the policy process.

Media is also illustrated in the policy model (as detailed in Section 5: Pross' Policy Communities Model). It has been placed in two places to illustrate its prevalence throughout the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. The model illustrates that throughout the land use decision, no one group lacked the representation offered by the media. This is simply because the land use issues surrounding Clayoquot Sound during this period produced what may be referred to as a "media frenzy". The media was utilized by all policy communities, and all policy communities were utilized by the media.

Pross' model concludes the Clayoquot Land Use Decision case study. Before detailing the results of the research, the following section highlights the survey and questionnaire completed by numerous environmental activists from across the nation.

Chapter Seven: Results of Survey and Questionnaire

Survey

The survey was completed by a total of 37 environmental activists from across Canada. In order to obtain participants, a general request was sent out utilizing electronic mail via various mailing lists available through organizations such as the Canadian Environmental Network and the Environmental Studies Association of Canada (ESAC). All participants who responded to the general request, and accepted the conditions detailed (Appendix: Letter of Request - Survey), were included in the study. Unfortunately, due to time constraints and the need to further focus on the Clayoquot Sound case study, only one question has been highlighted and included in the research. (For the complete list of survey questions see Appendix: Survey. This question (question eleven) was part of the survey sent out during the month of November of 1998.

Questionnaire

Following the survey was a sociodemographic questionnaire (Appendix: Sociodemographic Questionnaire). This questionnaire provided a breakdown on details such as gender, age, level of education, occupation, and income. The results from the questionnaire are provided below in order to afford a basic profile of the respondents. The following offers a summary of this questionnaire.

There were a total of 29 respondents to this questionnaire (not all of the participants of the main survey chose to participate in the sociodemographic questionnaire) resulting in a generous amount of data. Confidentiality was the basis of participation, therefore the

identity of each of the respondents has not been included with the results. Of the 29 respondents:

Male	Female	Volunteer	Professional	Post secondary education	Age 20-40	Age 41-60
20	9	8	16	29	11	14

The volunteer/professional categories refer to the capacity in which each of the respondents involve themselves in the environmental field. Inconsistencies occurred because some respondents chose not to respond to either category, and because some other respondents stated as being involved both professionally and as a volunteer. All of the respondents achieved some level of post secondary education ranging from college/technical to a doctorate. The age distribution of the respondents ranged mostly between 20 and 60 years of age, with the remaining respondents above 60 (none of the respondents were under the age of 20).

< \$20,000	\$20,000-\$30,000	\$31,000-\$40,000	\$41,000-\$50,000	\$51,000-\$60,000	\$61,000-\$70,000	>\$71,000
8	5	2	8	1	1	1

The level of income, if charted, would illustrate a type of 'u' shape with the majority of respondents either at less than \$20,000 per year or at a more comfortable \$41,000 to \$50,000 per year annual income. (Interestingly, as a side note, when the level of income is cross-referenced with gender, the data showed that the two lowest income brackets are dominated by females, whereas the highest four brackets are dominated by males.)

Years active 0-5	Years active 6-11	Years active >11
6	11	10

The respondents, when asked how many years they have been active in the environmental movement in Canada, are evenly distributed throughout the year ranges with the majority having been involved for six years or more.

Prov./Terr. BC, AB, SK, MN	Prov./Terr. NS, NB, PEI	Prov./Terr. NWT, YK	Urban	Rural
19	7	2	18	7

The provincial/territorial distribution of the respondents indicates a western provincial slant, which coincides with the fact that the four western provinces are home to less than 30% of the population, but with almost half of Canada's environmental organizations based there (Stefanick 1996, 71). Perhaps not of particular surprise is that the majority of respondents are urban dwellers. And finally, when asked the question as to the position held within an environmental organization, 93 percent of the total respondents stated as being involved in some capacity. The involvement ranged from a door-to-door campaigner to a director.

Survey Question

The following is question eleven of the survey. The question asked of the respondents that will be considered herein was: What do you consider necessary resources in environmental activism (i.e. money, time, volunteers)?

The following table provides the results from question eleven, as well as the results from the pressure group theorists (taken from the literature review). In both of the columns below, the resources are listed according to priority based on the number of times each one was listed as necessary in the survey and literature review. Next to each of the

resources listed are the number of times that the resource was mentioned. The “(1) ...” indicates that the resources following are mentioned once. The table includes a bottom column listing the resources deemed necessary by one, but not reiterated by the other.

Question 11 of Survey

11) What do you [the activist] consider necessary resources in environmental activism (i.e. money, time, volunteers)?	Resources Defined as Essential by Pressure Group Theorists from the Literature Review
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • money (27) • time (20) • volunteers (19) • staff (4) • scientific data (3) • leadership & motivation (3) • education (to radicalize our citizens to action) (2) • people power (2) • media support (2) • network of connections (2) • visionaries (1) • direction and information • connections to the grassroots • patience • expertise • clear, distinct policies • open minds • political support • ideas • authority power • a good cause • solid beliefs and values • commitment • excellent intelligence gathering and sharing • networking and communication • clear objective with multiple ways of achieving it 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • leadership skills (4) • money/large budgets (3) • membership (well informed) (3) • expert advice/knowledge (2) • knowing access to appropriate policy makers (2) • strategy (1) • legitimacy (with gov’t, public, and politicians) • access & influence (legislators & bureaucrats) • communication skills • paid staff • an appealing issue • permanent organizational structure • flexibility • cooperation (gov’ts want advice & technical info)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • community support • attentive government • human resources • political power • people who are good with the media 	
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Resources Declared Necessary by Either Activists or Pressure Group Theorists that were Not Mentioned in Neighbouring Column

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • time (20) • education (2) • media support (2) • patience (1) ... • clear, distinct policies • open minds • solid beliefs and values • commitment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • permanent organizational structure (1)... • flexibility • cooperation (gov'ts want advice & technical info)
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The priority placed on each of the resources by both the activists and the theorists indicates that money was found to be the most essential resource. Money would allow participants in the policy process to concentrate on the issue instead of having to deal with the hurdles imposed because of the lack of access to the necessary finances (i.e. transportation costs, administrative costs, fees to access information, consultative fees, etc).

Followed by money was the need for 'time'. Time can initially be seen as a resource not easily addressed by the facilitators of policy development. However, if participants were able to concentrate on their participation in actions such as the policy process, instead of on their lack of monetary requirements, the issue of time (of the lack thereof) may largely be addressed.

The fact that pressure group theorists asserted leadership skills as a priority resource over money may indicate that without good leadership, no amount of money could ensure success. It could also, however, indicate that theorists (compared with the activists 'in the field') are somewhat out of touch in terms of what are truly priority resources. It could also be that due to the limitations imposed by the lack of money, good leadership goes largely under-utilized.

It was also found that both the activists and the theorists agreed that the participation of members of the public are essential resources (membership & volunteers); people are seen as essential. Volunteers are necessary, especially with persistent fiscal restraint. A solid membership is also necessary in order to organize and present a 'strong front' in any policy process.

Another resource identified was the need for, and access to, information, scientific data, and expert knowledge. These are considered essential resources by both the activists in the survey and the theorists in the literature review. Accurate information was found to be necessary in making appropriate decisions and planning courses of action.

The priority placed on the resources by one group and not by the other provides opportunity for speculation as to why this may be. For example, activists indicated that time was one of the top priorities in terms of resources, whereas pressure group theorists failed to mention this resource at all. This may be, as mentioned above, because activists are in the field and therefore would know first hand the difficulties incurred due to the lack

of essential resources. They have experienced the difficulties of trying to be effective activists, but because of the lack of time are largely unsuccessful.

The same can be said of the other priorities cited by one and not the other. Activists are able to provide insight into an area of policy influence (via activism) that theorists cannot. Activists are in the field, and therefore are able to provide first-hand knowledge of what are necessary resources, and the level of priority for each one. Pressure group theorists may largely be divorced from the activism but are perhaps better at ‘stepping back’ and providing an objective analysis. A theorist’s analysis of the policy process, and the identification and prioritization of necessary resources, may be seen as more credible due to their seemingly neutral position.

The results from question eleven and the literature review have demonstrated parallels between what activists ‘in the field’ believe are essential resources in order to be effective, and what pressure group theorists believe to be essential resources in order for activists to be effective. By combining the input from both activists and theorists, a comprehensive list of necessary resources have been developed. However, it is interesting to note the lack of priority placed on one specific resource by both groups; political alliances. Political alliances were found to be the most important in the interviews, as well as by Hessing and Howlett. Whereas political alliances were not specifically listed by either the activists or theorists. Instead, the activists alluded to this resource by listing “network of connections”, and the theorists list “access and influence (legislators and bureaucrats)”.

Ideally, with this information, government and other participants in policy development are provided with a list of necessary requirements in order to ensure that all participants at 'the table' are able to contribute equally. This would certainly be true provided the government is able to meet the demand of each of the necessary resources.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

The results from the survey question sent out to Canadian environmental activists in November of 1998 can be seen in Appendix: Survey, which has been matched with the results of the participant resources deemed essential by pressure group theorists (from literature review). These two columns have resulted in a final summary of what both pressure group theorists and Canadian environmental activists consider as necessary participant resources in order for pressure groups to accomplish their goals. These results were then combined with the Clayoquot case study and policy analysis (including the interview results). By applying Kingdon's Decision-making model to this study, the policy, politics, and problems were identified. Using Pross' Policy Community model, the policy decision was further explored: who were the actors, what participants were found to have won and to have lost, and how the views of the participants were reflected in the policy. The final outcome, combining the results of each part of the research effort, allowed the researcher to put forth the following:

- 1) The main participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision announced on April 13, 1999 (Sections 6.5.4 and 6.5.5; Appendix: Models - Pross').
- 2) Identified the interactions/alliances between participants that may have influenced the policy decision (ibid.).
- 3) Identified the resources participants deemed necessary in order to participate in the public policy process, and the resource necessary to influence the policy outcome (Section 6.5.4; Chapter 7).

4) Based on the perceptions of the participants interviewed, combined with the perceptions provided via media bytes, an outline of how the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was made (Sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4).

As stated in the section on pressure groups (Chapter 4), the institutional and economic advantage of some pressure groups, the productive actors, in the policy process typically exceeds that of other pressure groups, those representing the non-productive actors (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 73). This was also supported in the research on the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (see Section 6.5.4: Harcourt; Wine 1997); the productive participants had access to more of the necessary resources required to effectively impact the policy process and outcome than the non-productive participants - notably political alliances. The limitations of these participant resources for some groups compared to others played a role in the outcome of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision in terms of the main participants who were found to have won and to have lost. The literature and the research indicate that the limitation of political alliances curtailed the effectiveness of the non-productive actors. The following details the reasons for the curtailment of the non-productive participants in the policy process and decision.

1) The productive participants in BC forest policy enjoyed a traditional regime that emphasized the mutually compatible interests of the productive participants and government, with non-productive participants on the periphery. The importance of access to policy makers, legitimacy with government, and alliances/networks has been emphasized in the literature review and survey. The relationship enjoyed by the

productive participants with government was not also enjoyed by the non-productive participants in the policy process.

2) The NDP government has long been tied to the labour sector in British Columbia. The labour sector, in the case of Clayoquot Sound, represents the forestry worker; the very group that felt threatened by the efforts of the non-productive participants (environmentalists). As detailed in the pressure groups literature review, the requirement for alliances - especially political alliances - cannot be undervalued in the policy process.

By analyzing the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, combined with interviews of some of the participants in the case study, and the results from the survey and pressure group literature review, extraction of the following was possible: the necessary resources in order to participate in the policy process, the necessary resource (political alliances) required to influence policy decisions, the participants that had access to these necessary resources, and how this impacted the outcome of the policy decision. The study's findings provide the information required in order to address the thesis. The Clayoquot Land Use Decision can be said to support what pressure group theorists and activists suggest are essential for participation in the policy process. As well, the research reveals that political alliances are necessary for an interest group to be influential in the public policy outcome. The research has shown that not all participants involved in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision had access to the required resources to participate in the policy process, or influence the policy outcome. The productive interests participated in the policy process largely with the necessary resources, whereas the non-productive interests were found to be lacking in

these same necessary resources. The disparity between the productive and non-productive interests influenced the equality in the participation of these interests in the Clayoquot policy process and their level of influence on the actual Clayoquot Land Use Decision.

The implications of the study's findings for the policy process concentrate on the requirement for representative participation during the policy process, and influence on the policy outcome. This study shows that the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, although presented as a "balanced decision", was not. The productive interests were better represented in the final decision due to their economic position in the province within the status quo political and economic paradigm. They were shown to have access to the necessary resources to effectively participate in the policy process, and to have the political alliances to effectively influence the policy outcome. The productive interests, compared with the non-productive interests, in the policy process have traditionally had access to the necessary resources due to their role in the economy. The productive interests' access to resources has afforded them an imbalanced influence over the policy process and the overall decision.

In order to ensure that the policy process and outcome is indeed representative of the communities it will impact, the bias shown to the productive interests by the policy process must be addressed. Throughout the Task Force and Steering Committee processes, there was the assertion by the non-productive interests that the government favoured and better served the productive interests. The bias shown to the productive interests was not unique to these processes. As detailed by Hessing and Howlett (1997,

73), the institutional and economic advantage afforded the productive interests has been quite typical in the resource and environmental policy process in Canada. Regardless of whether or not the participant resources are provided to all of the main interests in the policy process, if the bias of government towards the productive interests is not addressed, the policy process will remain imbalanced and non-representative.

Another area of the policy process that requires attention is the terminology used to define the interests involved. As shown in Section 6.5.1, the terms under which the various main interests are defined require redress. The current placement of economic value in the policy process (in natural resource economics in general) is found to be subjective and perhaps even ‘old fashioned’. Because institutional and economic gauges are readily recognized, accepted and measured by mainstream economists and members of government, they remain the preferred way of evaluating one interest from another, regardless of accuracy. This subjective preference precedes actual value resulting in the potentially biased labeling of ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’ interests.

Representative participation by all of the main interests involved in the policy process can result in a policy that meets the needs of each of the main participants who represent the various sectors in a community. A policy that is truly representative minimizes the risk of negative backlash being directed at the policy makers. It is in the interests of all parties involved to avoid outcomes such as that of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision with the ‘Summer of Protest’ in 1993 in Clayoquot Sound. In order to ensure proper representation in the policy process, participant resources must be provided to all

participants. As well, political alliances that favour productive over non-productive interests in the policy process need to be addressed. And finally, the terminology applied in the natural resources policy sector requires re-evaluation in order to realize the true value of each of the main interests participating in the policy process. Primarily, there requires a change in the use of the misleading terms 'productive' versus 'non-productive' when categorizing the interests participating. Until these areas are addressed, there will always be the possibility of other summers of protest, causing great expense and inconvenience to those involved.

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