The results from the survey question sent out to Canadian environmental activists in November of 1998 can be seen in Appendix: Survey, which has been matched with the results of the participant resources deemed essential by pressure group theorists (from literature review). These two columns have resulted in a final summary of what both pressure group theorists and Canadian environmental activists consider as necessary participant resources in order for pressure groups to accomplish their goals. These results were then combined with the Clayoquot case study and policy analysis (including the interview results). By applying Kingdon’s Decision-making model to this study, the policy, politics, and problems were identified. Using Pross’ Policy Community model, the policy decision was further explored: who were the actors, what participants were found to have won and to have lost, and how the views of the participants were reflected in the policy. The final outcome, combining the results of each part of the research effort, allowed the researcher to put forth the following:
1) The main participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision announced on April 13, 1999 (Sections 6.5.4 and 6.5.5; Appendix: Models - Pross’).
2) Identified the interactions/alliances between participants that may have influenced the policy decision (ibid.).
3) Identified the resources participants deemed necessary in order to participate in the public policy process, and the resource necessary to influence the policy outcome (Section 6.5.4; Chapter 7).
4) Based on the perceptions of the participants interviewed, combined with the perceptions provided via media bytes, an outline of how the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was made (Sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4).
As stated in the section on pressure groups (Chapter 4), the institutional and economic advantage of some pressure groups, the productive actors, in the policy process typically exceeds that of other pressure groups, those representing the non-productive actors (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 73). This was also supported in the research on the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (see Section 6.5.4: Harcourt; Wine 1997); the productive participants had access to more of the necessary resources required to effectively impact the policy process and outcome than the non-productive participants - notably political alliances. The limitations of these participant resources for some groups compared to others played a role in the outcome of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision in terms of the main participants who were found to have won and to have lost. The literature and the research indicate that the limitation of political alliances curtailed the effectiveness of the non-productive actors. The following details the reasons for the curtailment of the non-productive participants in the policy process and decision.
1) The productive participants in BC forest policy enjoyed a traditional regime that emphasized the mutually compatible interests of the productive participants and government, with non-productive participants on the periphery. The importance of access to policy makers, legitimacy with government, and alliances/networks has been emphasized in the literature review and survey. The relationship enjoyed by the productive participants with government was not also enjoyed by the non-productive participants in the policy process.
2) The NDP government has long been tied to the labour sector in British Columbia. The labour sector, in the case of Clayoquot Sound, represents the forestry worker; the very group that felt threatened by the efforts of the non-productive participants (environmentalists). As detailed in the pressure groups literature review, the requirement for alliances - especially political alliances - cannot be undervalued in the policy process.
By analyzing the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, combined with interviews of some of the participants in the case study, and the results from the survey and pressure group literature review, extraction of the following was possible: the necessary resources in order to participate in the policy process, the necessary resource (political alliances) required to influence policy decisions, the participants that had access to these necessary resources, and how this impacted the outcome of the policy decision. The study’s findings provide the information required in order to address the thesis. The Clayoquot Land Use Decision can be said to support what pressure group theorists and activists suggest are essential for participation in the policy process. As well, the research reveals that political alliances are necessary for an interest group to be influential in the public policy outcome. The research has shown that not all participants involved in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision had access to the required resources to participate in the policy process, or influence the policy outcome. The productive interests participated in the policy process largely with the necessary resources, whereas the non-productive interests were found to be lacking in these same necessary resources. The disparity between the productive and non-productive interests influenced the equality in the participation of these interests in the Clayoquot policy process and their level of influence on the actual Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
The implications of the study’s findings for the policy process concentrate on the requirement for representative participation during the policy process, and influence on the policy outcome. This study shows that the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, although presented as a “balanced decision”, was not. The productive interests were better represented in the final decision due to their economic position in the province within the status quo political and economic paradigm. They were shown to have access to the necessary resources to effectively participate in the policy process, and to have the political alliances to effectively influence the policy outcome. The productive interests, compared with the non-productive interests, in the policy process have traditionally had access to the necessary resources due to their role in the economy. The productive interests’ access to resources has afforded them an imbalanced influence over the policy process and the overall decision.
In order to ensure that the policy process and outcome is indeed representative of the communities it will impact, the bias shown to the productive interests by the policy process must be addressed. Throughout the Task Force and Steering Committee processes, there was the assertion by the non-productive interests that the government favoured and better served the productive interests. The bias shown to the productive interests was not unique to these processes. As detailed by Hessing and Howlett (1997, 73), the institutional and economic advantage afforded the productive interests has been quite typical in the resource and environmental policy process in Canada. Regardless of whether or not the participant resources are provided to all of the main interests in the policy process, if the bias of government towards the productive interests is not addressed, the policy process will remain imbalanced and non-representative.
Another area of the policy process that requires attention is the terminology used to define the interests involved. As shown in Section 6.5.1, the terms under which the various main interests are defined require redress. The current placement of economic value in the policy process (in natural resource economics in general) is found to be subjective and perhaps even ‘old fashioned’. Because institutional and economic gauges are readily recognized, accepted and measured by mainstream economists and members of government, they remain the preferred way of evaluating one interest from another, regardless of accuracy. This subjective preference precedes actual value resulting in the potentially biased labeling of ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’ interests.
Representative participation by all of the main interests involved in the policy process can result in a policy that meets the needs of each of the main participants who represent the various sectors in a community. A policy that is truly representative minimizes the risk of negative backlash being directed at the policy makers. It is in the interests of all parties involved to avoid outcomes such as that of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision with the ‘Summer of Protest’ in 1993 in Clayoquot Sound. In order to ensure proper representation in the policy process, participant resources must be provided to all participants. As well, political alliances that favour productive over non-productive interests in the policy process need to be addressed. And finally, the terminology applied in the natural resources policy sector requires re-evaluation in order to realize the true value of each of the main interests participating in the policy process. Primarily, there requires a change in the use of the misleading terms ‘productive’ versus ‘non-productive’ when categorizing the interests participating. Until these areas are addressed, there will always be the possibility of other summers of protest, causing great expense and inconvenience to those involved.