Clayoquot Sound is located on British Columbia’s Pacific Rim, on the west coast of Vancouver Island. The Sound has been the focus of intense public debate with attention on land use, First Nations land rights, ecosystem protection, aesthetic values, and resource development since 1980 (Province 1993a, 1; Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 11). The Sound consists of a significant wilderness area, with biogeoclimatic zones ranging from snow-capped mountains, to massive ancient rain forests, to sandy beaches. It encompasses 3,000 square kilometres (350,000 hectares) of land and water, running from Hesquiat Peninsula down the west coast of Vancouver Island for 65 km (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 10; Province 1993a, 1). Nine of Clayoquot Sound’s primary watersheds (watershed basins that drain directly to the sea) of 1000 hectares or more are essentially natural (Province 1993a, 2). Six of these watersheds together form the largest continuous block of natural primary watersheds left on Vancouver Island.
There are over 4,500 known plant and animal species in Clayoquot Sound, including black bears, wolves, cougars, Roosevelt elk, and 249 species of birds (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 10). In the spring, grey and orca whales feed offshore while hundreds of sea lions feast on the large herring schools moving inshore to spawn. The most politically notable plant species in the Sound are the ancient trees. Some of the world’s biggest and oldest Sitka spruce, western red cedar, Douglas fir, hemlock and balsam - up to 1700 years old and 200 metres tall - exist in the Sound. It is their notable beauty and commercial value that has sparked an intense conflict for almost thirty years, attracting attention from around the world.
Clayoquot Sound is part of the Regional District of Alberni-Clayoquot. There are four communities within the Sound: the Nuu-chah-nulth communities of Ahousaht, Tla-o-qui-aht, and Hesquiaht (with a combined population of less than 1000), and Tofino (Province 1993a, 3). The economy of the Regional District relies heavily on timber, tourism, fisheries, mining, and aquaculture (ibid.). The principle tourism attraction in the Sound is Pacific Rim National Park Reserve.
The following case study focuses on the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (released to the public April 13, 1993) as a public policy example. As stated previous, to analyze this policy decision the two policy models used are Kingdon’s Decision Making Model and Pross’ Policy Communities Model. The key areas to be addressed in the case study are: 1) the actors/participants, 2) the relations of power (alliances), 3) the interests served in the outcome, and 4) the resources necessary to participate. The overall objective is to understand the policy decision using the models.
The case study begins with a time line and summary up to the ‘Moment in Time’. This is followed by a detailed description of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. From there, Kingdon’s model is the first policy model to be applied in this research, followed by Pross’ model.
Time Line: (The sequence of events listed below was extracted from “A Report by the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, & the Friends of Clayoquot’s Forest Watch Program.” The Friends of Clayoquot Sound. 1998.)
1980 - MacMillan Bloedel (MacBlo) announces its intention to log Meares Island, sparking the formation of Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS), an advocacy group dedicated to the preservation of the rain forest (Ecotrust 1997, 101).
1984 - MacMillan Bloedel prepared to log Meares Island; a large old-growth island in the Tla-o-qui-aht and Ahousht First Nations territories. It was at this time that local First Nations and environmentalists came together in BC’s first blockade to stop logging. MacBlo responded by applying for and receiving an injunction to stop the blockades. The Tla-o-qui-aht and Ahousaht Nations declared the island a Tribal Park (Ecotrust 1997, 101), and applied for, and received, a counter-injunction based on outstanding land claims; the injunction remains in force today.
1988 - Sulphur Passage (north of Flores Island) is blockaded to stop a logging road being built by BC Forest Products and Fletcher Challenge. The blockade resulted in 36 people being arrested.
Late 1980s and early 1990s - the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force, and later the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, brought together local and provincial governments, industry, labour, and environmentalists to develop a land-use plan. An attempt at the use of consensus-based decision-making and resource planning was made. Both processes failed.
1989 - The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force collapses over disagreement over interim logging and representation at the negotiation table (Ecotrust 1997, 101).
1990 - A study by Sierra Club revealed that of 60 primary watersheds larger than 5000 hectares on the west coast of Vancouver Island, only five remain unlogged, including three in Clayoquot Sound (Ecotrust 1997, 101).
1991 - The BC government establishes Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee. Shortly thereafter, environmental representatives walked out following a decision to approve interim logging (Ecotrust 1997, 101).
Summer 1991 – A logging bridge over the Kennedy River was deliberately burnt by members of Friends of Clayoquot Sound. There were road blockades and arrests (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
October 1991 - The New Democratic Party (NDP) formed a new provincial government (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
January 1992 - The new NDP government announced the formation of the Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE). Despite CORE’s mandate to develop a comprehensive land use planning process for the province, the Clayoquot Sound Steering Committee process was exempted (Hoberg 1996, 276). In protest, sixty-five people were arrested in a blockade at the Clayoquot Arm bridge (Ecotrust 1997, 101).
October 1992 - Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force disbanded, unable to come to a consensus-based decision on land use (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
February 1993 - The BC government bought $50 million worth of shares in MacMillan Bloedel. An inquiry held concluded there was no ‘conflict of interest’ on the part of the provincial government (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
April 13, 1993 - Clayoquot Land Use Decision Announced
Following the failure of the Steering Committee to reach full agreement on areas to be protected, Premier Harcourt flew his entourage and the press corps to an isolated hilltop in the Sound to announce the government’s Clayoquot Land Use Decision. This decision claimed to be a balance between the area’s economic, environmental, and social needs (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13). The decision protected the Megin Valley and other smaller areas, but still left 74% of Clayoquot’s productive old growth forests open to logging. In protest, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound organized a blockade at Kennedy bridge. As well, in protest, the environmental representatives resigned from CORE (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
July 5, 1993 - Opening of Clayoquot Blockade at Kennedy River Bridge.
Summer 1993 - Daily blockades and arrests totaled 857, culminating on August 9 when over 1000 people join blockade and 309 people were arrested. This was the largest civil disobedience action in Canadian history (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
The summer of 1993 concludes the intended extent of the time line and summary up to the moment in time. The events preceding the summer of 1993 are detailed throughout the remaining case study.
6.1 The Clayoquot Land Use Decision
The following details on the Clayoquot land use policy decision are largely derived from the government document Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision - Background Report unless otherwise cited.
The Clayoquot Land Use Decision was a policy decision made by the government at the provincial level. The government put forth with the decision principles underlying the policy. The stated principles are:
The decision:
· builds on the limited agreement that was reached with the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee (the Committee). While recognizing that no consensus was achieved on the total land use issue, the Committee process did result in an understanding on some areas that should be designated for development and on some areas that should be designated for protection;
· utilizes the extensive resource information that was collected by both the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force (Task Force) and the Committee (list of participants in both found below);
· is consistent with policy directions that were recommended in the Protected Areas Strategy and the Forest Practices Code;
· reflects the approach that any future forest harvesting in sensitive areas should be carried out under stricter guidelines for protecting environmental and tourism values than in the past;
· ensures that timber harvesting will utilize alternate strategies to avoid extensive clearcuts and to maintain visual qualities in important areas; and
· reflects a balanced approach between protecting the significant environmental values of the Sound, while ensuring stability for workers, local communities and their economies (Province 1993a, 6).
The Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision was broken down into two main sections: Protected Areas and Integrated Resource Management Areas (see Appendix - Map).
1) Protected Areas
The Clayoquot Land Use Decision gives protected status to 48 500 hectares; 18 percent of the land area (Province 1993a, 7). Combined with the existing protected area of 39 100 hectares, the result is a total of 87 600 hectares, or 33 percent, of the Clayoquot Sound land area is in protected area. These areas are reserved from any new (italics mine) resource development or allocation, including timber harvesting, mineral claim staking and Land Act tenures. Treaty rights have yet to be settled and include protected areas in the negotiations (ibid.). (italics mine)
2) Integrated Resource Management Areas
The majority of the Clayoquot Sound land base is designated as integrated resource management areas. It is these areas which contain the “working forest” (Province 1993a,10) (See Clayoquot Sound Forest Practices Standards for details on the working forest). These areas will continue to support various types of economic activity, including timber extraction, fisheries, wildlife, tourism, recreation and mineral exploration and development. Aquaculture activity can be conducted on the shoreline areas that adjoin integrated resource management areas. Economic assurance is provided with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision for forest workers, their communities, and the forest industry. The policy decision resolves the outstanding land use question in Clayoquot Sound.
The goal for the working forest is a sustainable harvest level of 600 000 cubic metres per year. The actual levels of harvest are tentative for the actual changes in allowable annual cut (AAC) are determined by the province’s Chief Forester. Some of the details guiding the allocation are based on the following:
- The government will amend the areas of Tree Farm Licenses (TFLs) 44 and 54 and the Arrowsmith Timber Supply Area (TSA) to delete the areas identified for protection.
- The Chief Forester will require that the TFL holders in the area prepare revised TFL Management Plans.
- The Ministry of Forests will complete a new timber supply analysis for the Arrowsmith TSA.
- Changes to the TFLs and TSA will reflect the requirements of the special management areas and the application of new forest practices.
- The small dispersed cutblocks will be reforested, on average, within 3 to 5 years following harvest.
- An emphasis on more environmentally sensitive harvesting systems will result in more jobs. Aerial systems which suspend the logs in the air will be required.
- Harvesting methods such as single-tree selection and group selection methods will be utilized in sensitive areas within the scenic corridors.
- Sixty-two percent of the land base of Clayoquot Sound remains available for mineral resource extraction and development (Province 1993a,10).
A policy of performance-based operations will guide timber resources development in the integrated resource areas. “Performance-based” means that forest companies, must, on an on-going basis, demonstrate ‘good performance’ in meeting harvesting and environmental standards. New operations will be approved only when monitoring indicates that operations have been conducted to these standards (Province 1993a,11).
The Land Use Decision requires timber harvesting plans to incorporate smaller dispersed cutblocks. Lower road densities are required, instead utilizing skyline and helicopter harvesting systems.
Participants of the Task Force & the Committee
Participants in the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force (Task Force) and the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee (Committee) can be limited to five categories: resource development and extraction interests (aquaculture, fishing, labour, mining, small business, timber, tourism), environment, First Nations, bureaucrat (government employee), and politician (elected official). The number of participants in each are as follows:
Task Force
|
Resource development and extraction interests |
3 |
|
Environment |
0 |
|
First Nations |
6 |
|
Bureaucrat |
3 |
|
Politician |
3 |
|
Residents of Tofino |
2 |
The Provincial government initially included the Nuh-Chah-Nulth Tribal Council (NTC) on the Task Force without consultation, resulting in disinterest and distrust by the native residents of Clayoquot Sound. In an attempt to resolve the lack of First Nation’s representation, the Province conducted separate discussions with the mediator and the NTC requested six representatives - one for the Council and one for each of the Tla-o-qui-aht, Ahousaht, Hesquiaht, Toquaht, and Ucluelet Bands (Darling 1991, 16).
The Committee (Darling 1991 in Appendix 5, 1)
|
Resource development and extraction interests |
9 |
|
Environment |
1 |
|
First Nations |
1 |
|
Bureaucrat |
6 |
|
Politician |
4 |
6.2 The Outcome of the Clayoquot Sound Decision-Making Processes
The Clayoquot Sound decision-making process was a failed test of an innovative and promising experiment in democratic governance (Hoberg 1996, 274). This failed alternative model of governance, known as consensus-based negotiation, or shared decision-making, was first applied by the provincial government in Clayoquot Sound.
There were two attempts to reach consensus on land use decisions in the Sound. Both attempts were hindered by the same issue; the issue of what logging should proceed while negotiations were in progress. The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force was the first attempt, formed by the provincial government in August 1989 (Hoberg 1996, 275). A broad range of interests were represented including: labour, industry, environmentalists, Natives, and government. The task force’s mandate was to develop a long-term sustainable development plan for the region, as well as approving short-term decisions about where logging would occur on the interim. It was the issue of short-term logging that resulted in the task force falling short of their stated goals (Darling 1991, 37).
The task force then recommended the creation of an alternative process, the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee, which was established in October 1990 (Darling 1991, 45). It was agreed by the task force that the mandate of the steering committee was to develop a long-term land use plan. The issue of short-term logging was left up to a panel consisting of officials from the Ministry of Forests and the Ministry of Environment (Hoberg 1996, 275). The decision of this newly appointed panel to allow interim logging created a major stumbling block for the consensus process. Individuals and groups representing environmental interests were outraged that the panel decided to permit logging in the Bulson Creek area, which was considered to be an unlogged watershed. The environmentalist interests saw this decision as an absence of a commitment to negotiate in good faith. They saw irreversible decisions being made on the very issues they were suppose to be addressing at the table, leaving them with the impression that they were falling into a “talk and log” trap (Hoberg 1996, 276). They had already agreed to give up one unlogged watershed, Tofino Creek, when they entered the original task force. Not wanting to lend legitimacy to the process, they resigned from the steering committee in May 1991 (ibid.). There are two reasons cited as to why the Bulson Creek watershed was slated for logging in spite of its “unmodified” state:
· From the perspective of industry, labour, and government, the watershed had already undergone some development so additional logging there was not considered unreasonable;
· Timber supply in the region was sufficiently tight that in order to keep the workers of the Kennedy Lake Division employed, access to Bulson Creek was deemed necessary (Hoberg 1996, 276).
In spite of the lack of environmental representation, the steering committee continued. The committee membership believed that environmental views were still being represented in the committee by representatives from Tofino, the tourism sector, and the Ministry of Environment (ibid.). However, once the official environmental representatives left, the committee lost its most forceful advocates of the preservationist position.
The new NDP government announced the formation of the Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE) in January of 1992 (Hoberg 1996, 276). Despite CORE’s mandate to develop a comprehensive land use planning process for the province, the Clayoquot Sound Steering Committee process was exempted. There are conflicting reasons given for this decision:
· The official government explanation is that more than two years had already gone into the local process and it was deemed unfair to the participants to preempt it at that point.
· The NDP was looking out for the interests of the International Woodworkers of America (IWA), which was concerned that CORE would become captured by environmentalists, and that it would be unfair to ‘reward’ them for walking out on the steering committee.
· The NDP wanted CORE to succeed, and including the Clayoquot Sound issue in the process would have potentially doomed the process from the start (Hoberg 1996, 275).
In spite of the environmental interests not being represented within the steering committee, the committee still could not come to a consensus (Hoberg 1996, 276). There was the presentation of what was called “Option 5”, but the “greener” members of the committee from Tofino and the tourism sector would not agree to it. As a result, the steering committee disbanded in October 1992 without coming to any consensus on the land use issues.
After the committee process ended, the coalition supporting Option 5 organized to present what it called the “majority option” (Hoberg 1996, 277). This option was supported by ten of the thirteen interests at the table. The thirteen did not include the Native groups for they did not take a position on it, nor did it include the environmentalists who had walked out of the negotiations. The three dissenting groups were Tofino, tourism, and mining; Tofino and tourism thought it was not preservationist enough, whereas mining thought it was too preservationist. Ultimately, the two co-chairs of the failed steering committee issued a report to cabinet in January 1993 laying out various options (ibid.):
· Option 5
· A more preservationist option - the Tofino Option
· The option to refer all parts of the decision to CORE
With the failure of the steering committee process, policy was then developed as it had always been, at the highest levels of government in a lengthy cabinet debate. It was this decision that was announced April 13, 1993 by then BC Premier Mike Harcourt in Clayoquot Sound (Hoberg 1996, 277). The decision was found to be more preservationist than the “majority option”, but did not protect nearly as much of the land base as the environmental interests had sought. It was this decision that sparked the massive protests during the summer of 1993 leading to over 800 people being arrested for blocking logging roads into Clayoquot Sound .
6.3 Summary of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision
The failure of the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force to reach a consensus, later the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, resulted in the government presenting their own Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
The summer of 1993 proved to be very memorable for most people of British Columbia. What first appeared to be a difficult local issue in land management became an international issue putting Canada’s west coast on the international media scene (Hoberg 1996, 277). Despite opinion polls showing general public approval within the province for the government’s compromise decision (although, soon after over 800 protesters were arrested in acts of disobedience in Clayoquot Sound, the government had only a 22 percent approval rating on environmental issues (Harrison 1996, 295)), concerns raised by the internationalization of the issue forced the cabinet to rethink the decision (Hoberg 1996, 277). The obvious reversal of the decision was not a politically viable option. Instead, the government took two major steps that produced similar results of a reversal without having to publicly acknowledge doing so.
Post-Clayoquot Land Use Decision
The first step made by the government, faced with few options of appeasing all interests (at the prodding of CORE Commissioner Stephen Owen), was to engage in an impartial mediator role appointing people well-known for their said environmental sympathies. The appointed people served as co-chairs. In addition, foresters, hydrologists, biologists, and others were appointed to a new panel of scientists to draft recommendations “to make forest practices in Clayoquot not only the best in the province, but the best in the world” (Report 5, 1). This new panel was named the Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound, known as the “Scientific Panel” for short. It was realized at this point, by the BC Ombudsman in a report released in November of 1993, that the local First Nations had not been adequately consulted about the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (McCallum 1997). As a result, four First Nations representatives were included on the Panel to integrate Traditional Ecological Knowledge into the new discussions.
In April 1995, the panel recommended extremely stringent forest practices that would ultimately make logging in the sound far more expensive, in some cases prohibitively so (Hoberg 1996, 277). In spite of this, due to pressure from the public, in July of 1995, the government announced that it was adopting all the recommendations put forward by the scientific panel.
The second step made by the government was to enter into an “interim measures agreement” in March 1994 with the Nuu-chah-nulth tribes, creating what Hoberg refers to as a co-management agreement between the First Nations in the Sound and the provincial government (Hoberg 1996, 278).
6.4 The First Nations in Clayoquot Sound
The role of First Nations in Clayoquot Sound has not been explored in detail up to this point. In order to better understand the events surrounding the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, it is necessary to include the role of the local First Nations in this study.
The environmental controversy surrounding Clayoquot Sound has had a relatively long history, beginning with MacMillan Bloedel (MacBlo) proposing to log Meares Island in the early 1980s. It was then that the Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation and environmentalists put up the first logging blockade in Canadian history (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13). The blockade was constructed to stop the passage of logging equipment into the Tla-o-qui-aht Nations’ traditional territory. The Tla-o-qui-aht Nation, at this time, declared Meares Island a tribal park. The First Nations and MacMillan Bloedel went before the provincial Supreme Court, each seeking an injunction to stop the activities of the other (Tennant 1996, 55). The judge granted MacBlo its injunction; the First Nations appealed the decision. The province’s Court of Appeal reversed the lower court decision and ordered that logging be halted pending progress in resolving the Nuu-chah-nulth land claim encompassing Meares Island (ibid.). These land claim negotiations continue today.
The success of the Tla-o-qui-aht Nation was, unfortunately, saddled with tremendous debt. It was the strain of this debt that would serve as a strain on the alliance between the First Nations of Meares Island and the environmentalists who worked along side them. Francis Frank, an elected chief of the Tla-o-qui-aht, reflecting on the Meares Island dispute said, “They [environmentalists] said they were with us, and clearly they weren’t.” (McIlroy, June 27, 1993). Frank is referring to the $1.2 million in legal bills the tribal council was left with as a result of the court battle with MacBlo. This perceived breach of trust has resulted in the First Nations of Meares Island refraining from forming alliances with environmentalists to address the Clayoquot Sound issue.
In defense of fellow environmentalists, Friends of Clayoquot Sound director Valerie Langer responded by saying, “Nobody knew their debt was that much.” (McIlroy, June 27, 1993). Langer, like many other environmentalists working to preserve BC’s forests, is aware of the potentially powerful alliance that can be realized between the First Nations and environmentalists. During the Clayoquot Sound protests in the summer of 1993, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS) held off blockading logging roads until they received permission from the local First Nations. “An alliance with the natives is the best thing that could happen and I think the most frightening for the government,” says Langer (ibid.).
The maintenance of this desired alliance may, however, require compromise on the part of the environmentalists. The natives in Clayoquot Sound are opposed to the Clayoquot Land Use Decision announced by Premier Harcourt, and to the methods used by the logging companies, including the giant clearcuts. However, it is here that the First Nations part company with the environmentalists and where compromise on the part of the environmentalists is seen as necessary in order to maintain an alliance with the First Nations. “We aren’t opposed to logging,” says Frank. “How can I say that when unemployment in some of our villages is 70 percent. But I can say we would only log in a selective, sustainable way.” (McIlroy, June 27, 1993). The degree of willingness to compromise on the part of the environmentalists in order to build/maintain First Nation alliances was later revealed in the Clayoquot Sound land use issue with the creation of the company Iisaak (detailed on page 89).
Clayoquot and the Future of Policy Development
Before the late 1980s and the issue of Meares Island, BC forest policy was conducted through a traditional regime that emphasized the mutually compatible interests of industry and government, with environmentalists and First Nations on the periphery (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 387). The Clayoquot Land Use Decision of April, 1993, combined with the Meares Island outcome, resulted in dramatic policy changes in BC involving both Aboriginal policy and forest policy. (The actual land use decision in itself may not have had quite an impact on policy regimes except that it was accompanied by an Interim Measures Agreement with the Nuu-chah-nulth (ibid., 399; Johnston 1999, 6).) Hoberg and Morawski refer to this type of dramatic change as a “policy sector intersection” (1999, 390).
The concept of sector intersection involves the overlap of actors and institutions that comprise the policy regimes for different sectors. Hoberg and Morawski identify two forces required in order for the intersection to occur: 1) some type of significant disruption - economic, social or political; and 2) the result of the strategic actions of political actors (ibid.). Both forces, no matter how deliberate, can potentially produce unintended consequences, as well as intended ones.
Hoberg and Morawski applied the concept of policy sector intersection to the case of Clayoquot Sound. As stated, prior to the late 1980s, BC forest policy was administered through a traditional regime that emphasized the interests of industry and government. Aboriginal policy was dealt with in its own distinct policy regime. However, the combination of events involving the land use issues in Clayoquot served as catalysts resulting in these two policy regimes converging and producing notable policy changes (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 391). These changes include 1) the creation of a Forest Practices Code to implement what is considered more stringent regulation for harvesting; 2) an increase in the amount of wilderness protected from logging throughout the province; and 3) a comprehensive inventory analysis continues throughout the province to provide recalculations of the allowable harvest levels (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 393). These changes have resulted in policies that have been reported to have reduced the annual harvest levels of between 8 and 17 percent (ibid.).
The impact of these changes on BC’s Aboriginal population has been notable. Throughout this most recent transition in forest policy, the First Nations of Clayoquot Sound have participated in a selective manner. The initial occurrence concerning Meares Island involved the cooperation between environmentalists and the local First Nations. However, throughout the summer of 1993 in Clayoquot Sound, the First Nations remained quiet (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 394). The reasons for this lack of involvement was the lack of trust in alliances on the part of the First Nations, and that the First Nations throughout BC were, and continue to be, involved in the process of altering the political landscape of aboriginal policy through treaty negotiations (ibid.).
The application of treaty negotiations will alter the relationship First Nations have with government and impact the practice of resource management in the province of British Columbia. First Nations involvement will progress from the provincial and federal government being the dominant actors in the control over land and resources in traditional territory, with aboriginal groups largely excluded from meaningful participation, to the First Nations assuming administrative control over negotiated sections of land. This transition symbolizes dramatic changes in the status quo policy regime; what Hoberg and Morawski referred to as ‘policy sector transition’.
“Unlike environmental groups, First Nations groups have difficulty using public opinion as a resource to motivate policy-makers to address their concerns. Instead, their major political resource has proven to be the power of law.” (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 392).
Beginning in the late 1960s, the courts began articulating the specific rights of the First Nations people of Canada (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 395). This progressively allowed First Nation people a powerful position in the policy network. The legal force behind a land claim is the recognition by governments and the courts of aboriginal title. The establishment of the treaty process in BC has forced resource extraction industries to recognize the First Nations as potential competitors to the resource and/or as potential partners.
In Clayoquot Sound, MacBlo has chosen to take the later approach. MacBlo has publicly supported First Nations and their quest for resource-management responsibilities: “First Nations should have a central decision-making role in ... resource development,” and “First Nations should share in the economic benefits from resource development within traditional territories.” (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 403). In April 1997, MacBlo entered into a joint-venture forest company with the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 404), Iisaak. MacBlo maintains 49% control of Iisaak, with the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations maintains the remaining 51% (Johnston 1999, 3). The new company assumed control over MacBlo’s operation in the northern part of the Sound. In taking this step, the First Nations in the region became not only part of the government, but also part of the forestry business. As a result, when environmentalists oppose logging in Clayoquot Sound, their opponents now not only include industry and government, but also the First Nations.
On June 16th, 1999, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Clayoquot’s new joint venture company Iisaak and various environmental groups was formally signed. The purpose of the MOU is
“to promote the resolution of the historic land use conflict in a way which respects First Nations’ traditional ownership of their territories, enhances local sustainable economic development opportunities, provides stability for local communities by reconciling parties that have been involved in social conflict, and protects the natural beauty and bio-diversity of Clayoquot Sound.” (Johnston September 1999, 14).
However, the key environmental group behind the organization of protests the summer of 1993, Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS), chose not to join the other environmental groups (Greenpeace, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Western Canada Wilderness Committee) in the signing of this MOU. Friends Of Clayoquot Sound acknowledges the key steps towards conservation included in the MOU, such as not logging in pristine valleys. However, since only 27 percent of Vancouver Island’s ancient forests remain standing, FOCS could not endorse any industrial logging of old-growth (Paone 1999, 16). Instead, FOCS has taken on the role of monitoring Iisaak’s logging activities.
The decision by FOCS’ to not sign the MOU with Iisaak, thereby not supporting the new co-management arrangement encouraged by the interim measures agreement, is indicative of the considerable tensions between aboriginal groups and environmental activists (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 403). With the creation of Iisaak, resulting in First Nations participating in industrial logging in Clayoquot Sound, environmental groups are obliged to forego previous agreements made with the First Nations. For example, in June 1996, Greenpeace and FOCS initiated a blockade on a road accessing old-growth slated for active logging in the Sound (ibid.). This was done in spite of an agreement made with the Nuu-chah-nulth chiefs that approval would be sought before any actions were employed. This action angered the chiefs; they demanded that the blockades be removed. In justifying their actions, the activists noted that “the Nuu-chah-nulth chiefs approved the logging we were protesting... As with any government, we reserve the right to disagree with the decisions that cause irreparable ecological harm.” (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 403). Actions like this further the wedge between First Nations and environmentalists.
As discussed, the concept of policy sector intersection involves the overlap of actors and institutions that comprise the policy regimes for different sectors. The two forces identified by Hoberg and Morawski that are said to be required in order for the intersection to occur are: 1) some type of significant disruption - economic, social or political; and 2) the result of the strategic actions of political actors. In reviewing the above discussion, one is able to identify the significant disruptions that occurred in the case of Clayoquot Sound, as well as the strategic actions of the political actors. The first force, the internationally covered protests by the environmentalists and the land claims process, served as significant disruptions to the status quo in policy regimes. The second force consisted of notable events such as the introduction of the forest practices code, the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, as well as the creation of the interim measures agreement between the provincial government and the Nuu-chah-nulth. These forces combined have resulted in profound policy transformation. In the case of Clayoquot Sound, the regime governing First Nations has, in many cases, converged with the regime governing forest policy (Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 406). The impact of this transformation in policy sectors was advantageous to the First Nation. However, for the environmental groups working to avoid the liquidation of the old-growth forests in Clayoquot Sound, the wedge driven between them and First Nations is counter to an advantageous alliance in the effort to maintain the ecological integrity of the old-growth forests of Clayoquot Sound.
In conclusion, the transformation in policy sectors has resulted in the establishment of alliances between the forest industry and the First Nations in Clayoquot Sound. This alliance has undermined the efforts of environmental groups such as FOCS. As stated earlier, Langer realized that in the effort to halt industrial logging in the Sound, an alliance with the First Nations would help serve this objective. With the intersection of forest policy with Aboriginal policy, the interests involved in this intersection appear to have undermined future alliances between the First Nations and environmentalists. The overall result of the policy sector transformation on the effectiveness of environmental groups to impact policy has been substantial. Environmental groups such as FOCS, who have been unwilling to compromise in the past (i.e. refusing to sign the MOU regarding Iisaak), forego a potentially powerful alliance in their efforts to influence the impact of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
6.5 Policy Analysis of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision
Policy analysis involves the separation of the policy into its parts (i.e. events, actors, alliances) for individual study. In order to properly examine the various parts of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision policy, one must ensure that the terms applied are generally understood. In order to ensure this throughout the policy analysis, the following section is provided.
6.5.1 Productive Vs. Non-Productive
When identifying the main actors in a policy process, labels are used in order to simplify the model illustration and ensure optimum understanding of the process being illustrated. Pross’ Policy Community Model is no exception. Most of the terms used are straightforward in application. However, some of the labels require explanation.
The main actors in the Clayoquot Land Use policy analysis are mainly concentrated in three areas: bureaucratic, political, and interested groups. The labels applied in the two communities bureaucracy (government employed) and political (elected official) require little detailing for the labels used are commonly applied. However, the labels used in the area of ‘interested groups’ require further detail. The objective of this section is to first state the labels to be used, then define, and finally to justify why these labels are to be used and not others. The purpose of the objective is to reveal the potential misappropriation of labels which then form perceptions; perceptions and ultimately opinions and attitudes (Sherman & Gismondi 1997, 14; Tuan 1990, 70).
Hessing and Howlett (1997, 73), in their research on policy actors looking specifically at resource and environmental policy, have applied the terms “productive” and “non-productive” when describing stakeholders and interested groups. They write,
“The institutional and economic advantage of actors with ‘productive’ interests in resource activities typically exceeds that of those representing ‘non-productive’ interests. This imbalance curtails the opportunities for, and the effectiveness of, public involvement in the resource and environmental policy process.”
The ‘productive interests’, in Hessing and Howlett’s case, are institutional and economic; gauges readily recognized/accepted and measured by mainstream economists and members of government. The ‘non-productive interests’, however, are interests that appear to not contribute either economically or institutionally. One could certainly argue that all interests serve a productive role institutionally in the development and influencing of public policy (ibid.). However, one cannot easily argue that ‘non-productive’ interests contribute equally economically. As a result, the advantage remains with the ‘productive’ actors in the policy process. The productive actors remain at an advantage until one critically evaluates the term ‘economic’ and how this is calculated.
The case study in this research looks specifically at the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, developed in response to the controversy surrounding logging in Clayoquot Sound. In terms of ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’, these labels are applied to interested groups that either contribute to the economy by logging (productive) or do not contribute to the economy by focusing on the preservation of the old-growth forests (non-productive). Looking specifically at this application of labels, one could argue that both the extractors of the old-growth and the preservationists of the old-growth are both ‘productive’ interests. The economic value of the old-growth (without going into the entire debate in the inherent values of the preservation of old-growth) is shown to be far greater if left intact and unlogged (Schilder 1999, 18; Macy 1999, 12; Freed 1996, 211). The values of old-growth, if preserved, have been shown to contribute significantly to the local economies of the area in an economically sustainable fashion. The local economies are able to benefit from the protected old-growth through alternative economies such as low-impact tourism, wildcrafts, and seasonal product extraction (i.e. mushroom picking). The difference between the economy created/preserved through the protection of the old-growth forests and the logging of the old-growth forests may now be compared economically. Of course, one could then argue that preservationists, through the creation of an alternative economy, are ‘productive’ interests. The difference would be this ‘protection economy’ is long-term with sustainable economic gain because the forests are left standing. Whereas, the logging of these same forests is ‘productive’ but with short-term, limited economic gain (because clearcut logging is short-term).
Upon using the terms ‘productive’ versus ‘non-productive’ using a vertical (protection - the trees are left standing therefore are not harvested) versus horizontal (logging - the trees are harvested therefore are not protected) analysis one can realize that the terms productive and non-productive are relative to context and application. One could further argue that the terms have been applied incorrectly; productive typically considered long-term and non-productive typically considered short-term. However, for conformity sake, the terms ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’ will be applied throughout the policy model analysis as Hessing and Howlett intended them to be applied; ‘productive’ are the pro-logging interests and ‘non-productive’ are the preservationists. The purpose of the above is to reveal the potential misappropriation of labels which then form perceptions; perceptions and ultimately opinions and attitudes.
6.5.2 Analysis Using Kingdon’s Model
By using the decision-making model by Kingdon, the researcher was able to establish a general overview of events and how they are organized into the three streams for describing how the window of opportunity was created. Kingdon’s model worked as a frame, which was then followed by Pross’ community policies model. Pross’ model was used to identify essential events and actors leading up to the policy decision and announcement.
As detailed in the Policy Analysis section, Kingdon’s model enables an analysis of a policy to be broken down into specific, separate components to better study the process which led to the policy decision. Kingdon breaks the analysis down into three parts: the problem stream; the policy stream, and the political stream. As one of the two chosen models for the research, this analysis will begin by breaking down the Moment-In-Time using Kingdon’s model.
1) The Problem Stream:
There are typically indicators that show there is a problem. In this case, the demise of both the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force and the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, as well as the continued pro and anti-logging pressures in Clayoquot Sound, serve as the indication that there was a land use policy issue. It was the provincial governments responsibility to address the problem.
2) The Policy Stream
The policy stream focus is on the solution; the introduction of a new policy or the change of a policy. The Clayoquot Land Use Decision, made public April 13, 1993, was the solution; the introduction of a new policy.
3) The Political Stream
The political will, in the case of Clayoquot Sound, was driven by the sheer magnitude of the problem. The NDP government was faced with a problem which caused a strong enough public opinion that the government had to act. Had the government not acted, in spite of the public pressure, it would have risked political problems due to inaction.
In the case of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, all three streams occurred resulting in the window of opportunity opening and the introduction of the new policy. Using Kingdon’s model for this policy analysis, one was able to answer the two earlier stated questions: Was there the political will? and Where was it from? Both can be answered without complication simply because the situation surrounding Clayoquot Sound is fairly straight forward. There was the political will because of the external pressures exerted by interest groups, interested individuals, stakeholder groups, politicians, and bureaucrats in the provincial government. The political will came from all policy communities who had an interest or stake in the outcome of the decision.
6.5.3 Got Vs. Wanted
In any decision rendered by the state, there are perceived 'sides'. The Clayoquot Land Use Decision was no different. The 'sides' in this specific policy decision emulate the groups used in Pross' policy community model from the "Interest Groups Community". In the "terminology" portion of the thesis, the two sides have been broken down into 'productive' and 'non-productive'. In order to detail further the outcome of the policy decision, this next section identified who wanted what and who got what. As done in previous sections of this study, the division used to distinguish the two sides will apply the terms ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’. The policy is detailed above (Section 6.1), outlining the government decision as it is to be applied to the land base. What was then required was a comparison of the actual policy decision with the desires and expectations of each of the sides. The objective was to draw out the ‘winners’ in the policy decision, as well as the ‘losers’. From there, an understanding was gained as to why one side was seen as the losers and one side the winners, and the implications this has on the policy process in BC.
In order to accomplish the above, this next part of the study looked at the actual policy decision (Section 6.1; as well as at the proceeding, supporting sections - Sections 6.2, 6.3, & 6.4), the media bytes, and the interviews. Via the policy decision, media bytes, and the interviews, one was able to examine 1) the participants, 2) the alliances, 3) the interests served in the policy outcome, and 4) the resources necessary to participate in the policy process.
In examining the policy decision outcome from Section 6.1, one could simply state that because Clayoquot Land Use Decision allows for 74% of the Sound to be accessible to some form of logging, the productive interests won; leaving the non-productive interests as the losers. Reviewing the numerous media bytes from both 'sides', one was left with the impression that the non-productive interests are indeed the losers. Specifically, after the announcement of the policy decision by Harcourt, The Toronto Star reports that the forest companies impacted by the decision "...said the decision will prevent sawmill closures and massive layoffs that could have devastated the Clayoquot communities of Tofino and Ucluelet" (CP, April 14, 1993). This is supported by a report the same day in the Ottawa Citizen (Baldrey, April 14, 1993), stating that the forest companies in the Sound had expressed "...its cautious support for the decision, saying it will end uncertainty and instability in the region and allow for proper industrial planning." "In broad terms, we're pleased the cabinet has finally made a decision which should bring some stability," said Doug Cooper, interim manager of the coast forest sector for the Council of Forest Industries [productive interest] (ibid.). As well, a senior employee for MacBlo, Dennis Fitzgerald, stated that industry was satisfied with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision - “Yes, industry certainly accepted it and supported it” (Section 6.5.4).
The apparent satisfaction on the productive side runs counter to the level of satisfaction of the non-productive side. For example, Vicky Husband (an official with the Sierra Club) states after the announcement by Harcourt, "We [non-productive interests] feel betrayed, angry and frustrated, and I suppose more than anything else, sad (Baldrey, April 14, 1993). Environmentalists [non-productive interests] said the government's decision effectively fragments the ecosystem in the Clayoquot area, opens the door to widespread devastation of old-growth timber, and is fraught with uncertainty about logging practices (ibid.). While the environmentalists were outraged with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, the forest industry [productive interests] expressed relief that not only had the decision finally been made, but that it appeared to have struck the right balance. Fred Lowenberger, Vice President of Land Use for International Forest Products (Interfor), one of the two major forest license holders in the region, said the government had chosen a balanced approach. "It's a very realistic option. On balance, if you're sitting in cabinet and caucus and facing all the pressures they face, this is a balanced decision." (ibid.).
Contrary to the perceptions of the productive interests, a “balanced decision” is not how the majority of the general public perceived the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. According to an Angus Reid poll (Bell, April 17, 1993), the NDP led by Premier Mike Harcourt was the least popular party in the province, with 75 percent of the public disapproving of its performance. Harcourt and the NDP had the support of only 14 percent of British Columbians, while 75 percent said they disapproved of the party’s performance over the month of April. The poll, commissioned by the Vancouver Sun, indicated the provincial budget and the government’s handling of the Clayoquot Sound issue were among the issues that had eroded the party’s support. Pollster Angus Reid said the survey showed Harcourt was in “deep trouble” because of his “recent policies”. Before April of 1993, the NDP approval rating was 35 percent. The poll suggested the NDP government had “grossly misread” the people of the province.
This discontent is echoed in the federal caucus of NDP. “Three federal NDP politicians say the provincial NDP government is not protecting enough old-growth forest around Clayoquot Sound” (Bohn, April 17, 1993). The strongest criticism came from Burnaby-Kingsway MP Sven Robinson, who declared he was willing to join a peaceful road blockade to stop logging. Robinson also called the new land use plan a “betrayal” of NDP environmental promises. Saanich-Gulf Islands NDP MP Lynn Hunter also reported to be disappointed with the decision not to protect more rainforest. She was quoted as saying, “This is not improving the world picture at all. When they say they have to balance jobs and the environment, most of the jobs are lost because of technology.” In an attempt to address concerns, Svend Robinson appealed to BC NDP government to reverse its decision to allow limited logging (CP, April 18, 1993). He believes that any logging in the region would mean the international view of BC would suffer; he accused the provincial NDP of betraying its own principles. He wanted the BC government “to reverse this decision, to reconsider, to recognize the enormously destructive impact this will have on the environment” (ibid.). He was also upset that the provincial government bypassed its own consultative process in the Clayoquot decision and believed strong public protests would force the NDP to backtrack. Robinson had said the Commission on Resources and the Environment should be involved in the decision. Environmental groups had asked Harcourt to refer the Clayoquot issue to the BC commission (ibid.).
The Clayoquot policy decision resulted in unrest within the provincial NDP membership. “The so-called tax revolt over the NDP government’s latest budget is not nearly as critical for the government as the fermenting furor over Clayoquot Sound” (Baldrey, April 23, 1993). The decision to allow logging in 74% of the Clayoquot Sound area was a much more sensitive issue for a party that liked to wrap itself in a dark shade of green. The Clayoquot Sound decision enraged the NDP’s own supporters. Several people who held positions in the party publicly split with the NDP and quit those positions. The decision itself shocked even some NDP caucus members and government officials, who were stunned that so much of the Clayoquot would be thrown open to logging. Stephen Owen, head of the government’s Commission on Resources and Environment, waded into the fray with thinly veiled criticism of the decision and demanded that conflict-of-interest commissioner Ted Hughes be asked to look at the government’s purchase of MacMillan Bloedel shares before it made the Clayoquot decision. If the government had turned down the request, it risked damaging the Owen Commission’s credibility and further alienating itself from the environmental movement (ibid.). Doing so could have hurt the NDP in the long run for there were a number of environmental activists who were important election campaign organizers.
Liberal environment critic Paul Martin (Lasalle-Emard MP) stated on May 26, 93 (O’Neil, April 27, 1993), “The federal Liberal party will give Clayoquot Sound wilderness protection status if it wins this year’s election”. He went on to say that the Liberal government would launch negotiations with Victoria and the forest industry to determine compensation for lost logging rights. The report continues, stating that the Liberal party urged the federal and BC governments on April 8 to give Clayoquot wilderness protection status. There is support for park status based on the popularity and success of the Pacific Rim National Park, which is adjacent to the Clayoquot Sound region. Martin is quoted as saying, “One can justify the extension of the park obviously for the protection of the forest but also because of the tremendous success of the existing park” (ibid.).
Internationally, the response to the policy decision was not any more favourable. Groups like the European Rainforest Movement (ERM) encouraged an international boycott of wood products coming from Clayoquot Sound upon hearing the Clayoquot Land Use Decision announcement (Hamilton, May 11, 1993). A letter from ERM to the Ambassador Edward Lee in Vienna stated logging in Clayoquot Sound, an area containing rare and endangered species, violates the Biodiversity Convention which Canada supports (ibid.).
Locally, provincially, federally, and internationally, the response to the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was not favourable. The overwhelming majority of support for the decision was from the forest industry and the labour unions (productive interests). In fact, it was requested and suggested to government by a notable number of high profile government and non-productive interests to either modify the policy decision outright, or to allow CORE to be involved in the decision (CP, April 18, 1993). Mike Harcourt and the NDP party refused to consider such options, stating that the Clayoquot Land Use Decision would be “viewed as a paragon of balance between the interests of industry and those of the environment” (Seattle, May 1, 1993).
Looking at both the productive and non-productive interests, from when the decision was announced to today's impressions, one can propose the following: the non-productive interests, without question, were extremely unsatisfied with the policy decision. Whereas, the productive interests, overall, were satisfied with the policy decision. Simply looking at it from this perspective, one can assume that the winners in the outcome of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision are the productive interests, and the losers are the non-productive interests. The decision resulted in 74% of the Clayoquot Sound being open to logging, in spite of the pressure from the non-productive interests. Based on the literature review, and looking at both ‘sides’, one is able to state that the lack of participant resources (as detailed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2) on the part of the non-productive interests appears to have greatly impacted the policy outcome. In realizing this, one is made aware of the importance of certain required participant resources identified by both the pressure group theorists and the activists themselves. Had the non-productive interests been able to maintain alliances with the local First Nations (by providing financial and legal support), the policy outcome may have been more favourable to their interests. Perhaps if the non-productive interests were able to maintain more of a presence on both the Task Force and the Steering Committee, the policy outcome would have been more favourable. The non-productive interests (as was found in Section 6.5.1), however, are secondary to those of the productive interests in the policy process. As a result, their influence on the Task Force, the Steering Committee, and ultimately the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was limited.
6.5.4 Interview Results
The results of the media bytes, and the ‘sides’ portrayed in the above section, are reflected in the interview results. The interviews provided updated impressions and perceptions of the decision, and provided further clarity as to which ‘sides’ expectations and desires were most satisfied. Each interview involved four questions (Appendix: Interview Questions). The following section provides a summary of the results of the four completed interviews, progressing in the order of the questions given. A summary and conclusion of the results of the interviews will be used in the following final section of the research.
The Politician
The first interviewee was a senior politician (Independent) in Clayoquot Sound at the time the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was announced. He will be referred to throughout as the ‘politician’. The first question asked for the identification of the main participants in the policy process. The main participants according to the politician were: industry, NDP government, First Nations, and environmentalists.
The politician believes it was the lack of alliances that directed the progression of the policy process. The participants in the policy process could not come together to develop a community based policy. It was this lack of alliances that resulted in a politically motivated policy versus a community based policy. The politician believes there was a lack of an alliance between the First Nations (non-productive/productive interests) and environmentalists (non-productive interests) where one should have perhaps occurred. This was because of the distrust the First Nations have regarding the motives of the environmentalists. The politician believes that the stand taken by the non-productive interests regarding old-growth logging (preservation) alienated themselves from the First Nations, the local communities, and the labour sector in the Sound. This alienation resulted in alliances not being formed between these groups - a potentially powerful alliance. This lack of an alliance was believed to greatly hinder the progress of the environmentalists. In spite of the apparent polar interests of these two groups, one wonders if they could use each other in the form of an alliance - the same type of alliance seen in other resource issues in Canada - as a means to an end.
The second question focused on the necessary resources. In the interview process, each of the interviewees were asked the question which included the same brief list of examples each time for illustration purposes. The resources required in order for each of the participants to effectively partake in the policy process was not specifically listed in the interview with the politician. Instead, the politician simply stated that whatever resources were deemed necessary for full participation by the key players in the policy process should have been provided for. Without providing the necessary participant resources, the provincial government could not ensure a community based policy decision that reflected the interests of all the main participants. Instead, the participants with the necessary resources were effectively represented, providing a non-representative policy. Another risk to not providing the necessary resources was the threat of a policy decision being made externally, outside the communities impacted by it. The result, as had happened with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, would be the lack of endorsement and ownership by the communities involved.
When asked how the politician believed the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was made, he stated that the policy process was a process set up to fail. While he believes that the NDP government provided the forum for the consensus decision-making, this effort on the part of the government was deliberately deceiving. While providing the forum, the government was aware of the polarized views that were to be represented at the table. The provincial government, realizing the consensus process was unfamiliar and untested in BC’s forest policy process, was essentially “keeping the kids busy in the sandbox” while the politicians and bureaucrats worked on a politically motivated policy; the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
While unable to substantiate this perspective, one is able to speculate that there was a tremendous degree of distrust for the government’s conduct, as well as strong evidence of the feelings of futility on the part of the participants in the policy process. This senior politician, who served on various tables in the early 1990s in Clayoquot Sound regarding resource use in the area, can be said to be unsatisfied with the policy process. He posits that the Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision was politically motivated with little consideration for the “facts and figures”. He believes that the underlying factor in the policy decision was the treaty negotiations; the government was attempting to appease the First Nations, as well as the environmentalists. The politician credits the non-productive interests for raising the issue of the old-growth liquidation that was occurring in the Clayoquot Sound, but then followed by saying that these same groups went too far in their efforts. The non-productive interests wanted preservation instead of conservation, in spite of the fact that there were communities in the Sound that relied on the forests for their livelihood.
The Politician believes the First Nations benefited from the agreement indirectly, because of the agreement came the Interim Measures Agreement providing them with an increased role in the economic benefits of resource extraction in the Sound. The communities within the Sound benefited from the land use decision indirectly as well. The events following the announcement of the policy resulted in the small communities gaining notoriety, increasing the levels of tourism which continues today. According to the politician, the outcome of the policy satisfied some of the groups in question, including industry. The productive interests were believed to have gained by the policy simply because it involved “bailouts”. The politician believes that the logging companies operating in the Sound were generally satisfied with the policy. The implications of the policy provided compensation for the existing licenses, thus relieving these companies of what was seen as expensive, in some cases prohibitively so, logging options (Smyth, April 15, 1993). The only group involved that can be said to be entirely dissatisfied with the policy decision are the non-productive interests (environmentalists). The politician believes that because of the non-productive interests’ hard stance against any further industrial logging in the Sound, the government was unable to provide any level of satisfaction to them.
Interfor (International Forest Products)
This next interview involved a senior employee of one of the two main logging companies operating in Clayoquot Sound, International Forest Products (Interfor). Throughout this section this participant will be referred to as ‘Interfor’.
The main participants in the policy process, according to Interfor, were environmentalists, industry, local communities and community groups, labour unions (specifically IWA), the NDP government, the Social Credit, and the local First Nations. Interfor speculates that Bill Vander Zalm, of the Social Credit party, merits mention because Vander Zalm, in response to the environmental pressure in the late 1980s, visited a clearcut and burned area in Clayoquot Sound described as the “Black Hole” and was reported saying “this is a disgrace”. His description was thought by Interfor to lend credibility to the efforts of the non-productive interests and contributing to the provincial governments move to start land use planning in Clayoquot Sound.
Amongst the main participants there were alliances identified by Interfor as being part of the policy process. One such alliance was between the First Nations and environmentalists. He cited this alliance as being mutually beneficial for different objectives (First Nations for land claims and environmentalists for parks). Another alliance identified was one that included First Nations and environmentalists, but also the NDP government. Interfor believes that the provincial government was “more focused on ‘green’ decisions in the early 1990s than they are today”, thus, he believes, benefiting the environmentalists. A separate alliance identified was that between the IWA and the NDP government. Interfor believes that the forest companies “did not really exert all that much influence on the NDP in the early 1990s on [the issue of] Clayoquot Sound”.
The resources identified by Interfor as necessary for effective participation in the policy process reflected what was found in the literature review. Interfor believes that, in the specific incidence of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, the environmentalists’ resources were the ability to blockade (volunteers, connections to the grassroots), their access to money (source not stated), First Nations support (alliances), and friends in government (political support) enabling them to effectively participate in the policy process. The First Nations, he believes, had access to money (source not stated). The IWA had its membership and the influence on the NDP government as their necessary resources. Interfor does not provide any insight as to what the productive interests had to be effective participants in the policy process.
In addressing the forth question in the interview, Interfor presents his perspective in the form of a progression of events, beginning in the 1960s, to explain how the Clayoquot Decision was made. The 1960s witnessed the building of the first logging road through the Sound that allowed access to the west coast (previously accessible only by air or water). The logging road enabled recreationalists to access Long Beach for camping and hiking. This road also provided a route to remote areas on the coast desired by people seeking an ‘alternative’ lifestyle. In 1972, the Pacific Rim National Park was created, attracting more people to the Sound. With the addition of recreationalists and people seeking alternative lifestyles to the Sound, which had already been occupied by the various First Nations groups, combined with the logging activity, caused resource use conflicts to develop. These resource conflicts increased over the years until the late 1980s when pressure from the non-productive interests resulted in the provincial government having to address the land use issues. The provincial government imposed various decision-making processes specifically dealing with Clayoquot Sound (see Section 6.2) in an attempt to address the various land use conflicts. It was the failure of these decision-making processes that precipitated the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. However, as detailed by Interfor, the Sound already had a history of land use conflict prior to the 1993 policy decision.
MacMillan Bloedel
This interview involved a senior employee of the other main logging company operating in Clayoquot Sound, MacMillan Bloedel (MacBlo), Dennis Fitzgerald.
The main participants who influenced the policy outcome, according to Fitzgerald, were those who participated in the Task Force and the Steering Committee (Section 6.1). As participants, the First Nations fulfilled more of an ‘observer status’ because they felt that their participation potentially compromised their land claims and their negotiations with the provincial government. The environmentalists participated for a short while until they realized that the government was going to allow logging in the contentious areas in Clayoquot Sound throughout the processes.
Fitzgerald identified various alliances as being part of the policy process. The first alliance identified was between the First Nations and environmentalists. Fitzgerald stated that this alliance had been maintained since the Meares Island issue (detailed in Section 6.4). The alliance between First Nations and environmentalists is described as a “long-standing marriage of convenience”. They had certain common objectives. They also had certain fundamental differences. Depending on the situation, these differences would either be obscured (“shoved into the background”) or come to the fore. The First Nations were “shut out of the economy - forest industry”. They believe that this land belongs to them and are pursuing this in land claim negotiations. This was not always the case (First Nations were active participants in the forest industry right up to the early 1980s; they would fish, then when that was done they would work in the forest industry. As long as the jobs were there they could work. With the changes in the forest industry and less jobs, the ones who worked periodically did not have seniority and were the first to go.) First Nations were able to form a common cause with the environmentalists who wanted to stop logging, but their interests were contrary to one another. The First Nations objective was to enter the forest economy, whereas the environmentalists objectives were to hinder the industrial forest economy. There were conflicting interests, but they (First Nations and environmentalists) used each other. The First Nations shared the environmentalists disapproval of the logging practices. The First Nations wanted things done differently in the industry. However, the company of the two interests parted when it came to what each interest wanted for the land base. In the long term, these interests diverge, but in the short term they were able to find common ground.
Labour and the NDP government was another alliance identified by Fitzgerald. As well, industry, throughout the dispute, had made alliances with labour, as well as with the local communities (mostly Uclulet than Tofino - there has been a split in the two communities. The split in the two communities was the result of the main industry offices being moved out of Tofino to Uclulet. This resulted in Uclulet becoming the industry-based town, and Tofino the tourism-based town. This polarized the interests of the communities because each relies on opposite resource interests. Significant animosity has been created between the communities as a result; since the late 80s.).
Fitzgerald did not specifically identify the resources necessary for the effective participation in the policy process. He did state that the process itself was well-resourced externally by the provincial government. As a forerunner to the CORE process, it was much more extensive and intensive in comparison in regards to the amount of participant resources (‘resources’ includes access to scientific data, accurate geographical information, meeting locations, honorariums, etc.) allotted by the provincial government. Any resources deemed necessary were forthcoming. Fitzgerald believed that the participation of the environmentalists and First Nations were not deterred due to a lack of resources in the process because there were avenues provided by government to meet their needs.
Fitzgerald thought it important to recognize that, when detailing how the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was made, the decision was from the two very long processes before it, beginning in 1989 under Vander Zalm. Robert Prescot Allan and Jim Walker facilitated the Task Force group. This group was given the impossible task of reaching a consensus on a recommendation for Clayoquot. In the context of those times, there was simply no mood for the possibility for the parties involved in reaching an agreement (unanimity).
At the time, the processes were progressive initiatives by the government. These government initiatives were new in terms of being multi-stakeholder conflicts. Everyone approaches the negotiating table, they lay out their positions, then the facilitator must try to move these positions together as close as possible to build some sort of compromise that nobody is totally happy with, but hopefully nobody is totally unhappy with. “The decision couldn’t hold politically”. Logging on the interim of these processes is what killed the processes. The first third of the processes were spent trying to find the most contentious areas to set aside and the areas where logging could continue.
There was the “majority position” (Option 5) put forward that did not have tourism’s, mining’s, or First Nations’ (no position given) support. Mining would not support any protected areas because they felt that they could not agree to setting aside land that may have future development potential (they asserted that the economic costs - opportunity costs- had to be realized first). The remaining majority of participants did sign-off on the agreement. The agreement lacked support from what Fitzgerald referred to as the “critical groups” (First Nations and environmentalists).
With the overall results from the Task Force and the Steering Committee, Cabinet went away and made their decision. Fitzgerald believed that here was not much more conversation that went on between the time of the conclusion of that process, to when the facilitators filed their report, to the Cabinet decision.
Fitzgerald believed that the NDP always had their environmental wing and their labour wing. The government had to make a compromise between the two. The Cabinet decision went beyond the required protected area requirements. The process of the Task force resulted in further polarizing the main participants. The environmental position came further towards total protection; nothing should be logged. The final Cabinet decision was not viable as judged by the First Nations and environmental participants.
Fitzgerald further elaborated on the process and the events surrounding the release of the policy. He stated that overall industry appeared fairly satisfied with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, but environmentalists and First Nations did not. Fitzgerald believes that given where industry started out - their initial position at the negotiations (Task Force) - they had moved substantially in the accommodation of other interests. Industry had come to terms with the reality that there had to be compromise - whereas the environmentalists did not. When the policy came out, industry was already resigned to some form of compromise, whereas other participants were not. First Nations were in a special position; it was found that they were not consulted. They were primarily offended by the fact that they were not consulted.
According to Fitzgerald, “Industry certainly accepted [the decision] and supported it”. Industry came to the position over the course of several years to where the policy was found to be acceptable. However, this same position proposed several years before may not have been supported and accepted. What was considered acceptable changed over several years.
Premier
The final interview involved the then premier of the province, Mike Harcourt. Harcourt listed environmentalists, local commerce, community organizations, logging companies, unions, the various local communities, First Nations, Cabinet, NDP caucus, key ministries - forestry, environment, and Aboriginal Affairs as the main participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
The Premier lists only one alliance in the policy process; one that he describes as a dishonest one. The alliance between the environmentalists and First Nations was a dishonest one. The environmentalists were basically saying that they were on the First Nations side, but weren’t because the Nuu-Chah-Nulth wanted to log and be involved in the economic activities in the area. The environmentalists were misleading the First Nations; “It was a higher priority for them (environmentalists) to have the whole thing preserved than for the Aboriginal people to work their way out of poverty.” Harcourt did not believe that this was necessarily deliberate on the part of the environmentalists, “but they were not being up-front”. It was this alliance that Harcourt believed influenced the land use decision.
The resources necessary in order for the participants to effectively participate in the policy process were not directly listed by Harcourt. However, he does list the main participants whom he believe did have the necessary resources to effectively participate and the ones who did not. The companies and the unions had the necessary resources, and the Aboriginals as well to a certain extent (although they are talent and leadership thin with all the demands placed upon them). Harcourt believes that the individual citizens, and non-productive groups, lacked the necessary resources to effectively participate in the land use process.
Harcourt suggests some resources required by participants in the policy process. He believes there needs to be a well-informed process with good information available to all interests at the negotiation table. Harcourt suggests that there needs to be some compensation for travel and accommodation, and honorariums for the participants who do not have access to sufficient financial sources in order to participate.
Harcourt believes that the NDP was committed to taking a balanced approach to land use decisions, so those who wanted no logging, and those who wanted to over-log, would not be satisfied. With the release of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, 80-90 percent of the islands citizens accepted it. The policy was a compromise between the extremes; the policy was made on compromise.
Harcourt further elaborated on the policy process and the events surrounding the release of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. He states that there were extremists on both sides - environmentalists (particularly Rainforest Action Network, Friends of Clayoquot Sound, Greenpeace, and the Western Canadian Wilderness Committee) who wanted all of the Sound to be park, and pro-logging who wanted the status quo. However, the NDP made it clear that they were not going to preserve the entire Sound, nor were they going to allow the ‘old’ way of management to continue. A mistake by the provincial government was to have not consulted and/or done some interim measures with the Nuu-Chah-Nulth before hand.
Summary
The above interviews are summarized in the order of the questions given. The main participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision according to the participants interviewed consisted of: the logging companies (industry), the NDP government, First Nations, environmentalists, local community members and organizations, labour unions, local commerce, Cabinet, and the key ministries. Each of these have been mentioned by one or all of the interviewees. The participants listed above reflect those identified in Pross’ Community Policy Model. The participants lacking in the model are the local community members and organizations. These have not been identified in the model nor were they listed as participants in the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee (Section 6.1). However, the list of participants for the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force does list, as one of the categories of participants in the policy process, two residents of Tofino (Section 6.1).
The alliances between participants that may have influenced the policy decision, as identified by the interviewees, are: First Nations and environmentalists; First Nations, environmentalists, and the NDP government; industry and labour; industry and the local communities; and IWA (labour union) and the NDP government.
The absence of identified alliances between industry and the NDP government at the time of the CLUD is not curious; the NDP government’s alliances have historically been with labour and other ‘left’ interests. However, based on the literature on pressure group theory and the prevalence of alliances between productive groups and government, as well as with other productive interests, government typically aligns itself with corporate interests. However, had the provincial government been under Liberal government leadership, the apparent lack of an alliance may not have existed.
Judging by Interfor’s response, one is led to believe that the forest companies did not maintain any alliances. This would run counter to what was believed by the non-productive interests at the time the policy was released to the public. Specifically, in the video Fury in the Sound (Wine 1997), the non-productive interests assert that the productive interests exerted tremendous influence on, and maintained a strong alliance with, the provincial government throughout the policy process and the events following the announcement of the policy. There was the suggestion that the government bowed to the economic pressure applied by the productive interests and allowed logging in over 74% of the Sound (Baldrey, April 13, 1993). This same pressure by the productive interest was said to have been applied to allow the RCMP to arrest a perceived ‘ring leader’ who was not breaking the law at the Kennedy Road protests in the summer of 1993. It was also this pressure that was believed to be applied to the provincial court to alter the charges against the protesters at the “mass arrests” (standing in the middle of a logging road in an attempt to stop the logging trucks from accessing the Sound) from civil to criminal, resulting in the incarceration of protesters, some for more than four months. This perceived alliance between the productive interests and the provincial government did not exist according to Interfor.
Interfor’s perception of alliances also runs counter to what was described in Section 6.5.3, and what is illustrated in Pross’ Policy Community Model. The productive interests are shown to have closer alliances with both the Government and the Bureaucracy Communities compared with the non-productive interests.
The majority of the interviewees (excluding the politician) identified an alliance between the First Nations and environmentalists in the policy process. Fitzgerald describes this alliance as “one of convenience”, and Harcourt descibes it as a “dishonest alliance”. Interfor supports Fitzgerald’s assertion. Each interviewee believes that in spite of these two groups having apparent contrary objectives, their temporary alliance was seen to serve both their goals effectively. The politician, however, believed that there lacked an alliance between these same two interests, thus compromising the influence each had on the policy process.
On the question of necessary resources, two of the interviewees choose to avoid listing specific resources (in spite of the researcher including with the question examples to establish the direction of the question). Instead they stated that whatever resources were required were provided or should have been provided. The other two interviewees provided conflicting views on the question of resource availability. Fitzgerald asserted that all interests (productive and non-productive) had access to all necessary resources to effectively participate in the policy process. However, Harcourt believed that only the productive interests (except not as much for First Nations) had the necessary resources. Harcourt believes that the non-productive interests lacked the necessary resources to effectively participate in the policy process.
The participant resources that were identified as necessary by the interviewees consisted of: the ability to blockade (volunteers; connections to the grassroots); money, alliances, political support, membership, access and influence; well-informed process; and good information. Each of these resources are included directly and indirectly in the survey list (Appendix: Survey). The actual resources listed by the interviewees are not contrary to the survey results, but what is contrary to the survey results is who the main participants were perceived as having these necessary resources. For example, one questions how the non-productive interests and First Nations are perceived by Interfor to have had all of the necessary resources in order to effectively participate in the policy process when one looks at the outcome of the policy (Section 6.5.3) and the history of forest policy development in the province (Section 6.4). Both groups have traditionally been on the periphery (as noted in Section 6.4). It was found in previous sections that neither group had the necessary resources in order to alter their status, nor that there was an alliance between them. In fact, it was only with the outcome of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision that the First Nations in the Sound found themselves as participants in forest policy, after the fact. However, throughout the process the productive interests were represented, which can also be seen in their level of satisfaction with the policy outcome. This cannot, however, be said of the non-productive interests.
Along with the resources identified as necessary by the interviewees was the mention about the lack of necessary resources to the participants (see Section 6.5.4 - Politician and Premier). The Politician stated that whatever resources deemed necessary for full participation by the key players in the policy process should be provided for by the government. In neglecting to do so, the government would be unable to provide a community based policy decision that reflected the interests of all of the main participants. Premier Harcourt also stated that in order to ensure all interests are represented and able to participate in the policy process, the necessary resources must be provided. Harcourt, however, stops short of suggesting that this responsibility should be the provincial governments.
The final question focuses on how the each of the interviewees perceive process by which the land use decision was made. In summary, the first interviewee perceived the policy decision as one that was set up to fail; it was one that was deliberately designed so that government could dictate how the policy was to be designed. The second interviewee perceived the policy decision as one that naturally progressed based on the history in Clayoquot Sound and the evolving land use issues. The third interviewee perceived the policy decision as one that evolved out of the efforts of the Task Force and the Steering Committee with interests and alliances evolving with these processes. The final interviewee describes the land use decision as one of design based on compromise between the various productive and non-productive expectations. The prevalence of the role of government in the development of the land use decision is noted in at least two of the interviewees responses. This point will be explored further in the following section.
The interview participants provided insight into the events surrounding the Clayoquot policy process. After much effort in inviting the views of the other main participant groups (First Nations, bureaucracy, and non-productive) with no response, the researcher was forced to rely on the extensive information provided by media sources during the period in question, as well as on the survey responses, for their input. The above section (Section 6.5.3), combined with this section provides the basis for the next and final section of analysis.
6.5.5 Analysis Using Pross’ Model
This next portion of the research will look at the case study in more detail using Pross’ Policy Community Model. This model was designed to show the players/actors involved in policy development or influence. It shows that policy communities include all actors who have an interest in a policy area, who share a common policy focus, and who help shape policy outcomes (Appendix: Models - Pross’).
The policy communities include various actors who have an interest in this particular policy area, they share a common policy focus, and all play a role in influencing and shaping the policy outcome. Each of the many actors involved in the case study have been listed, as well as, where possible, their role/position during the policy process. The next step in the policy analysis, using Pross’ model, was to look at how each of the policy communities interact.
The policy communities’ interactions are illustrated in Pross’ model. By detailing the interaction of the policy communities in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, this analysis was able to provide insight into how the interactions between each community influenced the policy decision. The following model analysis details each of the main communities, as well as some of the sub-communities where necessary. Some of the sub-communities list only those members mentioned in the information sources available. This list is not all inclusive; there may be other participants within the sub-communities that were not mentioned in the information sources.
It should be noted that an entire political community is rarely involved in a specific policy decision (Pross 1995, 264). The process leading up to the release of the land use decision, like other policy decisions, involved specific actors from various communities according to their specialization. The Bureaucracy Community (Bureaucracy) is the first community of focus in Pross’ model. The Bureaucracy involved the Lead Department Agency - Ministry of Forests (along with the supporting agencies: Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks & the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs). The Sponsoring Minister - Minister of Forests - served as the liaison between the Bureaucracy and the Government Community (Government).
Cabinet, which is tied to both the Government and the Bureaucracy, served in its official capacity regarding the land use decision (Cabinet’s purpose is to direct the business of Parliament, administer individual departments of government, pass Orders-In-Council, and formulate and discuss policy (Smith 1995, 391)). Cabinet’s role in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was to formulate the policy with the demise of the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee (Hoberg 1996, 277). Cabinet and the Sponsoring Minister served as the link between the Bureaucracy and Government.
Within the Government Community there was the provincial government sub-community consisting of members such as the Premier, the Attorney General and the Finance Minister. The local government is illustrated as being neither closer to the provincial government sub-community or the official opposition. This is because the views expressed indicated that the local government favoured neither the views of the Official Opposition nor those of the provincial government (detailed in Section 6.5.4). The Official Opposition sub-community is illustrated in the model apart from the provincial government due to its obvious function in the Government. The final sub-community within the Government is the Interested Individuals. This group is illustrated as a periphery group due to their limited influence on the process. Like other such groups in other processes, this periphery sub-community is not static in membership; the membership changes with the issue.
The third and final policy community to be detailed is the Interest Groups Community (IGC). Within the IGC is the Stakeholder Groups (productive) sub-community, Interested Groups (productive) sub-community, Interested Groups (non-productive) sub-community, and International Interested Groups (non-productive) sub-community. Each of these sub-communities are illustrated according to the role and influence they had on the policy process. The Stakeholder Groups are placed in the model closer to both the Bureaucracy and Government based on what was found in the research: 1) The literature review on pressure groups found that stakeholders generally enjoy better access to the policy makers due to their access to the necessary resources, as well as their economic role in the provincial economy; and 2) The research shows that the typical role of the stakeholder was evident in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, especially when one gauges their level of satisfaction in the policy decision compared with the non-productive Interested Groups in the IGC. Within the stakeholder group is the Tribal Council. The purpose in placing the First Nations within the stakeholder group labeled as productive is due to their claim on the land and resources through traditional territory. As well, the First Nations became ‘official’ productive interests with the completion of the Interim Measures Agreement.
The Interested Groups (productive) and Interested Individuals (productive) are shown in the model as attached, but separate from, the Stakeholder Groups. These three sub-communities are separate, but there is obvious overlap when one looks at the interests of one compared with the other. The stakeholder groups are supported by the productive interested groups for it was in the best interests of the productive interested groups to do so. Members within this sub-community rely on the stakeholder group for employment, therefore they support the stakeholder groups in the land use decision making process.
The non-productive Interested Groups, both Canadian and international, are illustrated as being further away from the Bureaucracy and Government. This reflects the events in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, supported by the results of the pressure group literature review. This sub-community was shown to generally lack the necessary resources to provide the stakeholder groups and interested groups (productive) with competition for the attention and consideration of the policy makers. As well, the non-producitve interests were shown in the research to generally lack the political alliances entertained by the productive interests. This was shown in the two processes leading up to the Clayoquot Land Use Decision; they lacked non-productive interested groups’ input (see Section 6.2). The land use decision did not reflect the expectations and desires of these two sub-communities, especially compared with the productive sub-communities. Pross’ model reflects the position of the non-productive Interested Groups’ position in the policy process.
Media is also illustrated in the policy model (as detailed in Section 5: Pross’ Policy Communities Model). It has been placed in two places to illustrate its prevalence throughout the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. The model illustrates that throughout the land use decision, no one group lacked the representation offered by the media. This is simply because the land use issues surrounding Clayoquot Sound during this period produced what may be referred to as a “media frenzy”. The media was utilized by all policy communities, and all policy communities were utilized by the media.
Pross’ model concludes the Clayoquot Land Use Decision case study. Before detailing the results of the research, the following section highlights the survey and questionnaire completed by numerous environmental activists from across the nation.